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INTRODUCTION
The theoretical perspective one adopts helps to construct and/or limit
possibilities about one's life— and this is even more true when, as typically
is the case, the perspective one adopts is shared by those others with whom
one habitually interacts. To some degree, then, an inadequate theoretical
perspective can sustain patterns of life that are incomplete. And this general
point about the connection between the theories we hold, the possibilities they
provide or inhibit, and the lives we live, applies with particular force to the
condition of women in contemporary society.
The vocabulary one adopts, in part, reflects the theoretical perspective
to which one is committed. This is true of the vocabularies in ordinary life
and the vocabularies of the social sciences. In contemporary society the
vocabulary typically applied to women assumes that she has a special need for
security, order, passive contentment. Woman is described as ". . . gentle,
loving, unaggressive, tender, modest, giving, patient, naive, simplistic,
irrational, instinctual, intuitive, home-centered. When drawn together
in a
^)ana Densmore, "Sex Roles and Female Oppression," (Boston: New England
Vroe Press n. d.
,
p. 5. Also Judith Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan, in
"Ambivalence: The Socialization of Women, " in Vivian Gornick and
Barbara
Moran eds. , Women in Sexi^ Basic Books, 1971),
list
^
the often quoted adjectives used to describe women: ". . . dependence,
passivity,
fragility, low pain tolerance, non-aggression, non-competitiveness,
inner
orientation, interpersonal orientation, empathy, sensitivity,
nurturance,
subjectivity, intuitiveness, yieldingness, receptivity, inability
to risk, emotional
liability, supportiveness. " (p. 147.)
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list, these terms seem superficial ^nd trivial; it hardly seems possible that
many actually hold the views about women which this vocabulary implies. But
indeed, I will argue, this vocabulary reflects a well articulated theoretical
perspective
—the theory of anomie as it was enunciated by Emile Durkheim.
And that while this perspective does express widely held views about the needs
and limits of women in contemporary society, it precludes the consideration of
human potentialities in women.
Other vocabularies are today sometimes applied to persons
—
perhaps
more often to men; and these other vocabularies too reflect different theoretical
orientations. Bypassing here those which reflect Hobbesian and Freudian
perspectives, I will juxtapose the theory of anomie to the theory of alienation.
My overriding purpose will be to ask how woman is viewed from within the confines
of each, and the consequence these conceptions have for conceiving of women as
persons . I will then present a set of considerations designed to show that the
alienation perspective is, on the whole, and on balance, the richer framework
for understanding women and for forging a response to their circumscribed
condition. Women need an ideology and the alienation perspective provides the
appropriate and correct starting point for that ideology.
My task is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that many contemporary
social scientists have tacitly converted what was classically a dispute of
consequence between well articulated theoretical perspectives dealing with
differential assessments about human capacities into a muddle of common views
called the "alienation-anomie" syndrome. Typically, the theories of Marx and
viii
Durkheim are stripped of the concerns which sharpened their theoretical debate
and the social scientists in question then adopt without argument, the more
conservative side of Durkheim's theory. Sometimes, indeed, they do this while
using the language of alienation. My decision to examine the theories of
Durkheim and Marx directly and comparatively flows from my view that this is
the best way to come to grips with the underlying issues of human potentiality
in complex, modern societies.
I will begin, then, with an examination of Durkheim's theory of the moral
order, drawing attention where pertinent, to the differences he sees between
the actual and possible life styles of men and women. I will then consider these
snme issues in the writings of Marx, exploring especially his theory of the
"species life."
Since the differences between Marx and Durkheim turn to some extent on
differences in the model of "person" development assumed, I devote the third
chapter to an examination of this difficult issue. How did Marx and Durkheim
seek to vindicate their models of development? How do contemporary social
scientists face these questions? How should we face them? I will discuss the
theory of human "needs" in this context, asking to what extent it provides an
adequate basis for judgments of this sort.
I will then apply the results of this exploration to the understanding of
women in contemporary society, arguing that though the anomie paradigm is
more generally applied to the condition of women, the alienation model is more
appropriate and fruitful. It reveals hidden sources of discontentment and anger;
ix
it exposes new prospects for growth and development; it renders its proponents
more conscious of the extent to which established vocabulary and theories
circumscribe the life of the contemporary woman.
CHAPTER I
EMILE DURKHEIM: PRIORITIES OF THE MORAL ORDER
Everything which is a source of solidarity
is moral, everything which forces man to take
account of other men is moral. . .
Emile Durkheim
Being a more instinctive creature than man,
woman has only to follow her instincts to
find calmness and peace.
Emile Durkheim
Durkheim' s conception of the individual and the relationship existing
between the individual and society is at the root of his theory of morality and
societal organization. The condition of the moral order, and of anomie, express
varied relationships which man can experience in society. The pivotal position
and significance of the moral order, anomie and conceptions of the individual,
in Durkheim' s theory may be clarified by a thorough explication of his views of
"man's 'needs'. " It is hoped, that through these discussions, one can begin to
construct a viable idea of a "preferred person" within Durkheim' s thought. The
ideal of a person expresses a sense of priority for the "moral" life. Later,
Marx's view of the person in "species life" will be examined in light of Durkheim's
treatment of the moral order.
Such an analysis of the individual in society, the moral order, Durkheim's
statements on needs, his conception of the moral person as well as his treatment
2of women, are all necessary if one is going to try to assess the theory of anomie
as a valid statement of societal problems and examine it as a theoretical
vehicle for understanding the person in contemporary society.
The "Individual and 'Society' "
With conceptions of the individual (most often referred to as views of human
nature) at the root of political theory, it seems most appropriate to begin with
an examination of Durkheim's picture of the individual. Not until one is clear
about his conceptual treatment of "man in 'society' " can one understand his
broader theory. Students of Durkheim have written that he maintains that the
individual is a "social being for whom the society of other persons is a necessary
and natural environment.""'' In support of this view, although somewhat refined,
Durkheim states in his Rules of Sociological Method :
It has not been proved at all that the tendency to gregariousness
has been an inherited instinct of the human species from its
beginnings. It is much more natural to consider it a product of
social life, which was slowly developed within us; for it is a fact
of observation that animals are or are not gregarious according
to whether their habits oblige them to live a common life or to
2
avoid it.
However, even this example may express a tension in Durkheim's thought
[since] gregariousness is often treated on some level as instinctual behavior
^ Harry Alpert. Emile Durkheim and His Sociology . (New York: Russell &
Russell Inc. , 1961), p. 137.
^Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method , ed. , George Catlin,
(New York: Free Press, 1938), p. 107.
3necessary to survival rather than as a socially learned phenomena. This tension
between the "natural" as opposed to the "sociological" reappears throughout
Durkheim's discussions of egoistic tendencies and the theory of anomie, as well
as his treatment of women. This is not to deny the major thrust of Durkheim's
perspective which is social as well as historical,"^ but to note a serious problem
at the base of his thought.
According to Durkheim, often times psychological states which are the
consequence of social phenomena are designated mistakenly as determining
social phenomena.
Thus a certain religious sentiment has been considered innate
in man, a certain minimum of sexual jealousy, filial piety,
paternal love, etc. And it is by these that religion, marriage,
and the family have been explained. ^
History has shown Durkheim believes, that these are not inherent in the essence
of tnan. The tendencies noted above may even be lacking altogether. "These
sentiments then, result from the collective organization and are not its basis. "^
And to the extent particular tendencies derive from the society ". . . his nature
6
does not remain constant throughout history; it is modified with societies.
"
' For instance, Durkheim's treatment of suicide is social and historical. He
notes the causes of suicide as particular to specific societal arrangements as well
as studies them historically in terms of the different stages of development in
society. See, Emile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951).
^
Ibid .
,
p. 107.
'^Ibid
.
^Emile Durkheim, The Division of Laboj^in^Societ;^, (New York: Free Press,
1933), p. 403.
4Durkheim's societal and historical view of man's essence encompasses
the idea of potentiality.
To say that innate characteristics are for the most part very
general, is to say that they are very malleable, very flexible,
since they can assume very different forms
. . . potentialities
constitute man.
However, the potential which Durkheim appears to be the most preoccupied with
is that of man's potential to become self-seeking, or egoistic. It is important to
discuss this dimension of Durkheim's thought because he is to be distinguished
here from the innate drive theory of Hobbes or Freud. But the distinction cannot
be as clear as one might like it to be. Sometimes he discusses egoistic drives as
societally initiated (e.g. , as a result of an unregulated economy) but other times
he treats them as though they are imiversal qualities regardless of time or place.
The discussion of egoistic inclinations in Durkheim is of key importance because
it reflects upon the larger problem of the relationship between man and society.
The individual is seen in this sphere as a bundle of passions in need of
constraining forces. "In neither the organic nor the psychological constitution of
man is anything to be found which sets a boundary to such propensities." The
specific egoistic tendency dealt with by Durkheim is greed, and this is discussed
in relation to the industrialized economic society. Curbs and controls are to be
set up because "human nature is substantially the same among all men in its
"^Emile Durkheim, Education and Sociology , (Glencoe Illinois: Free Press,
1965), p. 84.
^Emile Durkheim, "OnAnomie," in C. W. Mills, ed. , Images of M^,
(New York: George Braziller Inc. , 1960), p. 450.
essential qualities. It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits
necessary to our needs.
So far it has been stated that Durkheim conceives of man as primarily
social and historical and therefore flexible and changing; although man does have
egoistic tendencies. Basically when Durkheim speaks of "man's nature," he
says he means by this what man is essentially in society and not what he is in
terms of some inherent make-up. But I see a serious tension in the view that
man is social and historical which underlines Durkheim's theory, and his view
of the underlying constancy of man as egoistic and self-interested. Durkheim
constructs the view that order and constraint are necessary to social life from
this view of man as plagued by self-seeking tendencies. I feel uneasy, therefore,
with the privileged status extended the necessity of social constraint. The
necessity for constraint becomes a "constant" in Durkheim, as will be seen wherf
the ideal of the moral order is analyzed. One rather expects him to treat it as a
flexible need, which would be consistent with a social and historical framework.
There is a serious tension between saying that the individual unfolds and is
modified in society which implies a flexibility to man and on the other hand
assuming egoistic tendencies as a dominant characteristic of the individual,
almost devoid of social impact. The tension derives from whether man as
egoistic, viewed as a bundle of passions, is a social phenomena or whether it is
inherent in man's nature.
John Horton explains the relationship of the individual and society in
^Op. cit. , Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , p. 247.
6Durkheim's thought as homo duplex; "£art egoistic, anarchistic and self seeking,
£art moral in so far as he is regulated and constrained by society. "''"^ But this
neat distinction aids us little in finding out where the lines are to be drawn.
Durkheim's division, though murky, between the socially developed, and innate
characteristics, appears somewhat mechanical in relation to his statement of
social man. For example, Durkheim does discuss in his Professional Ethics
and Civic Morals innate characteristics of the individual. "It is unreasonable
and contrary to the character of manldnd that things should not be taken possession
of. "^^ Marshall Clinard writing on Durkheim states that "Durkheim considered
one of the innate desires of man to be ambition to achieve unattainable objectives."
On the other hand, often when Durkheim speaks of the problem of passion-
like or egoistic behavior, it is related to the economic sphere of society. In other
words, it is the society which stimulates and further develops the tendencies in
individuals for self-seeking. The problem of anomie which is directly tied to the
problem of endless desires and expandable tendencies is rooted in the economic
system for Durkheim. "The fact is that there (in the world of commerce and
industry) a state of disturbance and of anomie is constant, and so to speak normal."
^^John Horton, "The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Problem
in the Ideology of Sociology," British Journal of Sociology , 15 (1964), p. 290.
^-'-Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 131.
-^^Marshall Clinard, "The Theoretical Implications of Anomie and Deviant
Behavior, " in Marshall Clinard, ed. , Anomie and Deviant Behavior , (New York:
Free Press, 1964), p. 11.
^^Op. jcit., Durkheim in C. W. Mills, p. 458.
7In other terms self-seeking flourishes within certain economic systems.
Anthony Giddens in Capitalism and Modern Social Theory notes the blending of
emphasis in Durkheim while emphasizing his social and economic perspective.
It is true that Durkheim anchors egoistic needs in the biological
(i.e.
,
pre-social) structure of the individual organism; but he
nevertheless makes it clear that egoism is also in large part a
product of society—the impulse to self-advancement, for instance,
is as much a creation of modern society for Durkheim as it is
for Marx.
One is, therefore, left with three possible alternatives to the explanation
of egoism in Durkheim. At different points he seems to adopt each of the three.
(1) That the economic sector is a major element in the development of egoism;
that the endless passions and desires originate in the economic sector. Or, (2)
the individual is "egoistic" through some inherent quality which is allowed to run
loose because of the structure of industrialized society. (3) A third alternative
is that the individual has egoistic tendencies which are developed and prodded by
the economic system. I think that Durkheim' s position is a somewhat uneasy
mixture of (2) and (3).
In conclusion, the discussion about Durkheim's treatment of egoistic man
reflects, I thinly, the unresolved inconsistencies in his discussion. On the one
hand egoistic tendencies are an outgrowth of a social order without clearly defined
rules, as is stated in the theory of anomie. As a result individuals aim at
objectives for themselves which are unattainable and even when attained are still
unsatisfying. On the other hand it would be totally consistent with his stated views
Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory ; An Analysis of Marx,
Durkheim and Max Weber, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 225.
8(reflecting a social and historical perspective) if Durkheim saw anomie not as
a result of insufficient rules or the lack of their internalization (which posits
the individual needing constraint and order) but instead as an outcome of a
society which practiced and supported the wrong rules. Unless, that is, he
sees the crux of the problem of egoism as inherent to the internal structure of the
individual. Let me explain what I mean by the wrong rules.
Capitalism operates, Durkheim agrees, upon a set of rules; the rules of
laissez-faire individualism and competition. Presumably a capitalist society can
be stable; yet its guiding ethic leads to anomie
. The problem is not the absence
of rules to structure behavior, but rather that the organizing rules of behavior
(i.e., competition) may be a major cause, once internalized and accepted, of the
condition of anomie; of individual self-seeking.
If Durkheim focused his interpretation in this direction he would be led to a
theory which emphasized the necessity of changing the societal rules of operation
as opposed to trying to institute rules to limit the individual.
The point I wish to make is somewhat elusive but nevertheless important.
Durkheim slides away from a social and historical perspective at key points
(sometimes only to be noted in terms of the priorities he sets). In his treatment
of needs and the related theory of anomie, as will be shown, he does not carry
through with his own analysis. This is especially true in the case of his analysis
of women.
He has rooted his treatment of egoism partially in society, and to this
extent it is a "particular" phenomena, and partially (this varies in degree) in an
innate need theory which lends it "universal" status. But as the three possible
9explanations I construct show, the relation between the particular and universal
status is confused.
The language of egoism has been used as such not because I thinl< it lends
clarity to the issues at hand but because it appears in the literature of Durkheim.
The problem with the egoism-altruism distinction is that in a non-anomic social
order people cannot be captured either by the category of egoism or altruism.
The distinction is not helpful if one is trying to grasp the difficult relationships
between people in given social situations or as social beings who prize ties to
others. For".
. .
in the pursuit of most characteristically human goals it is
impossible to separate out a part that is the consulting of my own interest and a
15part that is devoted to the needs of others. " Social living will involve the broader
interdependency of reciprocating relationships.
In my social life I cannot but be involved in reciprocal relationships,
in which it may certainly be conceded that the price I have to pay for self-
seeking behavior is a loss of certain kinds of relationships. But if
I want to live a certain kind of life, with relationships of trust, friend-
ship, and cooperation with others, then my wanting their good and
my wanting my good are not two independent discriminable desires . . .
I have one desire to live in a certain way, which cannot be characterized
as a desire for my good rather than that of others.
For Durkheim, the "individual" is not an isolate, comprehensible outside of
the social ties which help to constitute his life. In a non-anomic social order, he is
neither fully egoistic nor altruistic; nor is he adequately understood as a mix of both.
He is a socialized being, motivated to follow the norms of his society because those
^•"^Alasdair Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics , (New York: MacMillan, 1966),
p. 186.
^^Alasdair Maclntyre, "Egoism and Altruism, " Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed.
,
Paul Edwards, (1967), p. 466.
10
norms have become part of him. But the individual, under certain social arrange-
ments, is capable of a narrow egoism—an egoism which makes him suffer at
the very time he ignores the needs of others. These themes emerge more clearly
in a consideration of anomie.
Problem of Anomie
Durkheim's theory of anomie is rooted in the view of the "passionate"
individual prodded by the economic system. Anomie reflects both the (1) relations
between the individual and the society as well as incorporates (2) the "need"
assessments which derive from his initial conceptions of man.
It is interesting to note that most of the discussion of anomie in Durkheim is
either directly tied to a discussion of the anomie division of labor or anomie
suicide. Anomie is then almost always defined as integral to one or the other of
these social phenomena. Anomie division of labor is a result of rapid economic
growth without the development of the necessary regulatory apparatus. When
the relations of the organs are not regulated they are in a state of anomy.
18
Production is unbridled and unregulated. Anomie suicide ". . . has to do
neither with too much integration, nor too little, but it is a result of the crises of
societies."-'-^ Anomie suicide differs from egoistic and altruistic suicide in its
^'^Qp. cit.
,
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , p. 368.
1
8
Ibid., p. 370.
19
Emile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 153.
11
"dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached to society, but on
20how it regulates them."
Anomie, often termed as lawlessness or rulelessness, derives not only
21
from the society. It often is the result of the individual failing to internalize
the rules which are to structure his life. Anomie operates as a two-pronged
concept, with man and his needs on the one side, and the organized society on
(be other. This is not to deny, but rather to emphasize the interrelationship between
man and his society; although this relationship is not always clear, nor constant.
Anomie is created in the economic sector where the customary limits and
22
boundaries are lacking because of the capitalist ethic of greed and gain."
"The state of rulelessness (dereglement) is further heightened by the fact that
human desires are less disciplined at the very moment when they would need a
23
stronger discipline. " Anomie is then tied to the conception of man needing
constraint as much as it is to the expansion and loosening of "customary" limits.
20
Robert Bierstedt, Emile Durkheim, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966),
p. 154.
21
Anomie as defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, as quoted in
the Division of Labor
,
originally applied to the disregard for divine law. Later it
came to mean lawlessness, or rulelessness. See o£. cit. , Emile Durkheim,
The Division of Labor in Society
, (p. ix). As a positivist Durkheim seems to ignore
the distinction between a law and a rule as indicative of quite different processes;
hence, anomie applies to both lawlessness and rulelessness.
^^Herbert McClosky and John Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy,"
American Sociological Review, 30 (February 1965), p. 15.
23
Op. cit., Durkheim in C. W. Mills, ed. , p. 456.
12
So, Durkheim, who saw economic expansion and development as furthering the
individual's bottomless abyss, concluded that "the entire morality of progress
and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomy."^^
Durkheim discusses varied social relationships as resulting in anomie.
The following construct allows one to organize most of Durkheim' s study of
anomie.
Anomie exists when the relation between a
.
and b
,
results in condition c
creating d with effect e on the
society and the individual.
In the above (a) could be: rapid economic growth, industrial revolution, unregulated
division of labor; (b) is a constant, it is the individual in need of constraint, an
individual with indefinitely expandable desires and the impossibility of satisfaction
without limits; (c) is: unclear boundaries, lack of order, lack of solidarity,
rulelessness, lack of social integration; (d) is: competitiveness, status seeking,
concentration on consumption, economic ethic of greed and gain; (e) is: the
disintegration of society, weak conscience collective, lawlessness. Hence, one
reading of the construct is:
Anomie exists when the relation between rapid economic growth
,
and man
,
results in condition of rulelessness
,
creating economic
greed and gain
,
with the effect of a weak conscience collective
,
on the society and the individual.
The entire set of relationships involves a causal flow and encompasses the theory
of anomie; "a" and "b" cause conditions "c," "d, " and "e."
Besides the objective social conditions and relationships above, anomie
involves whole sets of assumptions about the individual's needs. This conception
24
Op. cit.
,
Durkheim, Suicide, p. 247.
13
of the nature of the individual which is built upon his statement of needs and desires
necessitates a concern with constraining the individual. The three most basic
assumptions built into the theory of anomie therefore are: 1) man has endless
desires and will always be striving for what he does not already have, 2) the
individual cannot limit his desires himself, and 3) constraint and order are
necessary and therefore valued for the "happy" life.
Durkheim's assessment of needs and desires has serious implications for
what he sees as the necessary arrangements between man and society. If maa
was not viewed as having indefinitely expandable desires the social condition of
anomie would not be posed as a problem. The description of the objective
social conditions of a capitalist society are not sufficient for a theory of anomie.
Without Durkheim's view of the individual and his needs one might find some of
his descriptions of capitalist economy conducive to a partial discussion of alienation.
It is the opposing conceptual views of the individual which is one of the most
significant differences between Durkheim and Marx and their theories of anomie
and alienation. In other words, integral to the theory of anomie is the picture of
the individual developed by Durkheim as well as a description of the society.
Durkheim's ideas about needs are crucial to the theory of anomie as well
as to his view of the moral order. Hence, his statement on needs calls for
examination in terms of our later discussions.
Needs and the Theory of Anomie
It is first important to examine the language Durkheim uses to talk about
human needs. This does not mean that the problems which arise out of the
14
discussion of human needs are simply terminological. But before the conceptual
issues can be dealt with it is necessary to be clear how the language is used.
The problem with the discussion of "need" in Durkheim is that he often
appears to slide or jockey back and forth among the terms "need," "desire,"
"passion," and "appetite." He sometimes equates these terms, and this
equation lends support to the view of a rather irrational or non-rational being.
It also confuses distinctly individual processes.
In the Division of Labor
,
Durkheim distinguishes biological needs as non-
expandable, from other needs which he generally views as endlessly expanding.
"Everyone recognizes that the needs of the body are limited, and that,
consequently, physical pleasure cannot increase indefinitely." Quoting Rabier
from his Lecons de Philosophie
,
I, Durkheim writes: "Hunger is satisfied with
a determined quantity of food; reason cannot be satisfied with a determined
quantity of knowledge.
"
In Suicide, Durkheim also distinguishes between individual and animal needs
because man's needs are not dependent solely upon his body; "a wider margin is
left for the free combinations of the will."^'^ "A more awakened reflection
28
suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment."
' Op. cit.
,
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , p. 238.
^^Ibid
. ,
p. 479.
27
Op. cit.
,
Durkheim, Suicide, p. 247.
28
Ibid.
15
Once Durkheim leaves the ordered objective "need" realm of animal life we find
him using a vocabulary reflecting the notions of subjective irrational feeling—
"appetites," "desiring," "craving."
Durkheim indirectly defines need in the Division of Labor
.
As we go forward, however, work becomes a permanent occupation,
a habit, and indeed, if this habit is sufficiently strengthened,
a need.
Need then is largely defined in relation to what one has become accustomed to, or
socialized towards, but this does not grasp its meaning totally. Need is partly
what we have become accustomed to for Durkheim, but more than that. We could
be accustomed to beatings, but not need them in any sense. So a need must also
be a tendency or inclination toward some state which, if not fulfilled, leaves us
unsatisfied or frustrated. Hence, for Durkheim a need is something we aim at
and this is partly because of socialization (thus, we are accustomed to it) and
something we gain satisfaction from.
The development of habits (needs) and tastes appears as a social and historical
process. To appreciate new developments and goods one has to develop new
tastes and desires. The new tastes and habits develop as a process of socializa-
30
tion. If one infers from the earlier statement that needs partially derive from
socialized patterns one can conclude from the above that needs also will develop
in relation to new goods. In other words one can construct from Durkheim's
loose discussion of needs, desires, and habits, that new goods will further stimulate
29
Op. cit.
,
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 394.
30Ibid., p. 240.
16
new needs in an ongoing process.
Then, truly as the conditions of life are changed, the standard
according to which needs were regulated can no lons:er remain
the same; for it varies with social resources
. . .
Social resources reflect the level of material development in the society. It is
important to note that thus far the discussion of need, tastes, and habits is
largely linked to the realm of material goods. However, Durkheim does not seem
to be self-conscious of this and although he links these desires with societal
forces (to a degree), he also grants them at points a universal status.
In Suicide Durkheim more fully discusses his conception of need, as desire,
or passion, or feeling.
It is not human nature which can assign the variable limits
necessary to our needs . They are thus unlimited so far as
they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any
external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in
itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss.
"Wants," "needs," and "passions" are used loosely and interchangeably by
Durkheim. "Thus the more one has the more one wants, since satisfaction
OA
received only stimulates instead of filling needs . " He continues to say that,
".
. . the passions first must be limited. Only then can they be harmonized with
35
the faculties and satisfied."
31pQj. systematic analysis of needs as social and historical within the
economic sector one must move to Marx.
Op. cit.
,
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p. 253.
33Ibid., p. 247.
^^Ibid., p. 248.
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The above quote on "passions" echoes his statement on "needs." "No living
being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are sufficiently proportional
3 6to his means.
"
If you want to be happy you must limit your aspirations,
since Durkheim presumes a shortage of means. To be happy you must learn to
need what you can have. "^"^
In Saint Simon and Socialism, Durkheim continues his equation of need
and appetite.
... a need or appetite in a living being can be explained only
if it secures some satisfaction for the being who experiences
it. But an appetite that nothing can appease can never be
satisfied.
From this loose use of the terms "need," "desire," and "appetite," it
seems plausible to infer from the statement: "no matter how one acts, desires
have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual possessions are partly the
39
criterion of those aspired to, " that desires are terminologically interchanged
with "needs." Hence, "needs" are seen as expanded by habitual expectation of
objects in relation to resources and actual possessions. Durkheim further
•"^^'
ibid
.
,
p. 246.
.37,
It is apparent that needs have to be sufficiently proportioned to means,
rather than means being proportioned to individual needs, because the means,
as part of the social structure, act as a limiting constraint for Durkheim.
The individual need structure is a limitless abyss.
^^Emile Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon, (Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958),
p. 197.
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supports this view when he states thfit superfluity extends "needs" indefinitely.
"The less one possesses the less he is inclined to extend endlessly the range of
his wants.
"^"^
As stated previously, I think that much of the discussion pertaining to needs
in Durkheim (as presented so far) presents needs as largely tied to materialistic
concerns. And it is these needs for acquisition that are endlessly manipulable.
Durkheim's position is that needs which are stimulated endlessly by the
economic system must be controlled because the individual by himself is incapable
of limiting his "passions." His muddled treatment of needs leads to his general-
izing about all needs as endless, requiring external regulation. This necessity
of controlling the individual is at the root of Durkheim's dualistic conception of
the individual and society. Society is in a transcendental relation to man.
Society can be interpreted transcendentally and extrinsically as
an entity different from and morally superior to individual men;
or it can be interpreted immanently as the extension of men,
the indwelling of men.
In trying to assess Durkheim's treatment of needs it seems to me that one
must examine the relationship he posits between man and society in terms of the
way his needs are defined and developed. Although Durkheim often poses the
dualistic view of man and society he does not appear to conceive of a societal
"interest," in opposition to the individual's needs, and this seems to be the
40lbid.
41
02._crt., Durkheim in C. W. Mills, ed.
,
p. 456.
^^Op. cit. , John Horton, p. 289.
source of further trouble. I agree with the position that needs are defined
societally. But this seems incomplete in and of itself. Societies have their
own priorities and "interests" and these may be, and often are in conflict with
individual's needs. It is in society's interest to restrain man's needs to the
established order. In other words, needs are limited by the established order,
by those with interests in already existing arrangements. Then, it seems to me
that needs, to the extent they are developed through a social framework are
structured by the "established interests" in a given society, and are not endlessly
ex]oandable. Their expandability rests upon two elements. The first, as already
mentioned, is that materialistic needs expand in relation to the interests of the
ruling elements in society, and it is not in their interests to stimulate endless needs
because severe discontent would most likely result. Secondly, needs can be
expanded only as far as social resources exist to stimulate them.
An unlimited desire suggests material desires. It is beyond the reasonable
purview of human behavior. It is a desire which no amount of 'x' can satisfy.
The idea of an unlimited desire, —"as much 'x' as one can get"—as boundless desire,
is inadequate to the extent that individuals live in society and are products of
the confines and limitations of those systems. Besides, to the extent man is
rational there are bounds to his needs, and desires.
Desires are limited by the forces of everyday life. The point is not that
individuals do not have aspirations, but that they do not have endless desires,
needs, wants. However, their inevitable expansion is at the crux of Durkheim's
theoretical framework.
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It is possibly necessary here for Durkheim to distinguish between an
unlimited number of desires and desires with unlimited objects.
To the extent that men are rooted in actual social arrangements, their
aspirations and desires have focal points. To conceive of man's need structure
as a bottomless abyss is to view him in a vacuum, with no points of contact
with reality. The tension one finds in Durkheim is that much of his social theory
is based on the position that man's needs are forever expandable and therefore
constraint must be exercised to create some level of moral order. The ironic
dimension of Durkheim is that he partially ties man's endless desires to societal
forces acting upon him but he also partially treats needs in terms of the egoistic
natural tendencies of man.
Because of the tension within his own thought he seems to exclude the role of
social forces acting in terms of privileged interests. Such concerns are excluded
by his very definition of needs. He, therefore, cannot view the fact, that it is
not in the interests of the ruling elements to develop needs without any sense of
limitation to them, as valid. He would then see that the endless development of
needs could only breed widespread discontent and the possibilities of social
unrest for those in power. This would be contrary to the purposes of those with
vested interests in existing arrangements.
And besides, interestingly enough, Durldieim expresses himself that most
men live according to their established means. Most adjust "successfully" to
existing society,
It will be said that it is not always sufficient to make men
content, that there are some men whose desires go beyond
21
their faculties. This is true, these are exceptionni nnr^, one
may say, morbid cases. Normally, man finds happiness in
realizing his nature; his needs are in relation to his means.
If man's desires are extended beyond his means only infrequently, why does Durkheim
construct a sociological theory which posits that most men are desirous of
more than they have? and construct a moral theory on the necessity for solidarity
and constraint? He draws at times universal tendencies from a condition which
is specific by his own definition to certain social and economic conditions. The
universal tendencies appear to derive from his initial conception of man.
Another major conceptual difficulty in the treatment of "needs," which the
terminological interchanges between desire, need, habit, etc., are only symptomatic
of, is that Durkheim at no point makes a clear distinction between real or false
needs. For instance, if he made this distinction between real and false needs, he
might have seen that false needs were most often related to his discussions of
materialistic desires, i.e. , endless abysses and infatuations. But as it is,
Durkheim only hints at this faintly. "There is, then a normal intensity of all our
needs, intellectual, moral, as well as physical, which cannot be exaggerated."'^'^
In Saint Simon and Socialism
,
Durkheim hints at a distinction between real and
false need, or possibly, need and want, but he states clearly that a need is never
without cause which negates the differentiation.
To be sure, we can be certain in advance that the remedies are
not precisely those sought by the systems, just as the drink
43
Op. cit.
,
Durkheim, Division of Labor
,
p. 376.
"^^Ibid., p. 240.
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demanded by a feverish patient is not necessarily what he
needs. Still, the needs that he does feel do not cease to
serve as some R-uide to treatment
. They are never without
cause, and sometimes it is best to satisfy them."^
Durkheim does not assess needs as definitively false and therefore harmful as
a guide to treatment.
In order for one to uncover the conception of "person" which operates in
Durkheim and to state which are the most valued needs of man, one must become
involved in a discussion of the moral life. So far the discussion of needs has
been largely tied to materialistic concerns and to a lesser extent to man's egoistic
tendencies. And hence, these needs are viewed as boundless. The moral order,
derives from the concern that boundaries must be set to limit human needs. The
derivative needs of order, constraint, solidarity, all contribute to the life of
morality. These are termed derivative needs because they flow from the initial
conception of man
,
which is a blend of "natural" and social phenomena, held by
Durkheim.
The Moral Order as Resolution
The moral life creates the happy life for Durkheim. Life is seen as
perpetual unhappiness unless the proper controls are developed and internalized.
His ultimate commitment is to the happy life which reaches fruition through the
mora] order.
Let us first quickly examine what Durkheim means by happiness, because
of the direct relationship it has to the moral life.
45
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According to Joseph Neyer^^ Durkheim perceived the uniqueness of the
quality of unhappiness that is associated with freedom. "For men to be contented
with their lot what is needed is not that they have more or less but that they be
convinced they have no right to more. "47 Durkheim associated happiness with
order and controlled relations. That is why anomie was conceived as a state of
normlessness. "No living being can be happy or even exist unless his needs are
sufficiently proportioned to his means. "^^
To be sure, once these needs are excited they cannot be suspended
without pam But our happiness is no greater because they
are excited.
Happiness coincides with a healthy state, and both happiness and the healthy
state are equated with the "mean" activity. It is not a function of more or less
pleasures (material goods, etc.) but a function of satisfaction that one has no right
to more.
It appears fairly certain that happiness is something besides
a sum of pleasures. It is a general and constant state
accompanying the regular activity of all our organic and
psychical functions.
46Joseph Neyer, "Individualism and Socialism in Durkheim," in Kurt Wolff,
ed.
,
Es^aj^s on Sociology and Philosophy by Emile Durkheim
, et al, (New York-
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 58.
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Op._cit., Durkheim, Socialism and Saint Simon^ p. 200.
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Pleasure is seen as momentary in distinction from happiness which is a more
sustained condition. Therefore, happiness can be maintained over time with
the proper organization of society.
A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not always legally
formulated, which fixes with relative precision the maximum
degree of ease of living to which each social class may legitimately
aspire.
The class division of society is then a functional arrangement for Durkheim.
Individuals in the middle and lower classes become bounded by the social
circumstances which engulfs them.
This relative limitation and the moderation it involves makes men
contented with their lot while stimulating them moderately to
improve it; and this average contentment causes the feeling of
calm, active happiness, the pleasure in existing and living which
characterizes health for societies as well as tor individuals.^^
A society organized around the priorities of happiness will therefore control for
"insatiable" desires. Stability and order become the privileged concerns in
Durkheim 's thought, as opposed to commitments to freedom and the development
of human capacities, as in Karl Marx. This may be tied somewhat to Durkheim's
belief that there is a significant difference in individual's capacities for growth.
This is not so for Marx. But primarily, it is within the context of man's
rulelessness, that rules become fundamental to "human happiness."
The problem of ordered, solidary relationships is best expressed in
51
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Durkheim's Division of Labor. ^3 it is here that the connections between happiness,
needs, and the moral order are established.
According to Durkheim the division of labor develops as the segmental
structure disappears as mechanical solidarity is transformed to organic
solidarity.
The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and
density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner
in the course of social development, it is because societies
become regularly denser and generally more voluminous. 55
In the past, mechanical solidarity was responsible for the moral order. The
<;ohesiveness of society derives from the collective similarity within its parts.
The homogeneity of society is the source of its solidarity, and therefore its
morality. As society changes through history it begins to differentiate and
^jpecialize. Durkheim sought an explanation for the "needed" cohesiveness which
56
^vas lacking. It is to this end that his discussion of organic solidarity is directed.
^^The abnormal functions of the division of labor are examined as well. The
E^bnormal forms are noted as, 1) forced division of labor; when the occupational
clistribution does not follow the distribution of talent, 2) when the functional activity
(|f each worker is insufficient, and, 3) the anomic division of labor. It is interest-
ing to note that these forms of abnormal division of labor parallel closely the
cjescription of the division of labor as stated by Marx. See_op. cit
. ,
Durkheim, The
]!)ivi sion of Labor in Society , Book Three, Chapters 1, 2, and 3.
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For this discussion see Joachim Israel, Alienation from Marx to Modern
^jOciology, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971), as well as op. cit. , Durkheim,
]^he Division of Labor in Society .
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In organic solidarity relations between individuals do not derive from
similarity but from social differentiation of function. Solidary relations form
a result of the way different functions complement each other. ^'^ As society
moves from its segmental stage the division of labor serves to integrate
society through fulfilling the role of the common conscience, lending solidarity
through the interdependence of function it perpetuates, and creates a moral
order by developing a dependency between the individual and society.
It makes individuals solidary.
. . not only because it limits the
activity of each, but also because it increases it. It adds to
the unity of the organism, solely through adding to its life. At
least, in its normal state, it does not produce one of these
effects without the other.
The division of labor increases the individual's activity and in this way creates
a fuller unity.
But if the division of labor produces solidarity it is not only
because it makes each individual an exchangist as the
economists say; it is because it creates among men an
entire system of rights and duties which \\vtk them together
in a desirable way.
Tliis system devises an orderly regularized structure to operate within. Then,
the "division of labor unites at the same time that it opposes; it makes the
60
activities it differentiates converge; it brings together those it separates."
'^'^The equation of the individual and the "function" that the individual performs
results from Durkheim's priorities with the performance of tasks necessary to
the development of the moral order.
'"^^Op cit.
,
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 395.
59
Ibid
., p. 406.
^^Ibid., p. 276.
The social solidarity created is at the foundation of the moral order. "Social
solidarity is a completely moral phenomenon
.
.
.
"^^ And since the
"divisions of labor becomes the chief source of social solidarity, it becomes
at the same time the foundation of the moral order. "^^ Durkheim's key
statement is this:
Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything
which forces man to take account of other men is moral,
everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through
something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and
morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong. ^"^
Morality for Durkheim appears as a "system of rules of conduct. "^"^
And the primary characteristic of these rules of conduct is that they enunciate
the fundamental conditions of social solidarity. Solidarity, and morality involve
order and harmony. Order is established through relations of authority.
"Authority in its relation to man, not only buttresses moral life; it is moral
life."^'^
^hbid
., p. 64.
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^^Ibid.
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Rob Nisbet, Emile Durkheim, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
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Involved in Durkheim's conception of the moral life is his view of an
ideal of a person. The concerns with authority, order and calm remain.
Although it is important to note that both Durkheim's and Marx's
discussions of morality and species being, respectively, are at the heart of
their models of persons, it is interesting to view a fundamental difference in
the way these conceptions relate to the authors ideas on "persons." Durkheim's
conception of morality is much more closely tied to his discussion of needs
than is Marx's conception of species being. The moral order is organized to
meet human needs, and in this sense derives from them, whereas species being
reflects upon the potentialities of the individual as opposed to the manifested
needs of the human being. The moral order is derived from the human needs
of solidarity, interdependence, order and control. The emphasis here is not
on potentiality as will become evident. The discussion of morality is more
attuned to concerns of human happiness than human development.
Durkheim and Marx agree that man is a social being. "And indeed, man
is man only because he lives in society. Take away from man all that has a
social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other animals. "^^
However, they view the relationship between individuals and the individual and
society differently. It is the nature of this relationship which reflects the meaning
of morality in Durkheim. It is, therefore, important to clarify the way persons
are related to one another and to society in his thought.
Op. cit.
,
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Durkheim sees man in a dependent relationship to society.
Because the individual is not sufficient unto himself, it is from
society that he receives everything necessary to him, as it is
for society that he works. Thus is formed a very strong-
sentiment of the state of dependence in which he finds himself.
So one estimates oneself as a part of a whole ... as an "organ of an organism.
Durldieim does peripherally mention a concern with individual's
"autonomy." "One cannot give oneself too completely to others without
abandoning oneself. "^^ And he states further that:
To be a person is to be an autonomous source of action. Man
acquires this quality only in so far as there is something in
him which is his alone and which individualizes him
. .
.
S9
However, he appears to give priority to the necessity for solidary relations.
• • •
the most complete relation which can exist between a thing
and a person is that which makes the former entirely dependent
upon the latter.
Durkheim believes that as society becomes extended and concentrated
the individual becomes freer to his own detriment. The common conscience
of the organic solidarity loses its hold. And it is in this way that the social
division of labor "lifts the collective yoke" off of the individual. However, the
division of labor does not isolate the individual because one relates to several
^"^Ibid
.
,
p. 228.
^^Ibid
.
p. 239.
Ibid
.
p. 403.
''^Ibid
.
p. 117, [The emphasis is my own. ]
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functions within any given procedure.
The division of labor, presumes that the worker, far from
being hemmed in by his task, does not lose sight of his
collaborators, that he acts upon them, and reacts to
them. ' -'
Durkheim does not see the division of labor as fostering an incompleteness in
the individual. He finds no tension between the regulation and the development
of the individual.
It is because this special structure allows society to enclose
the individual more tightly, holding him strongly attached to
his domestic environment and consequently, to traditions and
finally contributing to the limitation of his social horizon, it
also contributes to make it concrete and defined.
He does not view man as dissected by the division of labor. Specialization
and differentiation are the key to the solidarity necessary for the ordered life.
Why would there be more dignity in being complete and mediocre,
rather than in living a more specialized, but more intense life,
particularly if it is thus possible for us to find what we have lost
in this specialization, through our association with other beings
who have what we lack and who complete us?
Durkheim feels that specialization develops individuality and also is conducive
to a sense of completeness through social association and cohesion.
Harry Alport in discussing Durkheim's treatment of the individual,
focuses on the sacred element of the individual in the organic division of labor.
However, it rather seems as though the individual has not become more
Ibid
.
,
p. 372.
Ibid
. ,
p. 302.
Ibid
.
,
p. 403.
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important but that his function, as specialization, has. In the discussion of the
mechanical division of labor it is stated that each organ has its own
characteristics, yet, the more marked the individuality of the parts, the greater
is the unity of the organism. ^^Individuality here means specialization, not the
development of the uniqueness of the individual. It seems that when society
evolves from mechanical to organic solidarity functional specialization occurs,
and not the development of the potentiality of the person, as person.
In light of the above discussion it seems possible that autonomy is expressed
for Durkheim simply as the outgrowth of specialization. The relations which
derive from the differentiation of tasks create the controlled atmosphere necessary
to the moral order. If we try to distinguish between the autonomous and non-
autonomous person it would be that the former is able to limit his needs and desires
while the latter is driven to unachievable ends. One becomes autonomous in this
sense through a system of differentiation and specialization. Through such
networks one learns to function within boundaries. Such individuals, not driven
by inner compulsions, would be autonomous within Durkheim' s system and would
therefore be important to solidary and moral relations.
The key to Durkheim's belief that the division of labor creates unity is the
balance between the individual's dependency on society and his individuality
(specialization), his autonomy. The critical question becomes whether or not
tliis relationship between autonomy and dependency is balanced. Dependency
(through differentiation) appears to be an integral part of autonomy, for
74
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Durkheim, with all priorities given in the direction of the ordered, solid, moral
life.
In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, he states that "the human person
forms part of the physical and social mileu; he is bound up with it and his
autonomy can be only relative. Durkheim's statement on autonomy deals
with the difficult relationship of the individual in his society. However, one can
question whether he has captured the proper essence of the relationship. The
connection between man and society need not be conceived in terms of
dependence, but rather in terms of an exchange or reciprocating interaction.
Durkheim's conception of education constructs autonomous individuals as
those who relate to moral and solidary behavior. This appears to be in conflict
witli commitments toward human development. In Education and Sociology he
speaks of the necessity to educate children to accept their roles as they are
given. They must learn to accept the idea of circumscribed tasks and limited
horizons.
Society can survive only if there exists among its members a
sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and
reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the
beginning, the essential similarities that collective life
demands. ''"^
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The idea that one fulfills a determinate function is in conflict with a view which
focuses upon the potentialities of the individual, as we shall see.
The importance of solidarity, functional interdependence, and specializa-
tion create tensions when posed against the view of person as free and experiment-
ing. To the extent that morality for Durkheim is tied to the idea of solidarity
as created in the division of labor, his conception of morality may also be
exclusive of free and deliberative human beings. The necessity for constraint and
solidarity which derives from his conception of needs and desires exclude such
possibilities.
It has so far been posited that Durkheim' s concern with the moral life is
tied to his commitments to a solidary and ordered existence, rather than with
the development of potential capacities in persons. In other words morality is
important in that it circumscribes the individual and cements the society.
These are the priorities in distinction from how it could stimulate individual
growth and press for social change.
Durkheim then does have outlines of an ideal of a person which can be
derived from his discussion of the moral life, (including his treatment of
education and autonomy) which derives from the ideal of mechanical solidarity.
However, it appears that this discussion of morality derives largely from his
treatment of needs. And to the extent that it does it is difficult for it to
encompass the idea of human possibility.
If morality is defined by the human and societal needs of solidarity and
regularity, etc. , it is limited to those needs (as well as the conditions which
men
develop the needs) which have already been manifested. Hence, that which
tend towards, in terms of objects in a specific society, which is the partial
determination of a need for Durkheim, appear endless. Constructed from this
are the derivative needs necessitating order, control, and security. Because
the moral order basically reflects only these tendencies the perspective which
assesses society in terms of the moral order becomes extremely limited in
scope. Afterall needs are social and historical to a considerable extent for
Durkheim and this means they can only express tendencies within society as
opposed to the full range of human potentialities
.
Even if one views Durkheim' s treatment of egoistic desires as innate
tendencies (or as initially this) the narrowness of the moral order as a standard
for appraising societal arrangements still holds. For one still is working from
manifested drives or needs, as opposed to standards of development not fully
or necessarily manifested in felt needs.
Below is the construction of Durkheim' s morality as a set of relationships.
It expresses the closed circle which excludes a futuristic model of individual
development.
desires
needs
passions
solidarity
^ control
>/ >^
social man
(egoistic
strains)'
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If society develops or prods the desires for multiple acquisitions, of what
value is it to assess the individual in terms of the need to curb the desires?
Besides Durkheim's illicit shifting from society to individual (which has been
discussed in relation to the place of egoism in Durkheim's thought) the internal
structure of the question leads to a closed circle. Durkheim's conception of
"needing" man is at the foundation of the moral order and, therefore, defines it.
The moral order becomes the activity of the resolution of needs; for security,
order, and control.
Within Durkheim's framework the moral order does not deal with what men
could be outside of the ordered, stable, relation. This is not, however, to say
the moral order cannot be employed in a critical sense. Afterall, it is against
78the moral order as ideal that anomie is posed as a problem. But involved in
anomie as in the moral order, is the theory about man; that his needs are
bottomless, and therefore controls are necessary, and valued as "good." This
again shows on what level the critical eye is to operate. Both anomie and the
78The ideal society for Durkheim is the society bound by mechanical, as
opposed to organic solidarity. His Division of Labor deals with the problem of
the changing nature of order in that he wishes to organize society so that it will
approach his lost ideal. This position elaborates further my contention that
Durkheim's sense of ideal is limited to that which has already been established.
ARerall, mechanical solidarity is a historical phenomena. Durkheim's sense of
ideal, therefore, clearly is not Utopian in meaning. "But we shall attain this ideal
only after observing reality, and separating it from the ideal. But is it possible
to proceed otherwise? Even the most excessive idealists cannot proceed in any
other fashion; for the ideal rests on notliing if it does not keep its roots in reality."
See Emile Durkheim, op. cit. , The Division of Labor i_n Society
, (p. 34).
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moral order are too closely tied to the discussion of needs. Harrington Moore
calls Durkheim a critical conservative, his historical perspective alone saving
him from a complete acceptance of whatever is.''^^
In all of the discussion so far the terms man and individual have been used
interchangeably. This is because Durkheim has been speaking of men. Women
are excluded from his discussions of needs and the related theory of anomie.
The Sexes and the Moral Order
The process of the development of the moral order has historical
origins for Durkheim. He used the history of the conjugal society to show the
moral effect of the division of labor between man and woman. By this method
lie attempts to show how the division along sex lines provides solidarity for the
society. One has first to understand the way persons need one another in
Durkheim, which differs significantly from Marx. In both theories the "other"
person is crucial; but in different ways for different ends.
Precisely because man and woman are different, they seek each
other passionately
. . . only those differences which require
each other for their mutual function can have this quality. In
short man and woman isolated from each other are only different
parts of the same concrete universal which they reform when
they unite. In other words the sexual division of labour is the
source of conjugal solidarity
,
and that is why psychologists have
very justly seen in the separation of the sexes an event of
tremendous importance in the evolution of emotions.
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In discussing the differentiation between man and woman, Durkheim states that
historically there are fewer differences anatomically and, therefore, fewer
resulting differences in the division of labor. For example, he speaks of the
greater differentiation in brain sizes that has developed over time, believing
that man's brain size has enlarged to a greater degree than woman's.
Historically, the slighter differentiation between the sexes posed a problem for
Durkheim. "The state of marriage in societies where the two sexes are only
weakly differentiated, thus evinces conjugal solidarity which is itself very
8
1
weak." Through history, as differences become more stark, the solidary
relationship increases.
The union of two people has ceased to be ephemeral; it is no longer
an external contact, temporary and partial, but an intimate
association lasting, often even indissoluble during the whole life-
time of the two parties. 82
It is interesting to note here the shift from Durkheim' s earlier position that
historically, mechanical solidarity (which is the model that he works from) was
a)i outgrowth of homogeneous and like characteristics within society. In order for
Durkheim to construct moral relations between men and women he must find a
new source of solidarity, and this is so because of the differences he declares
exists between them. Therefore, he shifts on the question of women, and
discusses the lack of differentiation (historically) as problematic. Men and v/omen
were less capable of solidary relations when sexual differentiation was not as
^"^npid
.
,
p. 59.
82Ibid.
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significant. Durkheim specifically gpeaks of brain sizes here. He acknowledges
with discomfort that women are moving into literary and artistic fields. However,
he holds that "even in this sphere of action, woman carries out her own nature
and her role is very specialized, very different from that of man. "^^
For Durkheim there are significant differences between men and women
both in their existing orientations and their potential, for example, to experience
anomie. Women are seen largely in terms of their affective capabilities while
men are viewed more in terms of their intellectual capacities. Both, however,
as they are conceived by Durkheim are partial people. The relationship between
m;in and woman is solid because of this very incompleteness. Their differentia-
tion creates their dependency on the other. The paradigm case for Durkheim
of the moral life is the case of partial people, incomplete beings, finding their
completion outside of themselves. Instead of interdependence between complete
persons the relationship becomes one of dependence through deficiency. "It
suggests two beings mutually dependent because they are each incomplete, and
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translates this mutual dependence outwardly. " The question of whether two
complete persons would still "need" each other is never dealt with or even
questioned.
This division of labor is moral for Durkheim because the needs of order,
harmony and social solidarity are moral. This sexual division of labor, and
Durkheim extends this analysis to the social division of labor, is important because
GO
Ibid., p. 60.
84
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through it one individual is linked to another. "Only those differences which
require each other for their mutual fruition can have this quality. "85
Morality flows from partial persons fulfilling each other through ties of mutual
dependence.
Durkheim views marriage as an important institution for the maintenance
of the moral order. Its importance derives from the regulating effects it has
on man. However, it does not operate in the identical manner for women.
For women are regulated and controlled bv "natura." It is the man who
necessitates marriage by "needing" restraints placed upon his desires.
Marriage regulates the life of passion for men.
This is the function of marriage. It completely regulates the life
of passion, and monogamous marriage more strictly than any
other. For by forcing a man to attach himself forever to the
same woman it assigns a strictly definite object to the need for
love, and closes the horizons.
Durkheim does not conceive of women as passionate, although one expects her
to be conceived as such, as a result of her definition as an "affective" being.
Speaking generally, we now have the cause of that antagonism
of the sexes which prevents marriage favoring them equally:
their int|^ests are contrary, one needs restraint and the other
liberty.
Tlie woman has less need of marriage because she is constrained internally and
does )U)t, therefore, need the external controls of marriage.
8f
^Ibid
.
,
p. 56
^^Op. cit.
,
Durkheim, Suicide, p. 270.
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It is supposed to have been originated for the wife to protecther weakness against masculine caprice. Monogamy, especially
IS often represented as a sacrifice made by man of his
polygamous instincts, to raise and improve woman's conditionm marriage. Actually, whatever historical causes may have
made him accept this restriction, he benefits more by it The
liberty he thus renounces could only be a source of torment
to him. °o
men
Durkheim's discussion of women accepts stark differences between
and women and he understands the characteristics of women to be "inherent"
in her "nature.
"
He states in the Division of Labor
, that women live
significantly different existences from man. "Woman carries out her own nature,
and her role is very specialized, very different from that of man."^^ The
differences in the lives they live have left women largely separate from the
movement of civilization. He concludes that women are much less involved
in collective life than men.
Today among cultivated people the woman leads a completely
different existence from that of the man. One might say that the
two great functions of the psychic life are thus disassociated,
that one of the sexes takes care of the affective functions and
the other of intellectual functions. ^1
The above is a description of the way Durkheim views women as operating
88
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Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 60.
^"ibid., p. 247.
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Within society. Such an account does no more than describe existing situations.
Tt reflects the biases of the social system.
Any evaluation of what ought to be woman's position in society should
involve one in much more than mere description. However, Durkheim does
not distinguish between description (as explanation) and justification when
dealing with the question of women. He explains woman's condition at the
same time he justifies it because woman's position and the role she plays is
the inevitable conclusion of her initial design and biological nature for him.
The inequities and differences in life style which he describes as the woman's
fulfillment of her "nature" are used to collapse explanation and justification.
Durkheim considers the present arrangements to be natural aad therefore
justified.
Although Durkheim accepted the societal perspective and studied anomie
as a social phenomena in terms of his general theory he believes women are
by "nature" inherently constrained and ordered and, therefore, incapable of
endless desires. Women are excluded from the theory of anomie and its
ijiclusive statement of needs. The reason I do not say that women are free from,
and above anomie instead of incapable of it is because Durkheim' s initial view
of women is that she is abysmally simple minded. He has no higher ideals for
her development due to the fact that she is free of anomie. Her simplicity,
which spares her endless cravings, "spares" her also from a deliberative life.
Again we see, although in much more flagrant form the tension in Durkheim'
s
thought. This time it is the denial of a sociological perspective. It is ironic
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that a sociologist should deal with men's needs at least partially as a condition
of their social and economic surroundings, see that women by their social
sexual role are largely subject to quite different social and economic conditions,
and then conclude that the observed differences between men and women are due
to some inherent difference in the underlying permanent nature of women. By
his own description of women's lack of collective living she could not be open
to the same degree of socialization as men, in terms of needs and desires. Such
an exiolanation would be thought to logically flow from his own perspective.
Rather than viewing woman as ordered by social pressures from childhood on to
find a mate and marry, he chooses to view her condition as pre-social, necessary
to her essential make-up, a natural phenomena.
Nisbet has written of Durkheim that as a sociologist he rejected biologism.
He was negative toward analytical individualism, toward the idea
of progress, and toward~biologism, which means the tendency to
reduce social phenomena to biological phenomena, to exi^lain
social events in terms of individual, biologically founded motivation.
But clearly Durkheim reduces the explanation of women in society to biological
phenomena.
When one takes account of the strain in Durkheim's social theory which
emphasizes egoism as an inherent tendency
,
it is clear that Durkheim still
does not resign himself to egoistic behaArior. For Durkheim
,
the egoistic tendencies
of men, biologically rooted, are to be corrected and constrained by socialization
processes. But for women, the causal stream flows in another direction: A
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woman's biolog-y spares her anomie. but that very biology impedes her capacity
for development and individuality.
Women's sexual needs have less of a mental character because
generally speaking, her mental life is less developed. These
needs are more closely related to the needs of the organism,
following rather than leading them, and consequently find in'
them an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive creature
than man, woman has only to follow hor instincts to find
calmness and peace. ' '
The difference between men and women is this: Men are too complex and,
therefore, need constraint and rules. Women are so placid that they are
iDlu^rontly constrained. Durkheim has different theoretical methods for creating
peace and security for men and women. The starting points arc quite different
although the end results appear to be somewhat similar
. Women by "nature"
jiro ordered, while men are ordered by society, through marriage and the division
of labor.
In discussing women in relation to the incidence of suicide Durkheim
states:
. . .
her sensibility is rudimentary rather th;m highly developed.
As she lives outside of community existence more than man, she
is less penetrated by it; society is less necessary to her because
she is less impregnated with sociability. She has few needs
in this direction and satisfies them easily with a few devotional
practices and some animais to care for, the old unmarried
woman's lile is full. If she remains faithfully attached to
religious traditions and thus finds ready protection against suicide,
it is because these very simple social forms satisfy all her needs.
93Op. cit
. ,
Durkheim, Suicide, p. 272, [The emphasis is my own],
94
Ibid
. , p. 215, [The emphasis is my own].
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As for man, because he is viewed a. more complex and involved, to the degree
he is a social animal, "he can maintain his equilibrium only by finding more
points of support outside himself. "95 The moral order is established via
marriage and the division of labor (i, e.
, sexual and work) on the one hand and
by the natural serenity of women on the other hand.
From the above discussion one can conclude that Durkheim excludes women
from his social theory. 1) The conception of women's needs as "naturally"
limited excludes them from Durkheim's larger theoretical schema of endless
and manipulable desires. 2) His theory of anomie is rooted in a view of man
differentiated from the placid woman. 3) The view of a natural woman is in
clear contradiction with his earlier commitments, although fluctuating, to a social
and flexible individual.
However, the ultimate organization of the moral order requires the sex-ual
division of labor. Women is, therefore, necessary to the solidary relationsliip
formed through this division, and through marriage. Hence, woman remains a
part of the arrangements necessary to the moral life. Women are otherwise
excluded from Durkheim's theoretical formulations. She herself is not
theoretically constructed as an active force within the moral life. Her importance
is in its creation and its sustenance.
Men and women both are in the end assessed in terms of their relation to
the moral order. If man, or woman is to be seen in terms of their potential for
growth or creativity or human excellence, one will have to move outside of the
^^
Ibid
.
, p. 216.
framework Durkheim has constructed. The priorities are not organized
sv,ch within his moral order.
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CHAPTER II
KARL MARX: HUMAN POTENTIALITY IN THE THEORY OF ALIENATION
The various shaping of material life is of course in every
case dependent on the needs which are already developed
and both the production and the satisfaction of these needs
is an historical process.
-Karl Marx
From the character of this relationship follows how much
man as a sjoccics bcino;
,
as man, has come to be himself
and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman
is the most natural relation of human being to human being.
-Karl Marx
Having examined the pivotal position Durkheim's discussion of need plays
within the theory of anomie and the conception of the moral order I now want to
move to an analysis of Marx's competing ideolog-y about "Mensch"^ and society.
In i:)urkheim an unresolved tension was uncovered between his treatment of
universal needs, as tendencies in man, and their particularistic definition
For the purposes of this discussion the German word "Mensch'^ will be used
for Marx's use of the word "man." "Mensch" in its generic sense means human
being, either man or woman, although it docs have a masculine gender. Marx's
i(l(>as apply to both men and women in terms of his formulation of them and
MuM-cfore should be discussed whenever possible by a language which expresses
this concern. However, when the ideas which I am trying to exT>ress become
confusing as I try to write equally of men and women I revert back to male
dominated language. Hopefully, at least the root ideas may then be communicated.
Therefore, with the exception of the use of "Mensch" the structure of the male
dominated language remains the same.
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as molded in and through soeiety. As a result the moral order primarily becomes
the resolution of the needs for security, order and the controlled life.
Marx, however, is crucial to our analysis in that his treatment of the
individual is clearly a result of a social and historical perspective. This involves
Marx in a descriptive analysis of the individual (also through a theory of needs)
OS social, cultural and historical. He. however, does not limit his appraisal of
human development to the "needs" generated by existing society. But even
Marx's discussion of needs goes beyond the limited description of "Mensch" in
society. Through his model of species being he is able to express a differentiation
in the quality of needs. He is able to speak of real as opposed to manipulated
need; crude as opposed to human, need. The conception of species being not
only allows critical analysis, as we shall see, but it poses a model of human
possibility which I will discuss as human development.
It is important to note though that although species being functions
theoretically as an ideal, in some sense expressing human potentiality, and
therefore is not limited to social and historical phenomena, it is through
social and historical processes that species being develops to fruition.
When T pose the concern with potentiality as distinct from a social and historical
perspective this is not to deny the fact that human potential, for Marx, develops
in and through social and historical settings. Marx is not tied to and limited
by existing and pre-existing arrangements
.
Ilcnce, societal arrangements
and history do not set up the outer limits for his theoretical framework.
It is this dynamic relationship which Marx poses that I want to explore:
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1) "Mensch-^ as a "needing- animal; as a product of society and history, and
2) "Mensch" as a species being as a universal possibility resulting from
societal and historical change, expressing the potential capacities of human
development. This analytic distinction is not meant to dichotomize Marx's
thought, since the species being is not totally devoid of needs. More broadly
speaking, Marx's theoretical framework integrates descriptive analysis and
normative appraisals. For example, as will be shown, alienation is
descriptive of a series of relationships within the capitalist system, indicative
of society and history. But involved in the very description of alienation is
the appraisal that one is alienated from his species being, which is not indicated
by the society itself, but by Marx's conceptual framework.
"Mensch" as a needing animal is primarily limited to the view of how the
individual actually functions in the labor process, as a product of social and
historical forces. The individual becomes separated from his productive
capacities and other fellow human beings, and is described as such. "Mensch"
as a species animal reflects the theoretical conceptions of human possibility
;
the contrast model to alienating society.
The question I want to explore here is if Marx's treatment of needs is
relative to society and, therefore, plastic, how does Marx derive his radically
critical stance? The answer is uncovered in the examination of the relationship
between the concept of species being and the theory of alienation. As will be shown,
in order that the condition of alienation be described as such Marx must first
pose the condition of non-alienation (species life).
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I will elaborate upon the dimension of human possibility in Marx through
treating species being in terms of its specific import for deriving a model of
a person
.
There are only fragments of such an ideal because Marx himself
spoke seldomly on an individual level. His model was species life.
Theoretical Foundations of Alienation
One cannot begin to understand the theory of alienation without an under-
lying understanding of Marx's social and historical view of "Mensch. " These
positions are at the base of his theory and one's feelings about them as initial
assumptions reflect upon the acceptance or rejection of the theory of alienation.
"The theory of alienation is based on a certain theory of man; therefore the
Interpretations of the origin of alienation and of the way to overcome it depend
upon the theory of man from which they start. The theory of "Mensch" laying
the foundation of Marx's view of alienation is that the human being is social,
historical and laboring. "Mensch," society and history receive their dynamic
dimensions through Marx's theory of labor. The conceptual web which Marx
forms, as well as the interconnections which develop through "activity" between
the social, historical and laboring dimensions of "Mensch" makes it difficult to
analyze these elements separately.
Viewing the human being as an historical animal involves the idea of
Ivan Svitak, Man and His World — A Marxian View
,
(New York:
Delta, 1968), p. 123.
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"Mensch" as laborer because Marx saw "history as man's action and labor.
The individual labors in order to meet his needs and, hence, it is through
labor that he molds his "nature" to fulfill his needs.
-Man's needs are
historical and. the pursuit of their satisfaction is historical development."'^
The process of labor is social as well as historical. One individual by himself
cannot meet his needs, especially since one of the most important needs is for
other human beings. "Mensch" must cooperate with others to meet his physical
needs.
^
"Mensch" as laborer is the individual working in relation to others.
Therefore, labor is social activity and the laborer is social while he works
with others. In working socially "Mensch" controls nature by meeting and
developing new needs. It is in this sense that the laboring "Mensch" is
historical as well as social.
3 Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, eds.
,
Writings o£the Young Marx on
Philosophy and Society, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 21.
4
Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 73.
Marx's discussion of the "need for others" is differentiated from his other
treatments of need in that he appears to lend it a universal quality. There
are two meanings of the phrase "need for others" in Marx. As we shall see
later it derives from the model of species being and in this sense reflects
human potentiality and at the same time it reflects itself as a necessity
for survival.
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History involves the changing means of production^ organized around the
meeting of needs and the development of new needs. The human being's history
differs from that of animals because through one's labor one can alter one's
own "nature" (as needs).
History is not only the story of the satisfaction of human needs
but also the story of their emergence and development.
Whereas animal needs are constant and determined by nature,
man's needs are social and historical, i.e., determined in the
last resort by man himself.
Marx saw historical progress in the emancipation and growing control of
"Mensch" from and over nature. ^ At the same time, however, Marx's
philosophy of history has been said to be his theory of alienation. Marx's
theory of history understands the individual to master nature through labor
and at the same time the individual is mastered by external forces.
When Marx speaks of the human nature of "Mensch" he is speaking of
"Mensch" in society and as a part of history. It does not signify inherent
tendencies within the individual, devoid of social impact.
Marx was opposed to two positions: the unhistorical one that the
nature of man is a substance present from the very beginning of
history, and the relativistic position that man's nature has no
inherent quality whatsoever and is nothing but the reflex of social
conditions. ^
Alasdair Maclntyre, Marxism and Christianity
,
(New York: Schocken
Books, 1968), p. 62.
Op. cit.
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Shlomo Avineri, p. 79.
Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. , E . J. Hobsbawn,
(New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 13.
9Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual
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Marx's view of the human being as a social individual constructs the individual
as developing in and with society, as primarily a societal product. Secondly,
the phrase "'Mensch' as social" can also be understood to mean that "Mensch"
needs other "Menschen." The idea of social in Marx's writing signifies that
"Mensch" a) reflects his social environment, as well as b) needs others to
survive. But it is also prescriptive in that it reflects c) the need each has of
others for species life.
"Mensch" is to be conceived of in relation to society and not in isolation
from it.
Society docs not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of
connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves.
Man A is not a slave as such. He is a slave within society and
because of it.
If the individual is viewed as an integral part of the society in constant relation
to the forces within society, it eliminates an "a priori" conception of the essence
of "Mensch." Man "A" would not be viewed as a slave because of some
individual inadequacy but as a result of established social institutions which
allow and justify slavery. Within Marx's perspective one cannot construct in
abstraction a view of the individual without the appropriate discussion and
placement of the individual in society.
"'"^T. B. Bottomo ce , ed. , Karl Marx; Selected Writings i_n Sociology and Social
Philosophy
,
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 62.
11
Karl Marx, The Grundrisse
,
ed. , David McLellan, (New York:
Harper & Row, 1971), p. 76.
It is important, however, to note that the above discussion is not meant
to categorize Marx as a mere relativist, although some Marxist scholars
characterize him as such. 1stvan Meszaros states that Marx:
Denies that man is an essentially egoistic being, for he does
not accept such a thing as a fixed human nature (or, indeed,
a fixed anything). In Marx's view man is by nature neither'
egoistic nor altruistic. He is made, by his own activity, into
what he is at any given time. ^'^
The above is incomplete in that Marx does adopt a "fixed" standard, a standard
to discriminate between true and false consciousness and between the alienated
and fulfilled life. To the extent that Marx indicts existing arrangements he
cannot be a pure relativist.
Let us now examine the actual problem of alienation so that we can come
more clearly to see how the model of human development, expressed through
the idea of species being, operates in Marx's thought. It is the theory of
alienation which expresses the interrelationship between "Mensch" as a
historical being and "Mensch" as potentiality.
The Problem of Alienation
Alienation, then, is a social condition rooted in a series of relationships
which are ultimately assessed in terms of their relation to creative labor and
species life. It will eventually be shown that it is through creative labor that
species consciousness is realized.
12
1stvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin
Press, 1970), p. 148.
Before exploring the idea of species life, it is useful to have a broad
understanding of the problem itself. Alienation for Marx resides "in the
concrete relationship between man and his products. "^^ However, it is
important to see that Marx's discussion of alienation is not limited to the
worker, or the proletariat as a class. Although his treatment of alienation
is rooted in the worker's relation to his product, to the process of production,
to other "Menschen," and to his species being, these relations as well become
relations of private property, commodity production, and wage labor. These
relations of private property and commodity production involve more than the
worker. The capitalist is also directly involved.
First it has to be noted that everything which appears in
the worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement,
appears in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of
estrangement.
The discussion of alienation as presented by Istvan Meszaros is helpful in explain-
ing that both worker and employer are involved in the relations of alienation.
He has interpreted the theory of alienation as a condition arising from a set
of second order mediations. The second order mediations are private property,
13
Op. cit.
,
Avineri, p. 98.
14
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed.
,
D. Struik, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 119. According to
Avineri, 0£. cit. , the proletariat for Marx represents the paradigm case of
the human condition within capitalist society. George Lukacs in his History and
Chiss Consciousness
,
(London: Merlin Press, 1968), also states that the proletariat's
alienation is different in kind but that all human beings are alienated in modern
society. The worker's alienation is only more stark because there is no facade
of mental labor or responsibility. The difference is that the worker is faced
with the alien commodity, while the capitalist is not.
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the division of labor and exchange. These clearly affect both employer and
worker; they relate to private property through exchange.
Man's productive activity cannot bring him fulfillment because
the mstitutionalized second order mediations interpose
themselves between man and his activity, between man and
nature and between man and man.
In other words, "Mensch" is forced to relate to "Mensch" through exchange,
rather than labor, or through private property rather than nature. These
mediations "interpose themselves between man and his activity and prevent
him from finding fulfillment in his labor, in the exercise of his productive
(creative) abilities, and in the human appropriation of the products of his
1
6
activity." The theory of alienation extends from the division of labor and
the relationships created between "Mensch" in labor to his products to other
"Menschen" and his species being through to the second order of phenomena
resulting from these relationships. These second order relations or mediations,
build on private property and exchange.
The non-mediated, or non-alienated form of human relationship is
when "Mensch" is in a reciprocating triad with his labor and the forces of
"nature," as demonstrated below.
Mensch
15
Op. cit.
,
Meszaros, p. 83.
^%id
.
,
p. 78.
^'^Ibid., p. 104.
Labor
Nature
In the alienated form, the triad of "Mensch" controlling nature through one's
Mor is replaced by the relations of "Mensch, " property and labor, which
end in an antagonistic relationship between property and labor.
M-Mensch
P-Private Property and its
owner
L-Wage Labor and worker
AN-Alienated Nature
AI-Alienated Industry
In The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
, Marx discusses at length
the alienation of "Mensch" from his product and the process of production and
the consequences of this estrangement as the alienation of "Mensch" from
other "Menschen" and from his species being. More specifically, alienation is
seen m:
1) The relation of the worker to the product of labor as an alien
object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same
time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects
of nature, as an alien world economically opposed to him. 19
2) The relation of labor to the art of production within the
labor process. This relation is the relation of the worker
to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him.
. .
20
Ibid., p. 108.
19
Cp. cit., KarlMarx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 111.
Ibid.
The result of the above relations turns:
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3) Man's_s2cciesbeino-, both nature and his spiritual species
property, into a being alien to him, into a means to his
individual existence. It estranges from man his own body
as well as extremal nature and his spiritual essence, his
human being. '^^
And these relations culminate with the following consequence.
4) An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged
from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his
species being, is the estrangement of man from man. When
man confronts himself, he confronts the other manT^
In terms of the problem of alienation the estrangement from one's product
ofjabor becomes intertwined with the separation from the labor process, the
art of production itself.
1) This aspect of alienation reflects the laborer's side of commodity
production. The worker's life exists outside of him. He confronts his labor
as a stranger.
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only
that his labor becomes an object, an external existence,
but that it exists outside him independently as something
alien to him and that it becomes a power on its own confront-
ing him.
The more one produces, the more the world becomes filled with alien objects.
Instead of a worker with control over his productive capacities he becomes an
21
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22
Ibid.
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"Objectless" being. In present society ".
. . the creations of objects (objectifica-
tion, i.e.
,
production) instead of helping man to realize himself causes
alienation.
.
."24 The division of capitalist and worker creates the conditions
under which "Mensch" is not free to produce without making himself a slave.
. . .
the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomesindeed the most wretched of commodities; that the wretchedness
o the workers is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude
of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the
accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration
of monopoly in a more terrible form
. . . ending in society astwo classes
- the property owners and the propertyless workers. ^5
As the worker's work activity is mechanized his labor power also is translated
into a commodity26 because it becomes purchasable and salable and, therefore,
a pure element of exchange. Labor, as a commodity, becomes a clear
expression of alienation. "Labor power, therefore, is a commodity, neither
more nor less than sugar. The former is measured by the clock, the latter by
the scale. "28
In Capital Marx speaks of the conversion of products into commodities and
therefore the resulting conversion of men into producers of commodities.
24
O?'. cit,, Avineri, p. 102.
25
Op. cit.
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Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 184_4_. p. 106.
'Marx defines a commodity as an object outside the individual, as a thing
wliich satisfies human wants of some sort or another, in Capital, I, (New York:
International Publishers, 1967), p. 35.
27Op. cit.
,
Marx, Grundrisse, p. 59.
28Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital" in Marx-Engels Selected Works
,
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 79.
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Relations become commodity relations as opposed to human relations. The
exchange of products replaces the social interchange among persons. 29 The
fact that capitalism produces commodities is not what distinguishes it from
other modes of production, "but rather the fact that being a commodity is the
dominant and determining characteristic of its products, "30 is its distinctive
characteristic.
The products are no longer controlled by the worker, or recognized by
him as his. It is the separateness of the products, as opposed to the integral
relation of worker and product, which defines the worker's existence.
2) The second element in Marx' s discussion of alienation involves
the act of production, or the process of production. It involves the producting
activity itself. In terms of the actual activity of production it becomes
difficult not to treat the relationship between "Mensch" and his labor and the
process of production as integral to one another. It would be difficult to assess
alienation as rooted in the relation of worker to product without including the
process involved in the creation of the product. "The product is after all but
the summary of the activity of production. If then the product of labor is
alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of
activity, the activity of alienation. ""^"^
29
Op. cit.
,
Marx, Capital, I, p. 72.
30
Karl Marx, Capital
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III, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 879.
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The process of production is external to the worker in much the same way
that the product is external. The work process confronts the worker as pre-
established and autonomous. The worker then finds the work process "already
pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to
conform to its laws whether he likes it or not. "32
3) and 4) The effects of the above conditions result in the alienation of
"Mensch" from his species being^S and therefore "Mensch" is separated from
"Mensch.
"
The species life, then, must be the unalienated life , and the key to
understanding alienation is to grasp the ideal of species life to which it refers. 34
Species being involves the consciousness of oneself and one's species
relations. In other terms species being could be expressed as a collective self-
32Op. cit.
,
Lukacs, p. 89.
33Marx's use of species being can be traced back to Ludwig Feuerbach. For
Feuerbach the individual is incomplete without others. He spoke in The Essence
oj Christianity
,
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), of species being in terms
of the consciousness of oneself as a member of the species. "Consciousness
in the strictest sense is present only in a being to whom his species, his essential
nature, is an object of thought. The brute is indeed conscious of himself as an
individual—and he has accordingly the feeling of self as common centre of
successive sensations—but not as a species ..." (p.l.)
34
Adam Schaff sees species being as used in the four following ways within
Marx's thought: 1) Species being meaning social being, 2) as a being constituting
a specimen of the species, 3) as a being engaged in a conscious life activity,
and 4) as a being which corresponds to the model of man. See Adam Schaff,
Marxism and the Human Individual
,
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), p. 82.
I do not think that these are four separate or distinct meanings of species being.
They all are involved in the concept, but in an interrelated fashion. Conscious-
ness and social living are integrally related for Marx. His model of "Mensch"
as species being is related and combined with (1), (2), and (3).
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consciousness. This necessitates being aware that others share qualities with
you, and that these qualities cannot be shared by humans and animals but only
among human beings. HMensch'< experiences things completely his own which
he does not share with animal life. "Mensch" is a species being
(Gattungswesen) because "Mensch" is:
distinguished from animals not by "consciousness"as such, butby a particular kind of consciousness. Man is not only conscious
of himself as an individual; he is also conscious of himself as amember of the human species, and so he nppr-p].^n^.
, "humnn
essence" which is the same in himself and in other men.^^
Consciousness of one's species being involves awareness of oneself in relation
to others. A species being then is "... a being whose essence does not coincide
directly with its individuality. "^^ m the German Ideology Marx states that "the
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its
reality it is the ensemble (aggregate) of social relations. "^"^ "Mensch" is, hence,
tlie totality of his social connections and this involves not only the involvement
with others, but the consciousness of these connections. For Marx this would be
the consciousness of one's species ties. Consciousness becomes an integral part
of the interaction between persons because "... man's relation to himself only
becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to other men. "*^^
35
Op. cit., Marx, "On the Jewish Question, " in Bottomore, p. 13. [The
emphasis is my own.
]
36
Op. cit.
,
Meszaros, p. 81.
37Karl Marx, German Ideology
,
(New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 198.
38
Op. cit.
,
Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts o_f 1844
,
p. 116.
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Consciousness distinguishes
"Mensch" from anin>als and therefore
•Mensoh"
"apprehends a human essence which is the same in himself and
in other me„."39 ^he self-consciousness of the individual can be transformed
into the self-consciousness of "nature" within him, and this develops into awareness
of his species being.
But man knows himself, he is conscious of himself. Whereasm other beings, the natural instincts and energies manifest
themselves in isolation and unconsciously, they are unitedm man, he is aware of them
. .
.^^
A difficulty With the discussion of species consciousness in Marx is his
use of it to distinguish "Mensch" from animal. This is seen in a previous
quotation when he states that consciousness in and of itself does not distinguish
"Mensch" from "animal,
"
but it is species consciousness which does so. In some
"ideal" sense this distinction is valuable. However, in capitalist society where
species consciousness is most often replaced by an atomized individualistic
consciousness, what distinguishes man from animal? I do not think he means to
collapse the distinction between "Mensch" and animal in non-species relationships
(i.e.
,
capitalist society) but he does not construct a picture of societal life that
is apart from animal life involving conscious life experience, and yet not species
consciousness. I would think that consciousness would distinguish human and
animal life in all societies and that species consciousness is a possible distinction
3 9Og._cit., Marx, "On the Jewish Question, " in Bottomore, p. 13, footnote 2.
40Op
.
cit.
, German Ideology
, p. 103.
Ibid
. , p. 102.
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""ly wiUUn
„„„-.,ionaCo<i
.soeioUas. T,. „,„„.,
„„,„^ ^^^^^^^
"nly a, ,>„,s.si[,imy an<l not as actual hum.m fruition.
Species being iu the model ol what i.. p„„sil,le l„r "Mons.^h" in tho
o^-^'vo relation to products, to „is w..,-R and to
othor.s can develop a species consciousness. Thl» set of relationships n^entionod
is iho actual activity of species life.
Species being- expresses what is possible as opposed to what already exists
•-I in this sense expresses an ideal. However, it is no "utopian" ideal in that
it can be realized lor Marx th.-ough revolutionary activity. "Through
revolutionary activity one becomes conscious of the collective roots of his Being,
iic'volutionary activity pushes the possibility of species life to become an
.-•'^iu.-.lity. Through history and praxis tho "potential" becomes "reality" via the
activity of the ])rol(!tari;i,t. '^'"^
Species being expresses the universal dimension of "Mensch," while class
existence can only express th(^ ])a,rtial aspect of "Mensch." Species "Mensch"
lias a, unity with himself and with others and, hence, is able to form a community
of fcillow human beings. The partial existence of class society excludes such
possibilities.
The idea that the human being creates objects through his labor, the
view of labor as a social pi-ocess. as well as the notioii of labor as
conscrious activity are all important to tho conception of species being.
'^^James Glass. "Marx, Kaflca and Jung: The Appearance of Species Being."
i^)litics and Society, II (Winter, 1972), ]). 256.
AO
The posing of species existence against class existence is elaborated on
by James Glass, ibid., pp. 256-2G4.
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One of the major distinguishing elements between ^Mensch" and animal is the
idea of productive, objectifying labor. This is integrally related to his
previous discussions of "consciousness.''
"The object of labor is therefore,
'""^ ^^^^^^^^^^^i^^^
.
."44 and it is, hence, logical to
believe that in tearing away from individuals the object of their production,
one tears away from them their species life."45
In alienated labor the worker sees himself in isolation from others.
"Mensch" then conceives of the "others" as strangers, rather than part of his
species life. Instead of seeing himself in others he onfy sees the other "Mensch."
Marx extends his discussion of species being and, therefore, the problem
of alienation to the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, " in On
th^ J.ewish Questi^ Marx deals here with how he thinks society is organized
around a conception of the individual which ignores and perverts the very idea
of species being. In his critical examination of the "Rights of Man, " he rejects
the accepted usage of the specific "rights" of "liberty," "property," "equality"
and "security.
"
"Liberty," as discussed in the declaration views the individual as atomistic
and isolated. "Liberty as a right of man is not based on the association of man
with man but rather on the separation of man from man. "^^ The right of
0£._cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. p. 114.
Ibid
.
46
Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Guddat and Easton, eds.
,
Writings_o_f tjie Young Marx on Philosophy and Society
,
(New York: Anchor
Books, 1967), p. 235.
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property, Marx also views as a right to self-aggrandizement with the acquisition
of possessions as the privileged value. "The right of property is thus the right
to enjoy and dispose of one's possessions as one wills, without regard for other
men and independently of society. Equality, Marx views as "the equal right
to liberty, "48 ^j^i^j^ theoretically treats the individual as a "self-sufficient
nomad." According to Marx, security guarantees the state of alienation. It_
protects liberty and property
.
In essence, the values underlying the organization of society presuppose
an atomistic human being. They become an integral part of the societal
condition of alienation.
Thus none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond the
egoistic man, the man withdrawn into himself, his private
interest and his private choice, and separated from the
community, as a member of civil society. Far from
viewing man here in his species being, his species life
itself—society rather appears to be an external frame-
work for the individual, limiting his original independence. '^^
In order to help sort out the crucial dimensions of alienation, I have
designed the construct below. It reveals the pivotal position of species
being within the theory of alienation.
Alienation exists when the relationship between a
b established in c prevents the
ability to do, be or have, x
^'^Ibid
.
, p. 236.
48ibid
.
Ibid
., p. 237.
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The elements applying to "a" and '^b" are divided into two separate groups.
Some of the elements for "a" and "b" apply to "Mensch'' in the labor process:
the others apply to the relations between an activity and the institutions in
society. The elements in "a" and "b" flow respectively from "a" to "b".
1. "Mensch" in the labor process.
"^^^^^"^ product (object)
labor (activity)
proletariat
capitalist
wo^k^r
worker
2. Relations between activities and institutions.
property use nature by "Mensch"
wage labor needs
exchange or consumption creation of false needs
Elements from group one and two should not be interchanged. Elements for
group "c" can be work, political economy and commodity production. Elements
for group "X" can be humanly free, creative through labor, social "Mensch."
These are all partial statements of the entire notion of species being. "X"
in its largest meaning is species life itself.
When one fills out the construct alienation stands as a series of social
relationships. For example: Alienation exists when the relationship between
wage labor and needs, established in political economy undermines the ability
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^ol^eere^ti^^ Or: Alienation exists when the relationship
between ^rW^ie^ro^ and the use^fnatne.^^
^^^^.^.^^^^
political economy, prevents species life. Or: Alienation exists when the
relationship between worker and product, established in commodity
production, prevents the ability to be a species being
.
As this construct shows, species being ^as "x'n vital to the theory^
alienatio^^ poses the necessary c ontrast model to a series of social
relationships already existinp-. The social and Economic conditions alone do
not encompass the theory of alienation. Marx's model of human capacity is
built into the conceptual web. Alienation has a social and historical aspect and
a dimension that stands outside or above particular social arrangements. In
order words, alienation is said to exist because a series of relations (social and
historical) make un-alienated (species) life impossible. The mere description
of a set of relationships does not necessitate the conclusion that alienation exists
in any specific instance. A whole set of assumptions about "Mensch" are
involved here as is a model about a preferred style of life.
We saw for Durkheim that need statements and the moral order formed a
tightly woven circle limiting the ideal of the moral order to the resolution of
the needs for security, order and the controlled life. Needs are clearly unable
to operate as such for Marx. Marx's treatment of needs is severely differentiated
from the ideal of species life. For support of this position let us move to an
examination of the analysis of need in Marx.
68
The Vocabulary of "Needs" in Marx
Alienation, we have seen, is more than a social and historical view of
"Mensch" in that species being which is integral to the theory focuses upon
human possibility. (This is not to deny that the fruition of species being is
through social and historical processes, e.g.
, revolutionary activity.)
I would like to support further the above claim by showing how Marx's
theory of human needs camiot in and by itself express either his concern with
humanpotentiality or his critical stance
. This will involve uncovering Marx's
own definition of needs as reflective of society in terms of the society's stage
of development. And as Marx's treatment of needs is studied it will become
evident that he does not bestow the same validity to all the needs he identifies.
He terms some needs true, others false; some human, while others are termed
crude. And such distinctions cannot be made unless he has an external standard
of evaluation. If human needs are thoroughly flexible and completely relative,
how could one distinguish a need as true or not on the basis of the felt need itself?
One could not. For instance, if Marx assessed needs as merely inclinations
toward given objects he would be unable to distinguish among them, on the basis
of needs themselves. He, therefore, must have external criteria for evaluation.
Species being is not derived from expressed needs as is its closest parallel
in Durkheim's theory—the moral order. In alienated society there may be no
need (inclination toward) for creative labor and yet this is a part of the model
of species being. This is not however to say that needs (as reflective of
society) are not related to the model of species being. For instance, the "need
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for others" is at once both a product of social necessity and a part ofh«
social community necessary to species life. it seems as though Marx is
inconsistent in his terminology when he speaks of the necessity of "others"
as a need, because he treats this necessity as a universal duality. Needs are
at all other times for him reflective of particular societies and historical
processes. Although his language may not express it clearly, I think that the
"necessity for other beings" can be explained as involving two dimensions:
1) a condition necessary for survival, (the gathering of food, shelter, clothing)
and, 2) as a partial model of a preferred social form Integral to the concept
species being. The "needing of others" is used by Marx to express both reality
(necessity as actual) and possibility, in terms of an ideal form of human
relationship.
Because the idea of species being is not simply derived from manifested
needs it is able to operate as a contrast model to existing societal tendencies
expressed through individual needs. We shall see that it is through Marx's
discussion of needs that he develops a systematic attack on the political economy.
From where does the force of such criticism come? Clearly not from the needs
themselves which not only reflect but structure society. Let us then examine
Marx's appraisal of hum^m needs to see how the model of species being operates to
50
In Marx's discussion of Feuerbach in the German Ideology
,
op. cit. , he
treats the notion of "being social" as persons needing one another. "Feuerbach's
whole deductions with regard to the relation of men to one another goes only so
far as to prove that men need and always have needed each other . " (p. 33) In
the "Theses on Feuerbach," Marx states that "the human essence is no abstraction
inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social
relations." See, Adam Schaff, A Philosophy of Man. (New York: Delta, 1963),
p. 26.
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guide the appraisal.
An examination of the usage of need in the German Ideology. Th_e Economic
andPhiloso^c the Grundrisse, the introduction ^
PoliticaLEcono^ and Capital, volume 1, will uncover Marx's view of need in
relation to 1) its social and historical dimensions in terms of origin, 2) the mode
of production, 3) the capitalist's definition of the worker's need, and 4) the idea
of a "state need.
"
Durkheim is unable to make distinctions between needs such
as expressed in 3) and 4) because of his basic reduction of the moral order to a
set of felt human needs. The critical stance which is evident in the following
discussion reflects the underlying commitments of Marx to a different form of
social and human organization, i.e., species being.
Marx states clearly in Capital, volume 1, that workers have needs which
are defined by the level of social advancement of the society. Needs reflect the
level of the development of production which involves economic, technological
and social advancement. Wants are also reflective of such processes for Marx,
and at several key points he uses need and want interchangeably.
The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and
social wants, the extent and number of which are conditioned
by the general state of social advancement.
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Contemporary distinctions between "needs" as a constant, universal, a-
social, quality and "want" as a flexible more pliable notion clearly will not
apply to Marx. For Marx, both "need" and "want" are flexible phenomena,
open to society and history. Although he does seem to use need and want inter-
changeably at times, and would be amenable to the notion that all needs are wants
at some stage; I hesitate to say that he would hold the position that all wants are
at some point needs.
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Op. cit.
,
Marx, Capital, 1, p. 232. [The emphasis is my own.]
Categories most often thought of as physical necessities are also defined and
tempered in relation to the stage of historical development. Physical needs
appear to be defined culturally.
His natural wants such as food, clothing, fuel and housing
vary according to the climatic and other physical conditions
of his country. On the other hand, the number and extent
°^ so-called necessarv wants, as also the modes of
satisfying them, are themselves the product of historical
devclopmentjmddcp^nd therefore to7";^^^^r^^^^^^;r:;^^
degree of civilizat_ion_ofj^countr^ morel)articularly on
the conditions under which, and consequently on the habits
and degree of comfort in which, the class of free labourers
has been formed. ^"^
Natural and necessary wants (expressing the same phenomena) as reflective
of biological necessity (food, clothing, housing) are contingent to a great
degree on the historical development of a country. For instance, the less
developed a society the fewer nutrients define a balanced diet. The more
technologically developed the society the larger the differentiation there is
between what is necessary for survival and what is necessary for comfortabl
living. In the United States three balanced meals are defined as necessary
(although this does not mean that all, or most people have this) whereas in
Bengladesh water and a bowl of rice are defined as a necessary diet.
Marx also discusses the relationship between needs and the mode of
production in the German Ideology
.
History is then seen as the development
the productive forces, necessary to the process of society.
But life involves before everything else, eating and drinking,
a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first
historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy
these needs, the production of material life itself.
^^Ibid., p. 171.
^^
Op. cit.
,
Marx, German Ideology , p. 16.
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Marx further states that the needs that are already established structure the
social and historical processes. Needs, once established, begin to define
possibilities. They become self-sustaining.
The various shaping of material life is of course in every casedependent on the needs which are already developed, and both
the production and the satisfaction of these needs is an
historical process.
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx discusses the idea of
"manipulated need," termed as "imaginary appetite"; an example of an imaginary
need being the need to possess. He as well distinguishes between "crude need"
and "human need.
"
"Crude need, " viewed as the inhuman and unnatural, "human
need" is shown in its relation to private property. Crude need is the debasement
of human need.
Subjectively, this is partly manifested in that the extension of
products and needs falls into contriving and ever calculating
subservience to inhuman, unnatural and imaginary appetites.
Private property does not know how to change crude need into
into human need. ~
"
Marx makes clear that private property and the necessity of capital are givens
within the context of the political economy. "But the worker has the misfortune
to be a living capital, and therefore a capital with needs—one which loses its interest
[and hence its livelihood, every moment it is not working."^''' The political
^ economy defines human needs in terms of its own requirements and it therefore
^^Ibid., p. 71.
^^Op. cit.
,
Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
,
p. 147.
[The emphasis is my own. ]
^7
Ibid., p. 120.
counts as much upon the refinement of needs as it does upon their crudeness.
The political economy defines the worker's needs along these narrow lines.
. . .
political economy knows the worker only as a workin-
animal~as a beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs. ^8
Crude need prevails and bodily needs are redefined into subsistence needs by
the capitalists within the context of the capitalist society. Crude need
structures the worker's situation because he is forced to live on a subsistence
level. He earns enough to barely have his family eat and he must work long
hours to secure even this. According to Marx's analysis
,
in a society
structured by crude need, human beings suffer from fatigue and malnutrition.
This is an example on an initial level of the debasement of the human needs for
nutritional food, leisure and r^st.
The minimum limit of the value of labour power is determined
by the value of the commodities, without the daily supply of
which the labourer cannot renew his vital energy, consequently
by the value of those means of subsistence that are physically
indispensable.
The condition of necessity
,
or subsistence defines need within the political
economy.
The value of labour power is determined by the value of the
necessaries of life habitually required by the average
labourer. The quantity of these necessaries is Imown at
any given epoch of a given society and can, therefore be
treated as a constant magnitude.
^^Ibid
.
, p. 73.
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Karl Marx, Capital
, 2> P* 1^3.
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Hence, within the political economy there is only one need that is recognized
for the worker, and that is that he, or she, be able to work.
The cheat-thief, swindler, beggar and unemployed; the
starvmg, wretched and criminal workingman-these are
figures who do not exist for political economy but only for
other eyes, those of the doctor, the judge, the grave-
digger and bumbailiff, etc. : such figures are specters
outside its domain. For it, therefore, the worker's
needs are but one need—to maintain him whilst he is
working in so far as may be necessary to prevent the
race of labourers from dying out.
"Mensch" is seen merely as worker and as a worker he only has crude needs
defined by the political economy as a subsistence life.
Marx finds such treatment detrimental to the development of human beings.
His conception of "Mensch" as a human being capable of species relations outside
the present political economy has him constantly posing "Mensch" as worker
within capitalist society against "Mensch" as human being potentially capable
of species relations.
Marx continues to examine the relationship between the mode of production
and "human wants" in detail in his Introduction to the Critique of Political
Economy
.
Although the discussion employs the language of "want" it is clearly
indicated that the discussion extends to "needs" as well.
It is clear that while production furnishes the material object
of consumption, consumption provides the ideal object of
production, as its image, its want, its impulse, and its purpose.
It furnishes the object of production in its subjective form.
No wants, no production. But consumption reproduces the want.
Op. cit.
,
Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884
,
p. 121.
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Karl Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy," in David
Horowitz, ed. , Marx and Modern Economics
,
(New York: Modern Reader, 1968),
p. 30.
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Hence, production is in the position of developing and defining human wants.
Although Marx uses the language of wants here, I think this discussion is
understood most clearly as an explication of the development of manipulated
need, or false need.
According to Marx, as "wants" are further refined by production they
necessitate further production. It is this relationship between wants and
production which Marx calls "consumptive production. "^^ "Production creates
the material as the outward object of consumption, consumption creates the
want as the inward object, the purpose of production. "^^ The mode of produc-
tion creates new wants (false needs) as it organizes to satisfy old ones. People
and products are in a consumer relationship as each is developed with the other
in mind. But there is not a one to one relationship here. The priorities are
with production; the false needs (manufactured wants) must be created as a
necessary force for production, but these needs are most often not met.
Capitalist society for Marx develops needs which it can not meet.
As demonstrated in the above, Marx deals with human need in terms of
its social and historical origin via relationships with the mode of production
and the political economy in general. In quotations taken from The Critique
of Political Econoniy
,
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the German
Ideology, and Capital, Marx uses the terms "natural wants, " and "human need"
^^Ibid., p. 31.
S'^Ibid
.
iscussion
in
76
to apply to the concept of need as authentic or "real" need. These authentic needs
for Marx include food, housing, clothing, social living. They express only in a
partial degree his broader model of species being. He uses "imaginary appetite,
"
"want," and "crude need" to apply to false or manipulated need. These appear
to be tied to Interests manufactured by the political economy. In his di;
of need one sees that he distinguishes between reality, as manipulated need
political economy and potentiality as "human need" reflective of species being.
Clearly, species being functions throughout the discussion of need as that model
of social life which would be in tune with "human needs." Without such a model
the conceptual distinctions Marx makes between needs could not be drawn.
Although Marx may be somewhat loose in his terminology on the question
of needs, he clearly does make a distinction between real and manipulated need.
Even within the realm of "real" need Marx accounts for differences in the way
it may manifest itself due to societal forces. For example, hunger is seen as
a "real," or "natural" need, according to Marx, although there are different
kinds of hunger.
Hunger is hunger; but the hunger that is satisfied with cooked
meat eaten with fork and knife is a different kind of hunger
from the one that devours raw meat with the aid of hands,
nails and teeth.
"Needs," in Marx, whether they be related to the worker, the mode of
production, or "productive consumption," reflect the social and historical
dimension of their origin. Social distinctions are even drawn in relation to the
"real" (as authentic) need of hunger. However, several statements by Marx in
^^Ibid., p. 30.
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relation to his treatment of need raiee the question as to what degree needs
are social and historical and, therefore, manipulable. In the Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts Marx writes:
This estrangement manifests itself in part in that it produces
sophistication of needs and of their means on the one hand,
and a bestial barbarization, a complete unrefined, abstract
simplicity of need on the other
. . . even the need for fresh
air ceases for the worker . ^6 ~
'
... it actually reaches the point where it spares man the
need of either fresh air or physical exercise. ^'^
These statements seem to pose the idea of a totally flexible individual. The
view of "Mensch" as completely molded by external forces leaves room for
total dehumanization.
It is not only that man has no human needs—even his animal
needs cease to exist. The Irishman no longer knows any need
now but the need to eat, and indeed only the need to eat
potatoes ---and scabby potatoes at that, the worst kind of
potatoes.
The political economy debases the individual to the point that the worker needs
neither enjoyment or activity. "He (the capitalist) changes the worker into
an insensible being lacking all needs, just as he changes his activity into a pure
69
abstraction from all activity. " In the political economy, "self-renunciation.
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the renunciation of life, and of all human needs, is its principle thesis. "'^^
The above treatment by Marx interprets the presence of a need in
terms of the consciousness of the need. For example, when the workers
are no longer conscious of their needs, the needs themselves disappear .
In other words, when the conscious desire ends for fresh air, the need ends.
In the above quotations, the consciousness of one's needs appears to be
directly tied to their being "felt" and to the possibility of their fulfillment.
In essence, then, when the worker eats nothing but potatoes, and learns to
expect nothing but potatoes, he no longer needs anything but potatoes. A
similar approach applies to Marx's statement on travel. "If I have no money
for travel, I have no need—that is no real and self-realizing need—to travel. "'^^
Because the travel can not be actualized, it is no longer a need.
For Marx, in order for a need to be classed as such there must be
a) some level of consciousness in regard to an end, and b) there must be some
possibility of fulfilling it. "For Marx 'need' refers to the desire one feels
for something, usually something which is not immediately available. "'^^ jj-
involves a conative state, a desire or tendency toward something.
The above explanation of the use of need in Marx as a totally pliable concept
defines "Mensch" as a completely socialized product. The problem arises not
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'^^Bertell Oilman, Alienation; Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist
Society
,
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 77.
in the conceptualization of "Mensch" as a social animal, but in terms of the
dimensions and impact society levels on "Mensch." Does the classification
of "Mensch" as a social animal mean that he is completely plastic, with his
needs created by the society which nurtures him? There are statements in
Marx which can lead one to interpret his conception of "Mensch" as totally
pliable and, therefore, open to severe social manipulation; that the worker
becomes passive in the light of social and economic pressures. However,
there seems to me to be more of an overriding commitment to the position
that "Mensch" is an active force within society. Afterall, he has a constant
and underlying commitment to the possibilities of human potential which
undergirds his whole criticism of political economy. If "Mensch" were con-
ceived by him as totally plastic where would his commitment to the possibilities
of human development stem from? We have seen him move outside the relativist
position as he makes distinctions between needs. If "Mensch" and his needs are
only what society and history make them the differentiation among needs which
Marx speaks of would be impossible to construct.
Although it has not been discussed yet, one familiar with Marx's thought
might think that the discussion of false consciousness lends support to the view
that "Mensch" is not totally pliable, in that a true consciousness is possible.
However, the discussion relating to false consciousness does not prove too
helpful when dealing with the question of the manipulability of human need in
Marx because Marx's conception of false consciousness relates to the idea of
class consciousness. Class consciousness is distinguished from individual
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consciousness because it primarily involves being conscious about bcin,- a
member of a class. It is not consciousness about individual needs; "but it is.
on the contrary, the sense, become conscious, of the historical role of the
class. "'^•^ However, if "Mensch" were completely manipulate on the question
of individual needs how could there ever be the possibility of revolutionary
consciousness? Even though this also expresses itself as a class phenomena,
"Mensch" still must stand apart from the social and historical manipuhiting
forces of the political economy for revolutionary consciousness ever to appear.
This is not to involve us in the substantive issue of the possibility of revolution-
ary consciousness, but rather to expose the incompatibility within the same
theory, of a language of needs as completely open to total manipulation and the
idea of revolutionary consciousness.
If it is phiusiblc to say that Marx posits "Mensch" as an active force in
social activity and also has a conception of human potential (which operates as
an ideal of sorts not limited by social and historical arrangements) then I
question the terminology used by Marx in his discussion of need. It would seem
more accurate to speak of the "worker's no longer wanting, fresh air although
they might really need it." "Workers may no longer want relationships to other
"Mcnschcn," but thoy may still need them. The assessment of need in these
two cases is in terms of the model of species being. Needs are assessed in
relation to species life; person "a" needs "x" in order to experience species
life. Marx's assessments stand outside "need" and in the model of the un-alicnated
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society
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Further Outlines of the Un-Alienated Perse
My initial discussion of species being only begins to point toward Marx's
model of human development. Now that it is clear that a model of human
potentiality does operate within Marx's theory of alienation, which camiot be
captured by a language of needs, I want to further explore his notion of human
dcyelopmcnt. His model can be more fully assessed in terms of his treatment
of creative labor as it assists species consciousness.
Creative labor in its integral relationship with species being expresses
jDotcntialities within human development, while alienated labor and isolation
express reality for Marx.
Through the process and objectification of labor one becomes conscious
of his "species being." Without the activity of labor species being cannot be
actualized. It is the necessity to form social ties for the development of a
consciousness about one's life and activity which supplies the standard for
criticism of a political economy which alienates "Mensch" from his product
and the process of production, and from other "Menschen." As capitalist
society perverts social relationships species consciousness is not possible.
However, it is the model of species being which is the very idea active in the
assessment of the existing condition. Therefore, Marx may say that well
developed "rich human beings" have certain needs, deriving from the broader
model of species being, whereas the alienated person may not.
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The rich human being is simultaneously the human bein-
in need of a totality of human manifestations of life~the
man in whom his own realization exists as an inner neces-
sity, as need.
The conception of a person which is reflected through Marx's model of
species being and creative (objectifying) labor is one of the 1) social
character of the human being, 2) the creative element through the objectifica-
tion of labor, and 3) the dimension of consciousness, or a conceptual apparatus
which distinguishes "Mensch" from animals.
Marx expresses the meaning of species being sometimes through the use
of the term "natural," and hence a series of "natural" relationships are postulated
which encompass its meaning.
From the character of this relationship follows how much
"^-^P as a species being, as man
,
has come to be himself
and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman
is the most natural relation of human being to human being.
It therefore reveals the extent to which man's natural
behavior has become human, or the extent to which the human
essence in him has become a natural essence—the extent to
which his human nature has come to be nature to him. In
this relationship is revealed too, the extent, to which, therefore,
the other person has become for him a need—the extent to
which he in his individual existence is at the same time a
social being. '^^
This direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to
person is the relation of man to woman . Iji this natural
species relationship man's relation to nature is immediately
his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately
his relation to nature—his own natural destination.
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The interesting use of
-^naturaP^ in relation to species being is noted here
because it is also used somewhat differently by Marx. Nature is n.ost often seen
as integral to, but at the same time in conHict with, the individual. Marx in
the Grundrisse discusses labor, the ultimate in human activity, as the
appropriation of nature to human wants. Labor moMs nature. Nature is socially
mediated and society is mediated through nature.
But "nature" in this context is to be overcome, to be controlled.
Nature is not only an immense material present under allhuman social conditions of existence in all its modes of
appearance, but also a potential, whose extensive or
mtensive actualization takes place according to the measure
of the existing level of the forces of production.
Marx's treatment of "natural" is quite different when he is expressing
species relations. Marx has been quoted at length to expose this difference.
In the earlier quote Marx states that man and woman are involved in species
relations when the "natural" and the human combine; and they combine when the
individual acknowledges the need for other persons. In other words, man and
woman reflect the species relation because they need one another. They become
socially conscious beings. They become necessary to one another. From this
discussion of Marx one concludes that he is speaking of natural as meaning
necessity. But for Marx, as I have mentioned, the "needing" of others is more
than necessity. It is what ought to be .
77Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Natu^ (London: New Left
Review, 1971), p. 79.
Ibid.
, p. 162.
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On this level "natural" involves for Marx living in relation to and with
consciousness of others. Nature does not mean "the accepted flow of
events"; but rather, a preferred style of living
.
Necessity derives from the fact that "Mensch" cannot survive without
others. Beyond this level of necessity-needing food, shelter and clothing,
and the others who make it possible-is the model of social consciousness and
social ties. Species beings must incorporate both levels of social existence.
In this way the model of species being, which reflects concerns of human
potentiality within an alienated society, is itself in structure a combination of
the forces of reality and possibility. Species being in its own conceptual
structure combines wliat is and what possibly can be. In this sense also it is
no Utopian ideal. (Earlier I stated that species being is not a Utopian ideal
because it can be achieved through revolutionary activity. ) Social living and
social consciousness are perverted under the conditions of alienation so that
social "Mensch" is no longer a reality, and only a possibility.
It is to this extent that species being moves outside the statement of existing
:
needs. Otherwise the problem of consciousness as necessary to the recognition
of "need" would enter into the discussions of alienation, and it does not. For
example, if species being could be completely explicated by a discussion of need
in Marx, alienation would become dependent upon the individual's consciousness
of his alienation. But in Marx, as has been shown through the earlier construct,
alienation is an objective condition rooted in a series of social relationships,
existing regardless of the awareness of the individual, because of the model of
human development used.
The idea of potentiality and human development are focused upon in Marx's
discussion of "Mensch" as laborer. The very idea of "Mensch" as laborer is
crucial to the idea of species being. The individual becomes a social being
through labor and differentiates himself from the animal world by conscious
creation of objects. This view of labor as creative and purposive is contrasted
throughout Marx against alienated labor.
It is within the discussions of "Mensch" as creative laborer that one
finds Marx's concerns with human development outlined, though sketchily.
According to Marx the objectification of labor is anthropologically necessary.
'
The idea of objectification is that one's labor must be concretized through
the creation of "objects.
" He discusses the uniquely human property of labor
throughout his works. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, bespeaks
of human labor as the re-affirmation of oneself.
. . .
for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness,
intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore
he contemplates himself in a world that he has created.
In Capital, volume 1, labor is discussed as conscious creation, which
distinguishes human labor from animal labor.
Wc presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively
human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of
a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the
construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst
architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect
raises his structure in imagination before he erects it as
reality. At the end of every labour process we get a result
that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its
commencement.
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"Mensoh" concretizes life in a conscious manner through labor and this is. then,
a major source for his creativity.
The animal is one mth its life activity. It does not distinguish
the aim itself. It is its activity. But man makes his life
activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He
has a conscious life activity
. . .
"Mensch" is distinguished from animal life by his level of reflection and
consciousness involved in the laboring process. The creation of things through
labor involves "Mensch" in the act of creation and development. "Labour's
realization is its objectification. "^^ The objective world becomes friendly through
the labor process.
... it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for
man in society the world of man's essential powers—that all
objects become for him the objectification of himself, become
objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his
objects; that is man himself becomes the object.
In the Grundrisse
,
Marx states that "work is a positive creative, activity. "^^
Marx's involvement with the question of productive labor relates to his concern
with "man's world shaping capacity, "^^ his labor creating ability. He defines
labor in Capital as the ability of "Mensch" to mold and shape nature to human
concerns.
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Labour is in the first place, a process in which both man
and nature participate and in which man of his own accord
starts, regulates, and controls the material relations
between himself and nature. He opposes himself to Nature
as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs
head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to
appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his
own wants. By thus acting on the external world and
changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.
Creative labor involves both mental and physical capacities for the worker. In
order to labor one uses his hands, and in order to conceive of the project to
be created one must engage in thought.
By labour power or capacity for labour is to be understood the
aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in
a human being which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value
of any description. ^'^
This view of labor as objectifying, in that it involves the laborer in object
creating activity which realizes a previous mental conception of the object, is
Marx's view of unalienated, creative labor. It is a major source of developing
human potential.
It is necessary to note here, however, that Marx uses the term
"objectification" in two ways in his writings. One way has just been discussed
as the truly human element of creation in labor. Objectification is seen here
as the resolution of alienation. The other way it is used by Marx is to mean
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alienation itself. Here, objectification i^ alienation in capitalist society.
Objectification, therefore, which is a necessary characteristic
of an labour (involving the transference of labour power to the
object which is created by it) becomes in capitalism, identical
with alienation.
In On the Jewish Question, Marx also discusses objectification through
religion as alienation. In religion one objectifies one's essence through an
alien being. In this sense too, objectification can mean alienation.
To disregard the distinction between objectification and alienation in Marx
is to lose the entire impact of his concern with labor as creativity. If labor
was not important to the development of persons, i.e.
, the tapping of human
capacities, why be concerned about a condition of alienation? Afterall, it is
creative labor (as a partial statement) that workers are alienated from. It is
I
also through creative labor that one becomes conscious of one's species being,
since unalienated labor requires working with others as well as necessitates a
deliberativeness related to the product.
It is in Marx's further discussion of the laborer that one finds fragments
related to a model of a person. Such concerns arise as he criticizes prevailing
labor conditions. The model of creative labor and species life operate in the
assessments he makes, as they do throughout, about alienation.
89
Hegel always equated alienation and objectification. They were not distinct
processes for him.
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In Coital Marx speaks of the intellectual needs of the workers and poses
these against the society's view of what is intellectually necessary for the
laborer.
The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and
social wants, the extent and number of which are conditioned
by the general state of social advancement. 91
The problem of the development of intellectual capacities in workers is noted
briefly in his "Theses on Feuerbach" in the German Ideology
. Here he discusses
the division of labor as the division of material and mental labor. He notes the
problem of the division of physical and mental activity for the laborer. The
division of labor "only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of
material and mental labour appears. "^^ The integration, or rather the separation
of thought and action derives from the problem of alienated labor.
. . .
because the division of labour implies the possibility,
nay the fact that intellectual and material activity—enjoyment
and labour production and consumption—devolve on different
individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming
into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division
of labour.
The result according to Marx is that there appears a class of "thinl<;ers" while
other laborers are forced to be involved in mindless physical activity. It is
not until there is an integration of both thought and activity that the capacities
of individuals are truly being tapped.
Hence, the isolation of physical activity from mental involvement results
in alienating labor. The "truly" human quality which develops through the
91
Op. cit
. ,
Marx, Capital
,
I, p. 232.
^^Op. cit. , Marx, German Ideology, p. 20
^^Ibid., p. 21.
90
objectification of labor is that of consciousness, viewed as the development of
thought processes, m-^iessj^^^^^
^^^^^^^^-^^^^i^^^^^^ The possibility
of creative labor as well as species life create the theoretical framework which
makes it possible to indicate alienating labor for severing human processes.
The theoretical framework of Marx which poses the ideas of human
potentiality (through creative labor and species being) extends to both men and
women. Marx, unlike Durkheim does not have differential theories about their
areas of competence. He never seeks to justify social and economic inequalities
between men and women on the basis of biological difference. As we shall see
though, Marx does seem to believe that there are significant differences in
physical strength between men and women and from this he justifies the division
of labor along sex lines.
Although Marx's statement on women is limited in depth his thought is
important to us because of his commitment to uncover tensions between species
life aiid alienated forms of social experience. Marx's theoretical framework
which poses existing conditions against other possible forms of social organiza-
tion is valuable for an analysis of women. It is also the model of species life
itself which is valuable in constructing a model of human development to contrast
with existing life styles of women, as we shall see in the later chapters.
Species Life and Women
Marx's discussion of women centers largely around the analysis of the
"bourgeois" family. He is critical of the bourgeois family in its oppressive
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arrangements towards the woman, especially in relation to her economic
oppression and familial servitude. Most of his writings dealing with the
question of women are directly related to the alienated conditions resulting
from marriage within a capitalist society. However, Marx did in his early
years write on questions concerning the family in such a way that one is
lead to believe that he, in principle, was not opposed to marriage as an
institution. This may be why he never questioned the basic division of labor
along sex lines, especially within the family.
When Marx wrote his article for the Rheinische Zeitung, "On a Proposed
Divorce Law," he was approximately twenty years old. At that time he had
not, of course, written his Paris Manus^^ the Coimnun^ or
the German Ideology, all of which later contain partial statements on the question
of women and the institution of marriage. These later statements on marriage
deal with a description and criticism of the practice of "bourgeois" marriage,
whereas the earlier statement in the Rheinische Zeitung speaks of marriage as
potentially a kind of species relationship.
In his article "On the Divorce Laws" he states in agreement with Hegel
that "implicitly and in accordance with its concept, marriage should be
indissoluble but only implicitly, that is, only in accordance with its concept. "^^
In other words, so long as marriage remains an ethical arrangement it is
indissoluble. In accord with the seriousness in which he thought about marriage
he finds the Prussian divorce laws too numerous and frivolous.
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It is self-evident of course that ^-u
Will of the legislator nor Ze a" wm oTr'^'^fperson, but only the essence of the ^41 ° 7"?
whether a carriage ildiSTor not f^r is' weU tthat a declaration of death depend on the fa^t"0^^
case a.^ e on the wishes of the parties conc rned''But If m the case of physical death you demand preciseand unmistakable proofs, must not a legislator fav dola moraldeaih only after the most incontestable s^tls,
Marx sees the ending of a marriage partnership as the ending of a mora, relation-
ship. It involves a serious breach of faith in the social relationship. However,
Just What Marx means by "incontestable symptoms of moral death" in terms of
the marriage relationship is not made clear.
For Marx, divorce is much more than the separation of two people. It is
the breaking of commitments not only between the man and woman but within the
family, as it affects the children.
They think only of the two individuals and forget the family
They forget that nearly every dissolution of a marri^i^Tsthe
dissolution of a family and that the children and what belon-s
to them should not be dependent on arbitrary whim even from
a purely legal point of view.
This view of marriage as an ethical relationship involving the family provides the
contrast model for his later writings in 1844 and 1848. For Marx, the relation-
ship between man and woman as paradigmatic of species relations reflects this
sense.
From the character of this relationship follows how much
"^^t"^ as a species being
,
as man, has come to be himself
95Eugene Kamenka, Ethical Foundations of Marxism, (New York: Praeger,
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relation of human being to human
The direct a.d necessary relations between person, is the relationship between
man and wo.an in species lite. The idea of obligation and responsibility i„
hun^an relationships as retlective of species relations never disappears in Marx.s
writing.
« is afterallaueypart of species living and therefore a part of the
model posed against the bourgeois family.
Marx never denounces or restates his views on divorce, and this may be
because he thought ethical relationships in marriage were in principle possible
outside of alienated society. However, in alienated society where marriage
relationships reHect dehumanized relations between "things" as opposed to
persons, divorce does not represent the severing of huma. ethical relationships.
It merely means the end of an economic and often, exploitative, arrangement.
Let us now examine Marx's discussion of the bourgeois family. Marx makes
clear in the quote below from the Communist Manifesto that the family relation
has been reduced to a mere money relation.
The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production.
On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family,
based? On capital, on private gain
. . . .The bourgeois clap-
trap about the family and education, about hallowed co-relation
of parent and child, becomes all the more disg-usting the more,
by the action of modern industry, all family ties among the
proletarians are torn asunder, and then children transformed
into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour. 98
97O^. cit., Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 p. 134.
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The relations of private property beoon^e the .ode of exchange. The develop-
ment of these bourgeois priorities transform the social relations in the family,
and the fan^ily which Marx sees as the only^ relationship becomes a
subordinate need. ^^—-^ P-vate property and possession pervade
—man relations.
--The species relations itself, the relation between man
and woman, etc.
,
becomes an object of commerce. The woman is bought and
sold...iOO
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ relationships into those of
ownership and domination; and marriage into prostitution. '
Finally, this movement of opposing universal private propertyto private property finds expression in the animal form of
opposmg to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private
a piece of communal and common property
. Just as
woman passes from marriage to general prostitution, so the
entire world of wealth (that is, of man's subjective substance)passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the
oMoier of private property to a state of universal prostitution
with the community.
Because Marx sees the problem of women as arising from their status as
mere instruments of production, he thinks that .
. the abolition of the
present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community
of women springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution, both public and
102private." But this analysis seems inadequate, as does Marx's acceptance of
the division of labor between men and women along sexual lines, especially
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Within the fa.Uy. He never questions the assignment of wo.en.s capacities
along these lines. Further analysis of these questions will wait until the
later chapter dealing specifically with the question of women.
As stated earlier, the specific importance of Marx for the analysis of
existing theoretical constructions pertaining to women is not limited to his
actual statements on the problem, which are inadequate. Rather, it is his
theory of alienation, his model of species being, the conception of labor as
creativity, which point toward a model of a person which is valuable in the
examination of the relationships between theory and practice, for women as
well as for men.
One is not limited to descriptions of existing practices within Marx's
framework. The major concern is with assessing present arrangements in
terms of the individual's potential for development. The priorities for social
change are intermeshed with assessments that alienation prevails. His vi(
of social and historical "Mensch" excludes the treatment of conditions as
outgrowths of inevitable tendencies. This analysis will be valuable in the
balance of the discussion.
iew
96
CHAPTER III
ON APPRAISING STANDARDS OP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
It has been argued so far that Durkhe^.s view of the ^oral person is largely
tied to (and limited by) his theory of hun.an needs, whereas. Marx's „.odeI of
species being is not. I want to discuss how contemporary behavioral social
science literature alters the use of the concept of need and builds its models of
development from such need analysis. Representative samples of the contem-
porary research into the problem of alienation and anomie will be shown to
reflect the equation between need fulfillment and human development; or between
need statements and an ideal of a person. And this equation will be shown to be
faulty.
If needs cannot function in a justificatory manner in relation to a model of
persons one is still left with the problem of justifying that model. The Marxian
framework of alienation and the model of species being will be chosen here above
Durkheim's perspective of anomie and the moral order, as supplying the most
valid model of human development. I will deal with the Marxian perspective
through an examination of the consequences of both their frameworks as well as
provide an explication of a model of persons which can and does derive from
the priorities set from Marx's thought.
This chapter will lay the foundations for the next which will demonstrate
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how the discussion ot "needs., in relation to the question of women in industrial
society is an inadequate way of approaching the topic. It the problem of women
Within society is limited to the discussion of needs it limits a woman's self
understanding to the constructions accepted by society at large. To be oriented
merely to meeting the felt needs of women is to bind women to the present
organisation and definition of their lives. To deal with the question of the
potentiality of women as persons, one must move to the concerns expressed by
Marx in the language of "species being."
AjienatioD, Anomie and the Theory of Needs
Most contemporary American social scientists who have seriously considered
the theme of alienation and anomie have tended to think in principle at least, that,
these competing theories could be clarified and tested through empirical inquiry
into human needs. ^ I will discuss these approaches here pointing to their
deficiencies, and suggest the beginnings of an approach for dealing with these issues
more adequately.
1
In the contemporary literature dealing with alienation and anomie there hasbeen a collapsing of the two competing theories. Although I will be examinin- the
treatment of alienation, the same arguments hold for anomie. For other contemp-
orary literature on anomie and alienation see, Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social
Isolation and the Class Structure," Sociometry
, 20 (June, 1957), pp. 105-llG;
R. H. Brookes, "The Anatomy of Anomie, " Political Sciei^ 3(1951), pp. 44-51;
Jolin Clark, "Measuring Alienation Within A Social System," American Sociological
Review, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 849-852; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning
and Measurement,
" American Sociological Review. 26 (October, 1961), pp. 753-75°8;
Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom
,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1955); Harold Laswell, "The Threat to Privacy" in Robert Maclver, ed. , Conflict
of Loyalties
.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Simon Marcson, ed.
,
Automation
,
Alienation and Anomie, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Robert Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: Free Press, 1968); Gwynn Nettler,
The discussions of alienatio. by A.itai Et.ioni, Arnold Kaufman and
Erich Fro.„, ^ draw heavily upon a theory of needs and. therefore, ^i,
be treated as paradigmatic of the social scientisfs treatment of alienation.
Christian Bay. 3 ,,hough he has no explicit theory of alienation does have a
elearly stated position on needs which is quite similar to Etzionrs treatment,
a^cl. therefore, will be examined here. I will deal with Bay and Et.ionl together
because they present a more complete picture of the perspective I am examin-
ing than When dealt with separately. While Etzionl ties needs to the theory
of alienation. Bay more explicitly deals with the meaning of "needs." Although
I find the above social scientists deficient in their models of development (via
need theory), it Is Important to dlstlnghish their discussions of alienation from
PP wHt? ^''"^y^SlSIioSRS^^ 22 (December. 1957)
iceman On the Meanmg of Ahenatlon,
" America Sjx^^ 24
Prejudice, American Journal o_f Soo^^ 62 (July, 1956). pp. 63-67.
hee Amltai Etzionl, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and£ohlie^ Process, (New York: Free Press, 1968). epUoi:^. 117-667;
T?' (New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston,
PP 141^165
K^^f"*". "Oi Alienation, " Inquiry
. 8 (Summer, 1955).
3
See, Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo Politics," in Charles McCoy
and John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co.
,
1967), and his more recent article "Needs, Wants, and Political
Legitimacy," Canadian Journal of Political Sciennn, 1 (1968), pp. 241-260.
In his article "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," in Theodore Roszak,
ed.
,
The Dissenting Academy. (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 208-230,
he makes a plea for orienting political theory more closely to human needs'.
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a merely psychological analysis. ^
The'i^sychological" v.ew of alienation does not focus on the triadic relations
involved in the classical formulation, which are: a) a given set of social
arrangements, b) the Uves of individuals and c) a valid ideal of human develop-
ment. Rather it reduces the problem to one of personal adjustment and
personalized discontent. For example, I e>^erience dissatisfaction in my work,
but you may not in the same role. My dissatisfactions are unique to me; they are
not implicated in the role of worker ^a worker. Social phenomena are turned
into isolated experiences and are, therefore, thought not to flow from a social
structure in which all are implicated but rather from an individuated experience
within a set of roles. Most often when one deals with alienation in terms of its
triadic relationship one begins to deal on another level with 1) the roots of the
problem, 2) the effects or consequences of the problem, 3) and the remedies.
Such a view avoids the tendency to deal in isolation with person^s felt grievances,
anxieties, and frustrations.
I want to now examine those theorists who, when dealing with the question
of alienation avoid some of the above problems. As we shall see shortly,
Christian Bay, Amitai Etzioni and Arnold Kaufman are weakest in their treat-
ment of a valid ideal of human development. One does not grasp the full sense of
4For statements of the psychological view of alienation see, John P. Clark,
"Measuring Alienation Within a Social System, " American Sociological Review
,
54 (December, 1959), pp. 849-852; Dwight Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning
and Measurement," American Sociological Review, 26 (October, 1961, pp. 753-
758; Eric and Mary Josephson, eds.
, Man Alone : Alienation in Modern Society
.
(New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962); Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation,
"
American Sociological Rejview. 22 (December, 1957), pp. 670-677; and Melvin
Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review
,
24
(December, 1959), pp. 783-791.
I
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my crmc.s» by acous.n, the. of psycholog..,n, the use of alienation because
they do deal with social structure as it relates to individual manifestations of
the proMe™. However, one shifts away fron. the social structure and the already» ™odel of persons because of Et.ioni.s treatment of need a.cl Kautaan-s
language of "satisfaction. This emphasis is best examined and criticised as an
outgrowth of need theory rather than under the more elusive title of psychologism.
It is important to note that even though Etzioni and Kaufman implicitly
treat alienation in its triadic form there have been considerable shifts from its
classical meaning. But let us first examine their analysis of the problem.
For Etsioni alienation means "a social situation which is beyond the control
of the actor and, hence, unresponsive to his basic jeeds. Alienation is then
seen as remediable if the social structure is made more responsive to these
human needs although there is an,
. . .
irreducible source of alienation in the tension amon-
these needs-responding fully to one, such as the need for
security, is incompatible with fully responding to others
such as the need for variety and creativity. 7
Etzioni's view is that there are autonomous, basic human needs , irrespective
of society, culture or history. And these autonomous needs provide a standard
against which specific social arrangements can be appraised.
Theories without a conception of human needs (which have specific
attributes of their own) are open to a conservative interpretation,
5Amitai Etzioni, "Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Inauthenticity, "
American Sociological Review, 33 (December, 1968), p. 879. [The emphasis
is my own. ]
^Ibid
. , p. 880.
'^Ibid
. . p. 879.
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of mdwidunls and groups that are expected to adapt to the
compare socijSSnTSISir^iteT;^^^
or less cllonantw,th bas.c human needs, and they lead one to e^ectpressure to chanse existing societies and cultures towardmore responsive ones. ^ i^waiu
The theory of needs ftmetions here as the theory of species being does in
Marx. Need is no longer seen as a social and historical phenomena as it was
lor Marx ai.d to some extent for Durkheim, but is seen as a-cultural and
a-social;
.
.that there is a universal set of basic hum^m needs which
have attributes of their own which are not determined by the social structure,
cultural patterns or socialization processes." ^
The priorities of the behavioral mode create likenesses in Amitai Etzioni's
Christian Bay's conception of need. Need for Etzioni is clarified in terms of
need deprivation; "that the person can be denied a specified kind of experience
only at the cost of an ultra-personal tension. "^^ Ultra-personal tension is judged
in terms of malaise, no matter how vague.
Bay's concept of need, also operational ized, is defined similarly. "'Need'
might initially be defined as referring to any urge or drive or behavior tendency
whose satisfaction benefits the organism and the person. "^^ However, for
Ibid_.
, p. H7H. ('I'he emphasis is my own.]
9
Ibid
.
, p. 871.
Ibid
.
'
'christian Bay, "Needs, Wants and Political Legitimacy," Canadian
Journal of Political Science
,
1 (1968), p. 242.
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CHMlieal
'Wtnes_s.. he modifies this definition because the "formulation is
much too vague for purposes of empirical utility
.
.
.
12
Bay also equates the treatment of needs with a model of person.
We camiot get much further toward an adequate norma-
tive t^heory of government, as Hobbes taught us, without
a model of man. or at least a conception of priorities
among man's most pressing needs.
He arrives at an "operational- definition of needs defined as "any behaviour
tendency whose continued denial or frustration leads to pathological responses.
Bay moves then, from dealing with need as benefiting the person, to dealing
with it in terms of pathological responses, and this shift involves a reconstitu-
tion of the earlier classical concerns of Durkheim and Marx. Because of the
concerns of empirical utility. Bay whittles down the dimensions he will handle in
relation to need. Bay has difficulty explicating "pathological"; instead he
settles for several indicators of the term
.
. . suicide, psychosis, severe
neuroses, severe addiction to alcohol and drugs.
Bay's effort to operationalize the concept need is misleading because the
definition of what constitutes a pathological response smuggles in a normative
claim. What constitutes mental and social health and sickness is not simply
an issue that can be resolved by examining the empirical facts without Bay's
employment of an implicit normative model of health.
Ibid
.
Ibid
.
14
Ibid
.
.
p. 242.
Ibid., pp. 243-244.
Need ,s Cenioc, a. soeio.o.ie., roots by doaUng wa„ a i„ ro..u,.„
manifestation, as i„ciiv,dua,i.„„. ato.i.ed sy„pto„s. Bay dea,« with
pathological behavior hy inferring that his indicators are representative <,r
such behavior anU further inierring that this is linKed to the question of
.,,eed
deprivation...
,«s use of patho.ogical hehavior as inferring need deprivation is
further troubioso^e because „f the n,uitip,o causes involved in n.u,y of his
indicators. A human being eould easily suffer from several lorms of this
behavior an.i the reasons involved might sometimes be unrelated to "need
deprivation... By definitional fiat he sets up his behavioral n.ode.
II- by delinition, pathological responses are linlced to our
hy|>,.thetK-al construct of
-.need," then it maizes sense
to assume that the most obviously and grossly pathological
nds 01 bohavmr indicate that relatively crucial needs havei)eon denied or frustrated.
Bay himself notes some of the disadvantages of his position. First, he
notes the problem that needs cannot be readily recognized until after
pathological behavior has l,een manifested. A mo,-e serious v.av of stating
this criticism is that Bay does not <lcal with the realm of needs, but rather with
unmet needs. A need in Bay.s language becomes very vague in meaning because
it only moans the lack of tension, or the presence of alcoholism, or some other
loi iu of deviant behavior. It lias no positivi. lorce. liesides, the idea that all
pathological behavior derives from need deprivation appears problematic at
best. There are a maze of intervening elements to be accounted for. And
Ibid
.
, p. 24:).
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because no^ sUna,-.. or personal development is funcUon.,
.
.eco.es
impossible to say that such negative behavior results fro. the manifestation of
false or manipulated needs.
This leads to the second major criticism of Bay. His scheme docs not
involve an explicit mode, of personal development, although an implicit one
deriving from a view of mental health operates. To the extent that most of hi,
inquiry is in relation to needs he spends little time trying to construct a view
of person separate and apart from his treatment of needs. Bay adopts Mas.oWs
hierarchy of needs as inclusive of a model of person, but it operates only within
the framework of tension reduction.
Needs are construed by Bay, Etzioni, and Maslow as conative dispositions.
The assumption is that needs are nn infn nsie part of human nni.nr. nn.i ... .
product of one's society and history as both Durkheim nnd Mn^^vp^ p^^pie
then need, (i.e., have drives toward) affection, security and love independent
of any societal conceptualization of goals and purposes. There is a sharp move
away from the classical concerns of Marx, here.
So long as models of development operate illicitly, explicit standards of
evaluation remain problematic. Hence, Bay and Etzioni deal with unmet need
as vague malaise and tension. But what happens when the question is person
17
Maslow's hierarchy of needs involves 1) physical, biological needs,
2) safety needs, 3) affection or belongingness needs, 4) self-esteem needs,
and, 5) self-actualizing or developing needs. See: Abraham Maslow,
Toward a PsychologY of Being. (New York: Van Nostrand, 1968), and his
article, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review
,
50 (1943),
pp. 370-396.
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development a.d not si.p,y „eed ft.,„„„o„t, This creates a problem, Tor
"under some eonditions human beings may not need. i„ any sense otneed
as a behavioral tendency, to develop their deliberative capacities to a high
pitch."" What I am posing here is the theoretical possibility of having
"tension tree" people who can still be deficient in terms of h„m^ development.
The largest problem here is that if there is no "tension" one assumes that all
needs are met. And yet it may be the case that an individual is perfectly
content and wc might still have good reason to say that conditions are not totally
acceptable. Contentment and satisfaction are paralleled here with tension
reduction but this implies that the tension free life is the only life to be prized.
One wonders about the counter example. Is it not possible to have one's
needs met and still experience levels of tension? According to Bay's and
Et.ioni's definition of need it is not possible because tension results from ,m
unmet need. ITowever, I would have to argue that the meeting of needs may
sometimes increase levels of tension. Developed individuals are not necessarily tension
frcG.
Arnold Kaufman in his discussion of alienation moves further than the
social scientists who limit their theory of needs to behavioral inclinations, or
urgings. That is, need is not equivalent for Kaufman, to an urging or conative
disposition of any sort currently experienced by the person. For person "x"
might not yearn, etc.
,
for state 'A' and yet find it satisfying upon experiencing
18
William Connolly, "Comment on Bay, " Inquiry, 14 (Autumn. 1971)
p. 239.
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it. This is quite different fron. Bay and Et^ioni, even though the final criterion
is Similar. Kauft.a..s treatment of alienation conceives of possible satisfactions
for Which there are not urgings. The problem here derives from the vocabulary
of "satisfaction.
"
as
In Kaufman's discussion alienation ca£ involve feelings, and/or beliefs
they arise out of particular social conditions. To make this point he distinguishes
between belief and awareness. "Clearly a person can believe something with-
out being aware of it-for if what he believes is false in what sense is he aware
of anything?""'"^
Kaufman speaks of alienation in the following manner. "To claim that a
person is alienated is to claim that his relationship to something else has certain
features which result in avoidable discontent or loss of satisfaction . "^^ Although
Kaufman seems to say that alienation need not involve consciousness of feeling
his conception of alienation does involve manifested conscious behavior, that is
discontent or loss of possible satisfaction.
The language of satisfaction is problematic in and of itself because it does
not grasp the idea of a model of human development. However, Kaufman does
19Arnold Kaufman, "On Alienation, " Inquiry
, 13 (Summer, 1965), p. 144.
20
Ibid
.
,
p. 143.
21
Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone criticize Kaufman's language of satisfaction.
According to them, "Kaufman's basic difficulty is that he thinl<s in terms of a
psychological theory of satisfactions and frustrations, desires and aversions, wants
and needs, while the concept of alienation is part of an entirely different theory,
a theory of self-realization." See Paul Diesing and Paul Piccone, "Kaufman
on Alienation, " Inquiry
,
10 (Summer, 1967), p. 208,
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move further than Etzioni in grasping portions of the theory of alienation.
Kaufman acknowledges the dimensions of alienation which involve the "notion of
a human being as a deliberative creature, as one potentially capable of exercis-
ing intelligent control over his own destiny.-^^ At the same time that Kaufman
stresses the "moral dimension" of alienation he also uses a language of the
utilitarian school stressing the importance of satisfactions. And the idea of
satisfaction functions more in line with the idea of tension reduction or a happy
bliss than with the concerns of say. developing deliberative capacities. For the
latter may require a certain degree of tension.
According to Kaufman, if a person seeks something, but once attained it
docs not bring satisfaction, then the individual did not know what he really wanted.
Real wants, or needs then, are measured in terms of the satisfaction they supply.
If needs are met, there will be satisfaction, and when there is sufficient satis-
faction there is not alienation.
The whole point of discussing alienation for Kaufman is to describe an
undesirable situation which is subject to remedy.
Though we are in a position to claim that what he thought
he wanted was not what he really wanted, we are not in
a position to describe what he does really want except in
terms of the almost empty formula, whatever would satisfy
his yearnings (or cravings, or painful feelings).
However, that which is most satisfying is often not related to the larger concerns
of human growth. Drugs are often satisfying and they also are often at the root
22
Op. cit.
,
Kaufman, p. 151,
^^Ibid
. , p. 156.
24
Ibid.
p ,u
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Of the expression of alienation, not the resolution of it.
It appears then that many contemporary soeial scientists treat "neec... in a
behavioralized form as tension reduction or in relation to the language of satis-
faction. The ideal of species being is dropped from contemporary discussions
of alienation.
Their constructions have taken the form of viewing the individual in terms
of a hierarchical need structure which assumes that the total development of a
person is accounted for within the need structure. 25 Attempts also have been
made to justify certain humaii rights from the assumption of certain human needs.
Behavioral concerns have caused conceptual shifts from Marx and Durkheim so
that need is defined as tension reduction or felt tendency.
As I have argued, the classical theory of alienation develops out of a theory
of "Mensch" centered in a distinct historical and social perspective. Marx's
theory of human needs derives from the social and historical framework. And it
is through the activity of "Mensch" as laborer that history and society progress
and needs are formulated and reformulated. The above perspective, within the
context of capitalist society becomes the theory of exploitation and commodity
production. Contemporary social science literature transforms this theoretical
framework into a loose perspective structured by need as behavioral inclination.
One is at this point dealing with indicators as opposed to the conceptual clarifica-
tion of need.
25
Maslow's hierarchical need structure is an example of this. See Maslow,
"Theory of Human Motivation, " o£. cit.
26
See, Christian Bay, "Foundations of the Liberal Make-Believe" Inquiry
,
14
(Autumn, 1971), for this discussion of deriving human rights from human needs.
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eems
Needs and the Mndel of Person
in order to clarify the l.sues raised one ™ust deal with the structure of the
concept "need." In this way the problem of assessing needs is clarified.
,t s
most usemi to- n.e to deal with need in its verb for. ,as opposed to as a noun,
,
When "needs" are studied as verb torn.s they cannot be viewed as self-justifying.
The const^nact which best expresses this forn, is. "A" needs "x" in order to do or
27
'
be "y". In this triadic scheme, "a" is the agent, "x" is what is needed, and
•y is the objective or end state. For example: "A" needs a hammer to drive a
nail, "A" needs a creative work life to develop as a deliberative being. One makes
choices in terms of the end state desired; "y" is clearly the crucial element. If
need is viewed in its verb form its use in contexts specifically pertinent tor
alienation and anomie is assessed always in relation to "y," the model of a person
derived from species being or the moral order.
The dependency of "x" in relation to "y" makes need a relational concept in
27A similar construct is that of the triadic relationship of freedom as explicatedby Gerald MacCallum, Jr.
,
in "Negative and Positive Freedom," in Anthony
de Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer, eds.
,
Contemporary PojiUcal Theory (New
York: Atherton, 1970). The triadic relationship involves freedom of something,
from something, to do or not do or become or not become something, (p. 109)
"Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom
from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing,
not doing, becoming, or not becoming something." (p. 109) It is interesting to
note that most differences about what freedom is, are really differences about
what persons are. "It would be far better to insist that the same concept of freedom
is operating throughout and that the differences, rather than being about what
freedom is, are for example, about what persons are, and about what can count
as an obstacle to or interference with the freedom of persons so conceived."
(p. 114.)
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that .V .annot be evaluated in isolation fro. ^^^ee^^^r^^
c~eito. Need, functioning here in its verb for. clearly shows how if .y
were read as species bein, or person neither could be equated with need, because
need within this framework is a ^eans to that end. Needs are assessed in ter.s
of end states, not vice versa.
Now, I previously argued that in Marx "need" is often assessed in relation to
the idea of species life. The richest use of the verb form of "need, " in my opinion
is the analysis of alienation with its instrumental ties to species being. The usage
Marx tacitly adopts fits the construct proposed here, i.e.
, the worker "A" needs
creative work
-.b" to achieve species life "c." In other words, his conception of
alienation involves the assessment of certain needs as harmful or necessary to
the development of species being. ^8 For instance, the form 'W' needs "x" in
order to bring about
"x" can be read as: A human being needs ties of mutualitv
to other human beings in order to foster (or experience) species life
. Marx
could just as easily state and has stated, that the human being needs creative labor
in order to bring about species being
. And this construct also enables the
28
Agnes Heller is one of the few Marxists who deals with the question of "needs"
in her paper "Theory and Practice: Their Relation to Human Needs," delivered
at the Conference for the Study of Political Thought
,
Spring, 1971. She differs
from the need theorists previously reviewed in her commitment to a social and
historical orientation to needs. Secondly, she distinguishes between alienated
human needs, human needs proper and existential needs, whereas needs are
treated in an undifferentiated manner, i.e., tension reduction, by Bay and Etzioni.
The problem with Heller is that she never spells out a justification for differentiating
among needs which is independent of the needs themselves.
assessment that the iu™aj^ does not need HSUnuoHS^n,^^
to bring about species life.
It is also important to recognize that Marx first deals with needs socially.
Which is to deal with the origin and derivation of the need. He then assesses
these need statements in relation to the ends they serve, as -y" For Marx
the goals and purposes needs serve derive from
-Mensch-. as species being living in
an historical society. Marx, then, deals with the origin andjustmcation of needs.
Brian Barry in his book Political Argur^ also argues that "need" is not
itself a justificatory principle and that one must move to the "ends" involved
before any assessment can be made, "No special account has to be taken of
'need'
... the only interesting questions arise in connection with the ends."^^
Need then is never an independent justificatory principle. It presupposes some
end, or some standard by which we can assess if something is a necessary means
or not. "Whenever someone says 'x is needed' it always makes sense to ask
^"Although Marx is unique in his two pronged approach to needs he does haveproblems m his usage of need, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. There
are times when he does not treat needs within the verb framework, althouo-h I find
this the exception to the rule. There are points at which he states that when
consciousness of a need does not exist, the need no longer exists. His model here
could be stated as "a" needs "x" in order to relieve felt suffering. This has been
interpreted by Bertell Oilman, in Alienation : Marx's Conception of Man in
Capitalist^Society, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), as". . . man
not only has needs, he feels them. They exist in him as felt drives, as wants."
(p. 77.) However, this interpretation is in clear conflict with Marx's recognition
that one can be alienated and not be aware of it. For Marx, remember, alienation
is a condition which can be separate and apart from individual consciousness.
30
Brian Barry, Political Argument, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965),
p. 49.
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.31what purpose it is needed for." Onoo ^ .ce the end is given, which in our case is
the idea of species being or the model of a person it h...^ n. I becomes an objective
matter to find out what conditions are necessary to bring it about. ^2
in this triadic relationship it is "y" which demands examination. However,
it remains largely undercover within an atmosphere of "operational exactitude.
"'^^
However, if "y. is not clearly stated it becomes impossible to make informed
judgments. Only when "y" is explicitly noted can informed choices be made.
"A nudist does not need clothing, and a person who has decided to commit suicide
does not need food or shelter. ""^^
If assessments about needs must wait for evaluation in terms of the ends
they are comiected to, then, the statement "x" needs "y" does not automatically
lead to the position "x" ought to have "y." Before a certain need can be assessed
and recommended for resolution or not, one first must assess it in terms of the
ends given, which are in some sense separate from the need itself. Thus,
the statement that a woman needs to marry or to have children camiot be properly
assessed until the ends and purposes of her life style are iustified . Only when
such a justification is provided can the woman's needs be evaluated as real or
false.
In the treatment of "need" as 1) simply something people try to get, it does
not necessarily follow that if "a" needs "x", "a" ought to have "x." However,
•^-^
Ibid
.
, p. 48.
Ibid
.
33
Op. cit.
,
Bay, p. 242.
•^^Paul Taylor, "Need Statements," Analysis, 19 (April, 1959), p. 107.
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"need., see. as
.) so^etMn, wMeh . a .eans to an end „MeH U .o.. ^.ng
(species being, etc.) does connote the assessment that
..a., ought to have .....
Or at least it is n.ore plausible, it may indeed be thought to be trivial since it
involves a normative claim itseif. Kai Nielsen must be employing the second
usage When he argues that it is logically odd to say
..a., needs
..x.. but
..a., ought not
to have ..X... Nielsen rejects the position that the relation between
..a" needing
"K.. and saying that
.'a', ought to have
..x.. is purely contingent. 35 Therefore,
for Nielsen it is a ..linguistic logical oddity, to say someone has a need for
..x'.
but they ought not have it because there is a logical relationship between fundamental
human needs and moral appraisals.
"Need" seen as 1) simply something people try to get, limits contemporary
behavioral social science literature because it does not allow one to criticize
socialized behavioral tendencies on the grounds that "real needs" are not being
satisfied. Usage 2) of course does allow this, but leaves as problematic just
how one is to establish what ends are worth having. The distinction of real and
false need is made here in terms of that which is worth having or not worth having
because they do or do not yield ends that are worth attaining. Such distinctions are
possible only in terms of ends.
Contemporary social scientists treat need as a noun; expressed as behavioral
tendencies toward the object. The same limitations press now in terms of
contemporary need analysis as they did in evaluating Durldieim's social thought.
35
Kai Nielsen, "On Human Needs and Moral Appraisals," Inquiry
,
6 (1963),
p. 171.
Ibid
. , p. 175.
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of society. Need, seen as felt behavioral tendency, U.its itself to the society
and history of the time and runs the
-risk of celebrating uncritically those
inclinations cultivated by dominant socialization processes.
.
."37 one becomes
locked into the circular process of analyzing and supporting society as it exists,
or as it has existed.
Let me summarize my discussion of needs in terms of Durkheim and Marx
as reflecting a social and historical perspective on needs as opposed to the
a-historical view of contemporary social scientists. Durkheim and Marx are seen here
as historical relativists, but at the same time, human nature objectivists (as
opposed to behavioral social scientists who are human nature relativists). "Mensch"
unfolds through history; but the ideal state of the moral order or species being
is not defined by society and history in and of itself. These are objective end
states only partially expressed through historical relativism. Therefore, the
statement of needs, for Marx especially, is only a partial statement of individual
potentiality, as species being.
For both Marx and Durkheim needs express concrete historical relationships.
37
William Connolly, "On Interests in Politics,: unpublished paper, p. 15,
to be published in Politics and Society
, 1972.
38One could speak of need as potentialities which do not exist in all societies
and none the less are a base from which to criticize society to the extent that the
felt needs people are socialized with fail to reflect these potentialities now
possible in this state of historical development. But I think that "need" has been too
closely tied to the tradition of conative dispositions for it to be extended meaning-
fully to the conception of potentiality. "Needs" to me are the paradigm case of
historical relativity; whereas, potentiality is tied more to an objective human
nature.
Marx posits a cross cultural standard of hu^an develop„,e„t in order to assess
these historical relationships. But Etzioni, typifying contemporary social
science alters this relationship. He treats need, themselves as a-historical and
a-cultural. He uses needs as the standard for assessing social arrangements.
He runs the risk, therefore, of justifying existing arrangements by assessing
social processes in terms of the ends generated by the society itseif. The problem
here is not in the a-historical, a-cultural stance, but rather with the illicit
shifting of the concept need to encompass concerns which are never clearly stated.
Marx's discussion of needs treats them as socialfy developed and therefore,
relative to time and society while Bay and Etzioni treat need as an innate
39
characteristic. (Durkheim is an uneasy mixture of the two. ) The lang-uage of
tension reduction which views needs as universal examines needs in isolation
from societal impact. Needs viewed as universal (as imiate and unchanging as
opposed to relative) operate in a self-justificatory manner in relation to their own
validity.
Behavioral need analysis excludes the standard of human development which
is so crucial for Marx in the assessment of need in relation to both the capacities
of the individual and the possibilities for society. "Need" as a critica l concept
loses much of its import in the same way anomie and alienation have (in their
39Marx systematically analyses the development of needs in and through
society. Etzioni poses instead the idea of innate need. However, there seem
to be problems with his discussion. For example, one of the primary needs
Etzioni speaks of is "recognition" which, in my opinion, is a highly social need;
its formation reflects societal definition. There is a difference between saying
individuals need others and that they need recognition. The very idea of
recognition is defined by the society.
concept or person e.Ouaes the poss.tHt.es the potent.aUt.es 0. the Hu^an
being.
When there is no visiMe tension, alienation is assumed not to exist. But
this assumption eoUapses ai, the distinctions Marx maUes. The proMe. of faise
consciousness would account for a tension tree individual who still r..y be
alienated, however unlikely the eo.hination
.ay be. The distinction between
real and false needs would also explain the "happy auton^aton. " if alienation is
measured in terms of a lack of development in relation to the ideal of a person
then alienation will be said to exist when species life does not exist.
What they lack, though is the ability to choose reflectivelyamong alternative courses of conduct, to act responsMy
^rieTZl °f resentment,gnef, gui t, remorse, and outrage which we associate withthe social life of the human being. 40
To the extent that the concerns of species being are lacking in contemporary
treatment of both alienation and need we are limited to a behaviorali.ed static
conception of "Mensch.
"
In conclusion one can see that need functions in contemporary need and
alienation literature primarily, 1) a-socially and a-historically, 2) as an individual
innate concept manifested in terms of tension reduction, behavioral inclination or
felt-tendency, 3) and primarily as a noun devoid of the integral relationship
between "x" and "y," as needs and ends.
One can see then that need analysis in its contemporary guise circumscribes
40Op. cit.
.
Connolly, p. 13.
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attempts to develop models or criteria for assessing established society. If „eed
analysis of this sort cam.ot supply a theory of motivation, a conception of a
person, or a justification for such a conception, the choice between Durkheim's
and Marx's models of persons cannot be vindicated through need analysis. ,n
other words, it needs themselves can only be judged or weighed as valid or not
in terms of a given purpose or end. they evidently cannot be used to justify these
ends. Hence, to further evaluate the competing models of human development
wc shall turn to an examination of the consequences of both Durkheim's and
Marx's thought.
Consequences of Models of Persons
If the models of species being and the moral order cannot be appraised
adequately by reference to a theory of autonomous needs, how should we proceed
here? What does each model allow you to understand and what does it ignore?
What kind of people do Marx and Durkheim value, and how would one choose
between the models of human persons that they present?
Perhaps one's answer to these questions ultimately expresses commitments
which are not fuU^ amenable to confirming or disconfirming tests. But that does
not mean that evidence, arguments and reasoned speculation cannot heljD to shape,
sharpen and justify these commitments. There are, in my judgment, reasoned
explanations related to the consequences of thought that can be given in defense
of Marx's theory, as opposed to Durkheim's before one moves to the level of
ultimate commitments. If one believes that appropriate standards can be set up
for the judgment of one model of human development against another then it
beco.es i.ponaM to construct an ar^u^ent based on the relevant reasons.
A reasoned ease can be .ade so long as underlying commitments to
purposes and goals are made explicit. Whether the reasons will be accepted
as a justification is another, although connected, question. Reasoned
arguments can be set up about privileged values, although this is far from saying
that the choice can be made in terms of "objective" criteria."
Let us now examine the consequences of Durkheim's and Marx's root
assumptions.
If one accepts Durkheim's view of the importance of solidarity and morality
in relation to the needs of security and order one must first be clear as to one's
position on the value of security and order as human goals. Involved in making
this decision is one's position on the issues of whether 1) "Mensch" is social,
2) needs are socially derived, and 3) the distinction between real and false
needs is valid. All of these issues impinge on one's attitude toward the necessity
of security. As we saw earlier, each is involved decisively in Durkheim's
theory of anomie. For instance, Durkheim's ideal of a person gives priorities
to the concerns of order and security. But one cannot make a judgment as to
whether this is a valid ideal of a person unless one first takes a position on
whether this is a "real need," because needs and the model of person in Durkheim
41
Barrmgton Moore, Jr., in "Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook " in
Wolff, Moore, Marcuse, CriU^i^ of Pure To^^ (Boston: Beacon Press,
lJ)Or,), supports the validity of such enterprises. Moore states that "the problem
of evaluation, like that of objective knowledge becomes one of trying to discover
if there are some aspects of what is loosely called the human situation that
might provide a suitable point from which to argue ... the introduction of a
subjective component does not lead to purely arbitrary results." (p. 66)
are equatable.
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The lac. of a distinction between real and false needs causes serious problem^
for Dur.heim.s social theory and it infects his model of person via his theory of
them.
)
Durkheim ends up distinguishing very weaMy among needs (except for
the fact that the needs of security, order, and control are in some sense givens).
His idea of insatiable or endless desires stated in his theory of anomie are at the
root of the moral model of person. They condition his entire theory.
Marx, however, poses the distinction between manipulated and real needs42
and it then becomes possible to decipher which needs^ endless by their own
design. Such manipulated or abstract needs as private property and possession
are considered inherently insatiable with the only limits to them those created
by the "states" interest. It is these needs which Durkheim to a large degree
proceeded to generalize about. "Actual human needs and appetites, whether
internal or external, can in fact, be stilled whereas there is nothing to limit an
Marx not only makes the distinction between real and manipulated need buthe traces the development of manipulated needs through commodity productionProper y values and the accumulation of capital (manipulated need) oppose human
values (real needs) in the political economy. Marx also becomes involved in
posing the needs of the worker against the need of the state (the capitalists)
Durkheim does not deal with this level of distinction because he basically accepts
the Idea of hierarchy. He does not conceive of a state interest in conflict with
the workers need. Needs are insatiable for Durkheim. However, real needs are
not msatiable. But he does not treat needs as such. Then again, Marx wants to
change the society to deal with curbing the development of false needs. His
concern is not with controlling the individual but with ending the insatiable desires
of changing the society.
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abstract need.
"
For example, one might conclude, in contrast to Dur.heim that security
and order are
-.alse- needs (at least in the way Dur.heim conceptualizes them)
in relation to the total picture of the individual. In other words, one might
believe that security and order may be worthwhile,on^ and to some degree,
but not merit the priority they receive in Durkheim.
One seriously wonders who it is that Durkheim generalizes about, because
I can see the goal of security in conflict with other desired ends human beings
hold. To the extent '.Mensch'. is a conscious thinking being (Durkheim accepts
and even fears this) he may a..d often does seek new adventures and involvements
and alternatives. Why do people yearn to move? to travel? to read about other
cultures? to experiment with the unknown? to marry more than once? Because
humans are curious; because they change, and there are no guarantees they will
want the same things tomorrow as today. Evidence of these capacities in
individuals can be seen throughout history through different social movements,
and today it is demonstrated to some degree by the Women's Liberation
Movement.
Durkheim poses quiescent security against the view of the unrestrained
individual. But the occurence of security and choices among alternatives need
not be opposites. One can feel secure in the struggle to master and develop
one's potential which involves the seeking out of alternatives, if he or she
chooses this.
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People Who accept Durkheim's view of the necessity for security and order
do not often include themselves among those who have these needs. Sometimes
men exempt themselves and decide that it is women who have these needs. In
general, theorists of security think it must be the other person who operates
within these confines, or should operate within them.
One can begin to test the acceptability of Durkheim's theory, then, by posing
the following questions: Would I accept Durkheim's constraints as a ^ide for
my own life? To the extent that Iwould not, what distinguishes me, basically,
from the members of a "lower" class, from women, or from other groups whom
I view as appropriately guided by these limits? And, what makes these claimed
differences justify proposed differences in life stvie ..^ r^...^^.J^^.
If given the choice, would I enroll my child in a highly disciplined school
with a philosophy of education which required an extremely slow pace so that the
child would not become confused by the newness of material, or would I register
the child in a class which tapped his or her utmost resources? For those given
the choice, I think, they usually operate with some regard for their potentiality
and for the potentiality of those close to them.
Most of the time then when one speaks of the importance of an ordered,
controlled life style structured by strict role orientations one is speaking of
others; the other individual. How many individuals would choose to live within a
strict hierarchy if there was no chance at all that they could get "to the top"?
The above discussion relates to Marx's conception of the human being as
an object creating creature, as creative. If "Mensch" is viewed as potentially
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creative, then it appears plausible that this creativity should receive the proper
prodding. One can extend Marx's discussion of labor to encompass the human
qualities of
--Mensch.' These would involve his or her consciousness, conceptual
abilities, and the capacity for alternative thinking. According to Marx this
dimension of "Mensch" develops through the free activity with others, where
curiosity is even encouraged. Once you grant the human being his purposiveness
(seen specifically through one's labor according to Marx) and capacities for
thought (evidenced through language and human progress) it appears that one
would be denying "Mensch" his distinctive character if one did not encourage these
dimensions. Afterall a person has intentions and purposes and should be allowed
an effort at identification. This conception of "Mensch" "determines what man
is on the basis of what he really can be tomorrow. "^5
Durkheim works from the position that "Mensch," through his capacities
for "thought," is capable of building alternative actions and hence new possibilities.
As a matter of fact Durkheim's theory is structured around the fear that "Mensch"
might construct too many alternatives and hence experience anomie. Therefore,
"Mensch" must have limits placed upon his endless desires to create new horizons.
Durklieim fears the thought capacities of "Mensch" while Marx sees it more fully
as a force in the development of the individual and society.
The one thing that Durkheim did not account for is that to the extent the
individual is conscious and can reason, to that extent, he or she can handle more
than a one-dimensional world. Alternatives need not boggle his or her mind and
44
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create a situation of anomie. On the same plane, it is an oversimplification
to think that you can construct a neat hierarchy of fonctions and purposes which
the indmdual will blindly accept. Individuals can think of alternative arrange-
ments.
As people reflect more they question the organization of
society and their place in it. If they see it as a mere
product of the society; then they may waat to change it
And this idea of necessity must be eventually undermined
by the growth of people's reflective consciousness about
their role, still more when it is combined with the thought
that what they and the others have always thought about
their role in the social system was the product of the
social system itself.
.
.^^
One must decide whether an individual's thought process gives him greater control
over the forces of his world or whether it nourishes these boundless desires
which hold him captive within a state of anomie. It seems to me that the mental
capacities of "Mensch" make it possible for the individual to deal actively with
society and not be passively defined by existing needs, i.e.
,
security, order and
calm. The thought processes which Durkheim fears as creating endless desires
are the very thought processes which caji and have been used to create patterns
of order.
Along a related line let us now examine Durkheim' s view of the person as
discussed in terms of his view of morality. For Durkheim, as we have already
seen, the paradigm case of the moral relation is the relation of dependence
between men and women. Durkheim's morality assumes partial people, each
dependent upon one another for completion. In his view there are stark
46
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differences between men and women stemming from the division of intellectual
and affective capacities which necessitate this pooling into one. The relation
between man a.d woma. is moral because it is ordered. The woman, according
to Durkheim, could never live a moral life independent of the social ties relating
her to male intellectual dominance.
Durkheim's belief in the severe differentiation in capacities between men
and women necessitates the above conception of moral relations, as well as his
belief in hierarchical order. Marx, however, would find such a view of moral
life most problematic, because he poses an underlying equality between men and
women. There is then no reason to establish relations of dependence, based upon
an inequality between the sexes. The relationships of dependence would not only
be suspect in and of themselves but would be suspect in terms of breeding further
societal inequalities and exploitation. Reciprocal relations displace dependent
relationships based on inequality in Marx's ideal of species life.
Durldieim's discussion of morality leads to a justification of inequality if
one does not posit it within one's premise. When a person is partial and another
is needed for one's completion, it is inevitable that inequality will arise. "One
cannot be a dependent and still an equal
. . .
"^"^
Inequality will arise also
because society will weigh and value the roles of men and women differently.
Specifically in Durkheim's instance, the man, as intellectual, is most highly
valued and therefore attains more status and power.
47
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The two sexes are necessary to each other, but this
necessity has never brought about a condition of
reciprocity between them
. .
. women don't
make exchanges or agreements on an equal footing. ^8
On what basis does Durkheim justify this position of reconciling women to
a life ordered by decisions she herself does not make, being viewed as incapable
of such activity? The justification of his view falls upon the weak argument of
"natural" design. It is woman's natural make-up which structures her resulting
life-style for Durkheim.
The question of the development of potential deliberativeness cannot be
raised within Durkheim's framework because the woman is not conceived in terms
of mental capacities. To the extent Durkheim denies her this he denies her
her uniquefy human quality of creative activity and thought processes. Marx's
counterpart which will be developed more fuUy shortly, is that human existence
should be committed to the development of human capacities to encourage
deliberative life styles.
Earlier I said that certain concerns related to persons are more privileged
than others and that at some point the choice between the Durkheimian and Marxian
models of thought become a matter of ultimate commitment. However, I am not
sure that we have arrived at that point yet. My point here is that the idea of
"moral" relationships is usually assigned to only certain prized forms of activity.
48Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex
,
(New York: Bantam Books, 1952),
p. 401.
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The root assumptions about "woman's nature," if not accepted, call these
moral relations between man and woman into serious question. But this will be
dealt with in detail in the chapter on women.
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Whether one aeeepts exploitation as the assessment or the outcome of Du..heim.s
position or not. one is stiU left with the dilemma of posing the relations of
inequality between man and woman as a moral relation. Inequality is^
eonoeptually United to the idea of morality. And for it to be Justified as moral,
the unequal relations have to be based on some defensible reason, like eompetenee.
I£ one rejects the biological inequality between man and woman which Durkheim
posits then on what basis does one Justily the definition of moral relationships
as unequal, hierarchic, ordered relations? There seems to be no justification;
only the incompetence of the woman rooted in "natural design" is provided as a
justification.
Imagine a society in which the few social relationships people were
involved in were based on a form of dependence. Each relates to others in
terms of some specified role or function. Responsibilities are clearly outlined.
The work each docs is not measured in terms of creativity but rather in relation
to the amount of solidarity it creates through the interdependence of the workers.
Would it surprise you if you were told that the society was stagnant and
resistant to necessary change? Afterall this society does not sound conducive to
experimentation with new ideas, whether in medicine or social planning. One
might then logically assume that this is not really a description of how everyone
in the society operates. There must be some who lead and make the decisions.
But if some are exempted from the ordered life because they (after all someone
must) handle the difficult freedom involved in decision making and choice, why
can't all be (except for the mentally retarded or deranged)? One should not find
it hard to accept that most humans have the potential to deal with the choices and
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alternatives which make life exciting if they accept the idea that "Mensch" is
both a thinldng animal and a social animal.
But here we are involved with a model of persons which has been insinuated
into our discussion but not yet explicitly stated and defended.
Model of Person as an OutgroAvth of Sppni^c T., fo
The concerns with human possibility are articulated through the median of
an accepted model of person. The discussion here will in no sense be complete
or final. However, as problematic as it may be to state a model of persons
an implicit or explicit conception of person operates at the base of formulations
and assessments about individuals and society and, therefore, should be stated
as self-consciously as possible. Because I am a social and historical being my
model of persons will reflect ideological commitments which are not fully immune
to social and individual limitations.^^
A serious additional problem is the limitation of the language itself.
Because there is a paucity of literature which deals with the meaning of species
life or a model of person development language has not developed to adequately
deal with such ideals. Furthermore, the male structured language will make
the discussion about persons appear to be primarily about men. Since this is
entirely contrary to my purpose, I will use the term "person."
The ideal of a person defended here is, to a significant degree, rooted in
Marx's conception of species being. To the extent that species being is a view
50See, Alasdair Maclntyre, Against the Self-images of the Age, (New York: Schocken,
1971), Chapter one, for a discussion of the role of ideology in individual thought.
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of ^'Mensch'^ in the non-alienated society, the yiew of person is tied to the open-
ness of human possibilities. The ideal of person focuses on the tension between
presently organized society and the capacities for deyelopment in human beings.
Persons, as are species being, are conceived of here in terms of what human
beings may be, or can be, but not necessarily what they are. With the
emphasis on the individual developing through and in work, the model of a person
will incorporate the notions of gurposive activity as well as aspects important
to social community
.
To be involved in a life of persons one has to experience a) labor as a
creative process or as "purposive rational action," b) critical thinking
involving the exercise of consciousness of one's interests, goals, and purposes,
and c) social living which includes the consciousness of others integrated with
group experiences, forming a sense of human community. Because thinking
and especially critical thought involves the exchange and examination of ideas, and
both language and the exchange of ideas necessitate other people, both group
experiences and active thought processes involve one another. Creative produc-
tive activity is not isolated activity, as we have already discussed. Hence, it
does appear that the three dimensions involved in the ideal of a person are
interrelated and interdependent.
a) Labor as creative activity has already been discussed at length, for it
is through objectifying labor that the individual becomes conscious of his species
51
being, in Marx. The individual through his work ejq)erience can be self-objectifying.
Stuart Hampshire in Thought and Action
,
(New York: Viking Press, 1959),
Jurgen Habermas in Toward a Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968),
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one's
More
.roaai, stated.
^^^^^-^Slone:^^^^^^^
Labor m ttseir is purposive behavior in relation to its objectiiyin, dimen-
sion. ,t involves the person in conceiving the object, in deliberating about the
creation of it in re.ation to others, and in this way it becomes conscious activity.
The very idea of the integration of thought and action is involved in the view of
person as an object creating being.
,
"Thinking and being are thus no doubt
distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other. "52 Creative
labor is an important paradigm case for the discussion of persons because it not
only involves the individual's own consciousness and purposiveness towards
himself, others, his product as well as the process, but it necessitates the
integration of thought and action. Creative labor clearly seems a crucial link
to species consciousness because in alienated labor one is severed from all the
above relations.
b) Critical thinking which involves the consciousness of one's interests,
goals and purposes is termed as such because it may and often does require
the rejection of other statements of what one's own interests, needs, and purposes
are. It involves the exercise of consciousness which necessitates individual
choices specifically in relation to one's goals and purposes. Thought here
includes the ability to question established arrangements, to consider alternatives
and Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971),
who deals with the importance of individual active participation; as the concretiza-
tion of the individual's ideas.
52
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. (New York:
International Publishers, 1964), p. 138.
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to them, to ascertain how these arrangements look when questions are raised
and alternatives considered.
" as a
One may wonder why it is important to deal with the idea of "Mensch
critical thinker. The reason is that it begins to point toward the^roblem of
conceiving the human being as a social animal. It points to the incompleteness
of this view. Marx did not deal per se with the individual as a "mental, "
thinking being in an explicit self conscious form. It may be as a result of this
that he overplayed at times the societal pressures on the individual as noted in
his discussion of total manipulation. Clearly, the more tied and manipulated
the individual is by society the less he or she reflects upon his or her own
thought capacities in terms of his (or her) goals and purposes. Although Marx
notes this tendency clearly he also always maintains the possibility of revolu-
tionary consciousness and the necessity for social change. These two tendencies
reflect the problem of social and historical'Mensch." How does one become
reflective or conscious of one's own ends as a social being?
Thought and language are necessarily social. But there are at the same
time different levels of consciousness and deliberativeness which allow one to
reflect upon one's ideas to different degrees. What is it that prevents the
individual from totally reflecting the surrounding society? I think the answer is
because he or she is a thinking animal and potentially a critically thinking animal.
Thought, although a social process itself, can stand apart from societal and
historical pressures and be reflective of that which it is a product of.
Marx in the 18th Brumaire has written that:
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Men make their own history, but they do not make it Just
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. 53
^
Clearly then, when I speak of the person in terms of the capacity for critical
But I do mean to say that it does allow one to see the person as an active force
in the struggles of his or her time. This interpretation of the person in relation
to society holds that the person is not a mn^reflection of his or her society, but
can as well reflect upon the forces which operate.
Reflection is possible because the person conceptualizes as well as inter-
prets his surroundings. The construction and use of concepts is part of the thought
process of "IWenseh." Concepts help us conceive and delimit reality. "He can
begin endlessly to question and to criticize the vocabulary and the forms of
language which he has learnt always to use in considering alternative ends of
54
action. To the extent that concepts derive much of their meaning from larger
theories, they allow one to draw upon relationships and inferences which become
a vehicle for understanding relationships between ideas and activity. ^5 ^he active
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For Marx language was an element of thought itself. As Karl Marx states in
the German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947), "language is as
old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, as it exists for other
men, and for that reason is really beginning to exist for me personally as well;
for language, like consciousness only arises from the need, the necessity, of
intercourse with other men." (p. 19.) Also see Denis Lawton, Social Class
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role conceptual thought can play is that concepts can create reality as well as
reflect it. The person can construct "realities" other than that which one
experiences. "Beliefs and ideas influence social life; and social life influences
beliefs and ideas. There is a two way causality. "56
The problem of where manipulation or socialization ends and a reflective
conceptual structure or consciousness begins still exists. The relationship
between individual consciousness and socialization processes is a highly complex
problem. This was a key problem for Marx. The answer lies at the root of the
difficult interrelationship between individual consciousness and social pressures
which I cannot broach at this point.
There is evidence, however, in support of the thesis that "Mensch" is
capable of reflective critical thought processes. If the individual could not
conceive of alternate life styles there could be no Women's Liberation Movement,
there could have been no Civil Rights Movement, or the Black Panthers.
Consciousness of the possibilities for social change would be impossible^^
"^^Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake About Causality in Social Science, " in PeterLaslett and W. G. Runciman, eds.
,
Philosophy
. Politics and Society, 2nd Series(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 49.
57^^^^^^.^^^ j^^.^^ Mitchell in Woman's Estate. (New York: Pantheon, 1971)the development of a critical consciousness would be possible within society. The'
forces at work create more than one dimensional results. As Mitchell states:
"Expanding the consciousness of many (for the sake of expanding consumerism)does mean expanding their consciousness. And the products of this expanded
consciousness are more elusive than those of the factory conveyor belt." (p. 31.)The values related to the free market of free choice can rebel in their own term's.
The media can manipulate one to buy the whitest wash, but the T. V. screen also
brings you Vietnam.
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It is the aspect of a person as a oHticaUy thirling being which can open up the
closed circle of Marcuse.
The social system is not something given in history, but isa social object that is selectively intexpreted and is acuU yconceptuahzed by men in the here and now; it is seen as theproduct of the interaction of "subject" and
-object! "58
Thought processes are part of the potential of any given individual, unless
mentally deranged or retarded. The problem arises when this potentiality is
ignored or perverted, as in the case of alienation or false consciousness. The
ideal of a person then involves the prospects of a conscious human being deriving
from the possibility of thought, deliberation, imagination and those activities
which allow the person to be an active element in defining his goals and purposes.
Closely tied to the ideal of person as a critically thinking animal is the
related activity of choice. If the person can construct ideas actively out of what
otherwise would be passive experience he or she starts to create the possibility of
choice. Choice follows from certain levels of consciousness. Human activity
involves purposes, reasons, and goals. Therefore, when choice is not involved
in what we do, most often neither is there consciousness about one's purposes or
goals.
Person's ends and purposes must be clearly stated in order to be able to
make choices which will push one toward an outward development.
The more explicit a man is in formulating to himself the
ends of his action, and the grounds upon which his decisions
rest, the more he is aware of himself as having made choices
that are always subject to revision.
Alvin Gouldner, "Review of History and Class Consciousness, " New York
Times Book Review
,
(July 18, 1971), p. 4.
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To the extent persons "act" they always have ends.^"
"Their action is goal
oriented and their practical reasoning concerns both the proper ends of acti,
and the appropriate means for achieving those ends."" Purposive acti,
involves the choice between alternatives.
"Purposive rational action rcali:
defined goals under given conditions. "^^
It is important to note that I am not saying that the element of choice .
always incorporated into the lives of all people. An alienated person is deficient
in this respect; but it is involved in the ideal of a person.
Once consciousness of ends and goals are incorporated into the model of
a person, as well as the resulting activity of choice which results from the
choosing of ends, one is dealing with the idea of conflict. Conflict is viewed here
as a positive dimension in the life of persons. Afterall it is through conflict, let
us say around ideas, that one becomes more self-conscious of his or her own
ideas. Differences normally arise when choices between alternatives are to be
60.„,
1 he combmation of the concerns of both the model of species being and thelanguage involved with "human action" is fruitful in that it focuses upon the specific
quality of social consciousness and social living as well as providing clarity aboutpurposes, goals, and aims. Marx only begins in his theory of labor to deal with
the question of human action. Of course, for those who conceive of Marx as an
economic determinist this analysis will be troublesome, but the trouble lies in
thoir classification of Marx. Further conscious treatment of this area of human
action IS done by Alasdair Maclntyrc in his Self-images Against the Ago op. cit •
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made. Through the conHict which arises in these instances one often becomes
clearer about his or her own goals or purposes. Choices about human purposes
will most often involve conflict because they reflect decisions arising out of
alternative schemes. Conflicts not only arise out of differences about goals, but
differences relating to entire value systems as well as differences of sex and
age, and economic class.
Durldieim would not be able to accept this position because of his underlying
commitment to the need of order and security for the human individual. Although
Marx is committed to the development of persons he never directly discusses the
positive force of conflict except in relation to class conflict. With the abolition of
classes comes the resolution of conflict. It is because of the potential element of
human choice that I have to differ with Marx in his belief of the "genuine resolution
of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man, (as) the true
resolution of the strife between existence and essence
. .
."^^ Marx's difficulty in
handling the problem of consciousness leads to a deflected treatment of the individual
as "thinking" and therefore a choosing animal experiencing conflicts other than
class conflicts.
c) The last aspect of the ideal of a person involves the importance of social
living, as species life, or the dimension of social community. The view
here is that persons are social and that they therefore require relationships
Op. cit.
,
Marx, p. 135.
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However, most discussions of "persons" do not focus upon the social
dimension of the concepto P. F. Strawson in Individuals
,
(New York: Doubleday,
1959), says that "person" is a social concept but the meaning of social is limited
here. He discusses in Chapter three of Individuals that consciousness of being
a person implies that the individual is aware of other persons. He further states
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With others for their total developn^ent. These relationships between persons
involve certain levels of obligation and responsibility toward one another.
. . .
it may certainly be conceded that the price I haveto pay for self-seeking behavior is a loss of certain kinds
of relationships. But if I want to have a certain kind of
wfth
°f t^^t' friendship and cooperationi others, then my wanting their good and my wanting mygood are not two independent discernible desires. 65
If one aims at a life lived in relationship with others, one must take the
-'others"
into account in a systematic way. Hence, a life which involves a social conscious-
ness means that the "other" persons must always be viewed as important to the
group experience. Social living then would involve the concept of social
responsibility; a person's actions therefore being accountable to those with whom
they live. Durkheim would be able to accept this-but for different ends. The
reciprocating responsible life for him would be instrumental in implementing
the solidary life rather than a creative experimental life-style.
The above conception of person rules out the treatment of persons as things.
"Things are pre-empted for individuals own purposes, whereas a person cannot
be used to serve someone's ends. There is an unconditional worth and respect
that we see each other as persons "if we think first of the fact that we act and
act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature." (p. 109)
This dimension of "social" seems to merely mean that in order for one to
consider himself a person, he must identify those around him as persons also.
Strawson seems to think that "person" is a social concept in as much as it is a
genoralizable notion. The idea of "other" is involved in the preconception of
an individual seeing himself as a person, but the "other" is in no way conceived
as necessary to one's life in terms of the uniqueness or richness of social
community.
65
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Egoism and Altruism", Encyclopedia of Philosophy
ed.
, Paul Edwards, 2 (1967), p. 466.
137
extended to persons, which is never extended to things.
Species consciousness involves a different level of awareness than one
experiences in alienated society. This different level of consciousness embraces
the idea of a collective unity;^^ a sense of community with others. Feelings of
concern, of trust or friendship arise. One becomes involved in "meaningful
participation in a community of fellow human beings. "^^
It has been made clear in the earlier chapter on Marx that species relations
are the truly human relations which culminate out of a shared consciousness and
social experience. But clearly, feelings of love or hate or friendship need not
always arise out of species living, although they do always arise from social
experiences. Species living expresses a higher level of development. Obviously
the process of blaming, exhorting, admiring, or esteeming takes place within a
social community with some level of fundamental ties. Otherwise such
communication would be impossible.
An emotion term like "shame" can only be explained by
reference to other concepts which in turn cannot be
understood without reference to shame. To understand
these concepts we have to be in a certain experience,
we have to understand a certain language, not just of
words, but also a certain language of mutual action and
communication, by which we blame, exhort, admire,
esteem each other.
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But this level of activity is not uniquely indicative of unalienated as opposed to
alienated society. These relations can involve species relations but do not do
so by definition. Within capitalist enterprises individuals can be blanked and
admired; blaming and admiring can be alienated activity.
The development of the species character of human existence is more than
persons living together. It involves living together in a socially res.onsibl. way;
taking cognizance of the "other- person. Each must live up to his or her
commitments which includes living with a concern for others. Species relations
reflect a higher order conceptual field which reflects the concerns of social
justice and social responsibility. The feelings that "men desire, yearn, love,
want, hope, need, aspire, hate, shun.
. distinguish communal "Mensch"
from isolated individual. But the commitment to social justice or social
responsibility distinguishes a possible pattern for the development of species
"Mensch."
If one posits the varied human relationships on a continuum, species
relations will be the highest form of social community possible, while atomized
class society will be the lowest. One moves from casual to intimate relations
here. At the same time the community is developing the individuals involved
are growing, and experiencing truly human relationships. Species relationships
do involve commitments and responsibility; but these operate as guarantees
for necessary freedom in distinction from Durkheim's concerns with solidary
order.
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U should be clear from the above dlseussion dealing with the mode, of a
person that need analy.sis doe. not begin to deal with the issue of the potentiality
or "Menseh." The alienated individual may not express through behavioral
inclination or tension that he is dissatisfied. He may indeed not bo. However.
I would want to say that this individual has not developed In terms of his species
capacities.
Why is species being- vindieatcd here as the form of humrm activity one
should try to attain? Clearly it is not because people are always inclined toward
it in any behavioral sense. And it is not the most easily attained mode of life.
Therefore, let us explore the possibility that individuals would choose
species beings if they could experience that life.
The problems which arise with this approach are not as a result of the
choice criterion itself but rather with related questions. The first problem
arises when one tries to judge whether the experiencing of alternatives has been
adequate prior to choosing. It becomes difficult to assess whether a given
individual has been "fully immersed" in competing and different experiences.
One is to be exposed to a wide range of information before choices are to be
made, but how does one loiow if the information has been adequate or basically
comprehended? In other words, if person "x" chooses life style after
examining and experiencing situations "a," "b," and "c," and "/," how does one
know if these alternatives were wide ranging enough to make a valid choice?
How does one test to know if person "x" has really immersed himself or herself
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in the different experiences?
The above diseussion leads one towards the other major problem which
J^-^^J^eailrtllojHBO^ej^^
^^^^^
to truly experience competing lite styles one must immerse oneself in a
variety of situations, and the question is whether this emersion does not in
the end change the original human being. One does not walk in and out of a
social Situation which involves an entire conceptual set in the same way one
walks in and out of a doorway. Does a real involvement in competing social
situations require a different mental set or at least a tremendously self-
conscious sense of one's own perspective? And would this not change the way
one looks at things; or the way one viewed things previous to the expanded
information?
Let me elaborate by way of an example. If I was asked whether I condoned
exiDloitative relations, specifically in this case, slavery, I would answer no.
Very often the question is then filled out further to read: if you knew of a
relationship between two people "A" and "B, " where "A" was dominated by "B, "
but "A" was happy, would you still be adamant in your condemnation of it? Of
course the classical example of this is the happy slave, and the inference here is
that the slave has chosen his position.
When the assessment of the person as "happy" is brought in one often assumes
that this implies a certain degree of choice. The point here is that the individual's
happiness may not really be indicative of varied alternatives. The "choice" to
remain a slave may not be a reflective choice. The slave even when exposed to
71Sce, Taylor, "Interpretations and the Science of Man," op. cit.
,
and
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differing experiences may be unable to ehoose reflectively, because of Ms total
socialization into his role. Here again we are confronted with the problem of
1) trying to evaluate the value of alternatives granted the socialized being as
well as 2) dealing with the issue of whether he can really experience these
alternatives. The contemporary example often given is of the prisoner who does
not want his newly won freedom. First I think it is important to note that this
is the exception to the rule; otherwise prisons would not need their guards.
However, in this case the prisoner camiot judge the value of freedom within the
conceptual set of prisoner. Once he is educated again to value freedom he most
likely will not choose imprisonment. But then again, is this the same man choos-
ing as before his re-education?
It is posited here that once individuals are allowed, as well as prepared,
to experience other situations (S and S^) they are in a position to choose more
72
refl3ctively. S and represent two competing social situations here inclusive
of conceptual baggage as well as actual life styles. I am assuming here that
anyone who would choose to be a slave or who would choose a life of exploita-
tion would do so out of false consciousness resulting from a lack of information
or a lack of awareness of competing alternatives or experience.
Although I do think the problems related to the activity of choice are
troublesome, I still think that the process of choice is important to the
justification of the model of a person. It is a possible way in which the ideals
that characterize species life can be vindicated.
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CHAPTER IV
ANOM,E AND AUENATION AS THEORETICAL PEHSPECTIVES rOH WOMEN
Thus far I have e^a^ined two classical perspectives which purport to explain
the relationship of the individual to society as well as provide
.odels of develop-
ment. I have examined the role
..needs" play m the anomie framework of
Durld^elm and the alienation framework of Marx. I have argued that need theory
is insufficient In both theories to provide us with a comprehensive understanding
of social life. Only by elaborating a model of persons will any perspective be able
to provide us with both prescriptive and descriptive standards by which to
comprehend complex social reality.
The ultimate purpose of my excursion into the anomie and alienation
paradigms was to provide us with a framework for the understanding of women.
This concluding chapter will focus again upon the two perspectives, but with
particular emphasis upon their relevance for the understanding of woman In
contemporary society. I will examine both contemporary and classical versions
of these frameworks and will finally conclude that the alienation perspective
buttressed by a clear statement of the Ideal of persons is the only approach
that is able to provide us with a sound understanding of the issue of women as
persons
.
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Women in the Anor^i.
^^.^^^^^^^^^
The anomie perspective of Durkheim connects a series of claims to the
conception of a person, as ideal. It also presents the tightly woven assumptions of
woman's biology and sexuality and the resulting derivative needs. It is
important to remember that women are excluded from the condition of anomie
by Durkheim although the end state of the ideal moral person is the same for
both men and women. That is, although men and women are understood
initially within different frameworks, man as embroiled in a market society
leading to rootlessness, woman as passive and submissive by "nature," the
end state of moral solidary relations is seen as the ideal fulfillment for both.
The moral man has internalized the rules of the society. His existence is ordered
and stable, whereas woman more fully derives her ordered moral condition from
her biological make-up. The ideal person for Durkheim is in a passive relation-
ship with society because of Durkheim's overriding concerns with stability,
security and moral dependence.
Without explicating Freud's position on women, Durkheim's framework is
distinguished here from the "biology as destiny" argument, via his discussion
of human needs. Although he often resembles Freud in his treatment of women,
Durkheim does deal with woman's needs as they relate to his model of a person
and the question of the moral order.
Woman as Biological and Sexual Beings
Although Durkheim's general theory does contain a theory of needs which
distinguishes it from cruder forms of biological determinism, most conceptions
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of wo^a. toCay are tied very o.osely to a stereo«
.ew wMcH Ce.ves Tro. the
anoxic paradigm, and which perceives wo.en as sexual beings who are bound
by their biology and their "nature." Wo.en are further tied to their biology as
they are defined and described in terms of it and as needs are derived from it.
Much contemporary literature in the anomie mold binds women to the limits
Of their bodies. A developmental scheme for women which involves freedom or
experimentation is noticeably lacking. Rather, women are viewed as "naturally-
passive. Durkheim sees women as secure in their passivity whereas contemporary
atomic theory treats them as needin^^ further social constraints. These necessary
constraints can be attained through marriage and the fulfillment of the "female
role." They are seen as important for the "secure" life, and the secure life is
viewed as the good life. ^
The needs of security which derive from the dependence nurtured by the
sexual role of both woman and mother, and the resulting economic dependence
feed into the derivative need of marriage. ^
Oftentimes those who discuss the problem of women within an anomie paradio-m
really stray from the classical meaning of anomie and adopt a mixture of classical
and contemporary ideas. They retain the classical statement of needs, those of
security and order, but adopt a psychological, subjective dimension, different from
that of Durkheim's treatment of anomie. Woman, as anomie in contemporary theory
IS therefore abstracted from her social context, (the economic and sexist surround-
ings). Therefore, the study of women, especially by psychologists is with an over-
emphasis on innate characteristics rather than with the objective social conditions
of the surrounding society.
2
As Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, (New York: Bantam Books, 1952),
notes, marriage basically is conceived in terms of the security which it provides.
"Thus what bourgeois optimism has to offer the engaged girl is certainly not love;
the bright ideal held up to her is that of happiness, which means the ideal of quiet
equilibrium in a life of immanence and repetition." (p. 421.)
or
For these writers women are largely determined by their biology
sexuality; their "determinate taction" deriving from the fact that they are the
child bearers. Woman's purposes are defined in terms of her function as a
sexual being. Her biology serves to limit the way what she does can even be
conceived or understood.
Women, then, are viewed as "dependent, passive, fragile, subjective,
emotional, unable to take risks. For Freud, woman's passivity is rooted in
her biology because the vagina is the passive recipient. From the sexual
contours of woman's bodies to the biological states of pregnancy, menopause,
and menstruation, contemporary writers move easily to descriptions of women
as passive, weak, ajid tender, although they might not always agree with the
"specific" arguments of Freud. Possible life styles are constructed from these
assessments; as different anatomies define different needs which inhibit the
concerns with woman's potential. From the biological assessment of passive and
fragile woman one derives the needs for order and security. If woman is viewed
as dependent she needs someone else to depend upon. If woman is passive, some-
one else must be active. If woman is subjective and emotional someone else
must bring the objective and rational into her life.
This conception of women has made its way into notions of mental health
Judith Bardwick and Elizabeth Douvan "Ambivalence: The Socialization of
Women," in Vivian Gornick and Barbara Moran, eds. , Woman in Sexist Society
,
(New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 147. This kind of language partially
derives from the sexual-biological view of women as well as constructs the view
of women as sexual-biological beings. It not only reflects a view of woman,
it begins to define how women will be conceived in the future. The language
becomes active in prescribing certain life styles as distinctly "feminine."
m Which a "healthy" woman differs substantially from a "healthy" man. Theoreti-
ca, schema are differentiated according to sex. As Inge a.d Donald Broverma.
argue:
a double standard of health exists wherein ideal concepts
of health for a mature adult, sex unspecifi^re meantprimarily for men, less so for women. ^
. . .
the concepts of health for a sex unspecified adult and for aman will not differ, but that the concepts of health for women
will differ significantly from those of an adult. ^
"Man" and "adult" seem to be synonomous in the above, whereas woman appears
to be differentiated significantly from the idea of "adult.
"
For instance, among these items, clinicians are more likely
to suggest that healthy women differ from healthy men by
being more submissive, less independent, less adventurous
more easily influenced, less aggressive, less competitive
more excitable
. . .
their feelings easily hurt
. . . more
emotional
. . .
This constellation seems a most unusual way
of describing any mature, healthy, individual. ^
The idea of a woman's "nature" has a self-justifying role to play. Woman's
nature as it is defined in the anomie perspective presupposes a whole set of needs
which differ from men's, ranging from the physical to the mental arena. The
resulting organization of society which is structured to meet these needs is
justified by the very fact that it is organized to meet the needs of woman. These
needs (which derive from the treatment of women as biological-sexual beings)
4
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Clinical Judgments of Mental Health, " Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology
,
34 (1970), p. 2. These findings were a result of a survey which
Inge and Donald Broverman et al. , conducted themselves. The questionnaire
which tested the sex-role stereotyping was distributed among practicing clinicians.
5
Ibid
.
,
p. 5.
^Ibid
.
147
-sexual
ing
structure society. As a result society deals with women as biological-
beings. Needs in this sense become self-justifying a^ self-sustaining.
Although often in the actual practice of their lives men donot have fulfill
jobs and are not able to tap their potential, they are at least viewed as having
a potential and as requiring a life with purpose, aims and goals. Such an
approach allows for a critical analysis of the man's situation where it fails to
tap the potential or offer a purpose. Women, however, are viewed with purposes
biologicaUy and sexually defined and therefore as having no potential as persons
independent of these. On this model despite changes in social structure the
essential role of women would remain impervious to change. Society camaot
therefore be criticized for failing to allow women's development since she is
thought to be biologically motivated and defined. A social and historical perspec-
tive is necessary (although not sufficient) if a critical base is to be developed.
For example, most often the inequalities between men and women are
justified by explaining their biological differences which eventually lead to the
positing of psychological differences, and these culminate in turn, in the conclusion
that man is better prepared to handle the difficulties which life may present.
This leads to the inequalities which are inevitable when one person is allowed
to become more "complete" than another. But biological differences cannot alone
account for social inequalities. Issues of society and history must be accounted
for.
Strength, Sex Differentiation, and the Role of Inequality
There are several approaches that might be taken to assess the relevance
Of biology as the determiner of appropriate sexual roles. First, using the example
of differentials in strength, one might question the extent to which there is a
significant difference between the sexes with regard to physical ability.
We might well begin with a very suggestive quote from a black slave,
Sojourner Truth, whose life suggests the irrelevance of sexual differentiation
on the basis of strength:
The man over there says women need to be helped into
carriages and lifted over ditches, and to have the best
place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages
or over puddles, or gives me the best place-and ain't
I a woman? Look at my arm! I have ploughed and
planted and gathered into barns and no man could head
me~and ain't I a woman? I could work as much and
eat as much as a man-when I could get it-and bear the
lash as well! And ain't I a woman. I have born
thirteen children and seen most of 'em sold into slavery,
and when I cried out with my mother's grief—none but
Jesus heard me—and ain't I a woman?''
As Truth would have it, women are capable of carrying great burdens and suffer-
ing severe pain. Even if the strongest man is stronger than the strongest woman,
women obviously possess enough strength and ability to be involved in a variety
of tasks now denied to them. And besides, in terms of average strength,
differentials are not as great as they are made out to be between man and woman.
It is seriously open to question whether women are as weak as often described
and if when they are it is not as much a reflection of social pressures as
biological make-up.
One may speculate that if the delicate woman of the Victorian age suddenly
found herself in the position of slave, she would soon lose her societally developed
Eleanor Flexnor, Century of Struggle
,
(New York: Antheneum, 1959), pp. 90-91.
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delicacy and instead develop her physical capacities in the interest of survival.
Yet. even if one posits that there remains a modest ,or significant) difference
in strength between male a.d female, one must still ask if this difference (to
Whatever degree it exists) should serve as the basis for determining appropriate
models of human development. This question takes on even greater importance
in a society whose technology has attempted to define human strength, of both
male and female, as irrelevant for the performance of most important and valued
positions.
In a technologically advanced society it is impoverished to limit possibilities
for human beings to the forces of "nature." Societies are organized for the
very purpose of controlling and molding "nature" to human designs. However,
given the extent to which women's "frailties" are continually discussed, one
would think that physical strength was a key to "success" in highly industrialized
g
societies. However important strength might have been in primitive societies,
it is clearly not a key factor in the technocratic or programmed societies
described by Galbraith's New Industrial State. ^ or Alain Touraine's Post-
10
Industrial Society
.
A technological society by definition reflects the mastery of "nature" towards
Juliet Mitchell in Woman's Estate
.
(New York: Pantheon. 1971), discusses
the role "woman's physical abilities" (or disabilities) play in socialist thought
through an examination of Bebel, Engels. Lenin and Marx.
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conscious ends. The entire discussion of labor which has been presented so tar
Via Marx, has dealt with labor as
. . an indication of .an's growing awareness
of his confrontation with and differentiation from nature."" The idea of
creation through technological forces is expressed by the notion that through
labor, "IVIensch" molds nature into the preferred forms thought necessary.
"Mensch" is Within this view not limited by his nature or the natural surround-
ings, because through social forces he combines to control his life, in whatever
measure.
And yet, for those who believe in the existence of a "woman's nature," the
idea of controlling one's life even in the narrow terms of one's biology is dropped.
Societal forces, as technology, play no active role in defining or redefining
biology (as "nature") for related life styles of women. There is no differentiation
between "nature" and human "possibility" here. Biology defines possibilities;
woman's body, therefore, defines all.
Finally, the one question I have not completely dealt with yet is whether
"natural" differences between male and female, if we concede that they exist,
should be used as guidelines either to what is necessary or to what is "good"
as related to possible models of human development. There are two steps
involved in dealing with this dimension of "natural. " First one has to define
and explain what it is that is meant by natural and secondly one must then ask.
'^'^Shlomo Avineri, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in Hegel's
Realphilosophie, " Philosophy and Public Affairs
,
1 (Fall, 1971), p. 10.
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or argue that what is natural is good. ^2
Often, when the "natural" is invoked, wo are left in the dark
a c ai^:; f [ f " explanation, a recon^mendation,l im or determinism, or simply a desperate appeal, as
If the na ural" were some sort of metaphysical glue that
could hold our claims or values together.
When dealing with the question of women such concerns with an elaboration and
justification of "natural" are dismissed; that which is, is seen as naturaUnd
that which is natural, is good.
Biological differences clearly have led to social and economic inequality.
The question is however, when should difference Icadjojnn,^^ Within
this question one should distinguish between asking whether biological differences
must be assessed as biological "inequalities" as well as asking whether biological
differences must result in social and economic inequalities.
As Kate Millett notes "male supremacy" does not reside alone in physical
strength or biological make-up, but rather in a value system which is semi-autono-
mous of such considerations.
The heavier musculature of the male, a secondary sexual
characteristic and common among mammals, is biological
in origin but it is also culturally encouraged through
breeding, diet and exercise. Yet it is hardly an adequate
category on which to base political relations within
civilization. Male supremacy like other political creeds,
docs not finally reside in physical strength but in the
acceptance of a value system which is not biological
.
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Society
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, p. 160, elaborates on the concept "natural" for its implica-
tions for the issue of women.
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inequality is evidently rooted in social rules; society evaluates differences as
inequalities via the standards that are established. Hence, biological differences
between men and women are evaluated societally as biological inequalities
.
Even once such assessments are made this by no means automatically justifies
resulting artifical inequalities.
Although the above discussion is not limited to that of the United States
I want to demonstrate my point through an example drawn from contemporary
American society. American society is not organized around or structured by
the values which prize "the richness of difference." The United States has
difficulty in valuing difference in terms of the richness of its uniqueness. The
consequence is, if people are different, inequality is then assumed. The reason
for this is because one right way of "being" is viewed as the best way to be.
Hence, Blacks, Chicano's, women, children, old people, are all unequal in terms
of this restrictive ideal. Each is not regarded as important in relation to their
unique qualities as well as their universal human capacities. For instance, what
15^
See, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men, "in The First and Second Discourses, ed.
, Robert Masters,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), Rousseau clearly distinguishes between
societal and natural inequalities in the "Origin of Inequality." He states: "I
conceive of two sorts of inequality in the human species: one, which I call natural
or physical, because it is established by nature and consists in the differences of
ages, health, bodily strengths, and qualities of mind or soul; the other, which
may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends upon a sort of
convention and is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men. The
latter consists in the different privileges that some men enjoy to the prejudice of
others, such as to be richer, more honored, more powerful than they, or even to
make themselves obeyed by them." (p. 101.)
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happens instead is that because certain body structures are valued as aggressive
and therefore good (i.e.
.
the penis) in the man, the woman's body structures
must be less valued; hence, biological differences come to be assessed in terms
of inequality. Differences are converted into inequalities of status, educational
opportunity, etc.
,
when there is one restrictive model which all individuals are
suppose to try to attain; and that is to be White. Anglo Saxon Protestant, young
and male. In a society with one restrictive ideal, inequality is the outgrowth of
difference. Women then become variations on a theme of inequality.
If it were not for the acceptance of this one model biological differences
between men and women would be assessed as simply that-differences. They
certainly would not be used as a justification for the inequality between men and
women or the necessity for severely divergent life styles.
This is not to say that inequalities do not justifiably occur through and in
society, as opposed to "natural" or biological differences of sex or race. In
other words, there may be relevant differences which justify different rights
and obligationso For instance, a parent's greater competence in making certain
decisions justifies his or her authority, in certain respects, over the child. The
point I wish to make here though is that inequalities of this sort are acceptable
in so far as they are limited to particular areas of competence. However,
when inequalities become cumulative they begin to define life styles which are
detrimental to at least one of the individuals involved in the relationship, because
inequalities result which cannot be reasonably justified.
For example, from the difference that person "X" is bigger or taller than
the average individual one can justifiably account for the inequality of treatment
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which provides "X" with more food. Cumulative inequalities arise, however,
and are not justifiable, when person "X's" size becomes the judge of decisions
which have no direct bearing upon it. Person "Y" may be extremely intelligent
(which differentiates him or her from other individuals not as gifted) and therefore
is able to get an extremely creative and interesting job, which is unequal
treatment because most people would not describe their job as such. However.
"Y's" competence justifies her right to the job (although it does not justify that
others should be forced to do mundane work). It is the cumulative inequalities
which are unjustifiable in this case; "Y" not only has an interesting job, but the
salary is extremely high, and therefore "Y" enjoys a privileged status, etc.
Cumulative inequalities result in that "Y's" life-style could be described as
privileged.
On the same plane, man's greater strength (to the extent it exists) justifies
carrying loads that need to be carried, or justifies the sharing of the load. The
question of differential strength, however, should not be related to justifying
sources of authority.
Although I have stated that particular relations of inequality can be justified
as the valued criteria are brought to bear on the individual instance. I do not
mean to say that justification automatically flows from the explanation. Aftcrall,
there are cases when explanation will not invoke a justification because general
reasons and principles may be supplied for differential treatment such as in the
case of sexism and racism. In such cases the common humanity and equality
between persons is undermined and ignored. My ultimate commitment here is to
1
6
See, Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality, " in Joel Feinberg. Moral Con-
cepts
,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969). pp. 151-154.
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the point that individuals are equal in one respeet whieh overrides any differences
(except possibly mental derangement) and that is in terms of their right to
experience the full range of alternatives society can provide or they can develop
in community with others. Relations which ignore or subvert this human
quality cannot be justified.
My argument thus far has three dimensions. First I see the biological
differences between the sexes, as manifested for example by differences in
strength, as primarily a result of socialization, and therefore less innate than
generally assumed. Second, I have argued that differences in strength and
physical ability, even if they do exist, are not as important in an advanced
society whose technology has been dedicated to freeing both sexes from the limits
of "nature." This includes the position which some hold that states that although
woman has a "basic nature" (inclusive of different anatomies, needs and potentials),
it is changeable and can be molded by technological advances and social conditions.
And finally, that inequalities must be rooted in relevant criteria if they are to be
justified. The inequalities attributed to women in relation to men are most often
not. Societal inequalities which ignore the human capacities of some, can never be
justified.
Woman as Sexual in Feminist Thought
Despite my arguments about the irrelevance of biology it is interesting to
note that these same factors extensively define portions of the literature which
argue for the liberation of women. One can see all too clearly that conceptions
of women, even by feminists themselves, too often reflect socialization patterns as
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severe pressures of the societies in which they live. Let me explain further what
I mean here. Particular statements within the literature of the Women's
Movement reflect the conception of woman as sexual rather than woman as a
person; a species being. I think that to the extent a good portion of the contemporary
women's literature reflects this view of woman a_s s_exual being, and there are many
variations upon this theme, it arises out of (although it does move beyond) the
anomie paradigm to a much greater extent than one would expect.
Germaine Greer, for example, speaks of feminism, in part, as the move-
ment towards free love and sexual liberation. According to Greer one should
abandon marriage and replace it with sex, for the more sex you have the richer
you are. Integral to this idea is Greer's conception of "spontaneous association,
which is the ideal form of social relations for her. Spontaneous association keeps
things alive and moving. "Lovers who are free to go when they are restless
always come back; lovers who are free to change remain interesting. "^^ It seems
to me that although spontaneity is an important part of the way individuals
interact together it is only a partial description of preferred socal interaction.
Spontaneity seems to describe relations encountered by sexual beings;
rather than expressing the full sense of relations between species beings.
17
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Dana Donsmore. also a writer of the Women's Movement, sUxtes the problem
With this view of woman as sexual.
The articulated assumption behind this misunderstanding-
is that women are purely sexual beings, bodies and sen-
suality, iuckmg machines. Therefore freedom for
women could only mean sexual freedom.
Shulamith Firestone, who accepts the Freudian perspective in some degree,
in her Dialectic o_f S^, tries to construct a dialectic of sex, because she sees
the key problem of modern life as sexuality. Sex classes for Firestone are
derived directly from the biological reality that men and women are different.
The difference in and of itself is not the basis of the sex class system but the
domination of one group by another which arises from it is.^^ From the
differentiation of who gives birth flows the resulting inequalities.
Because Firestone sees women as sexual beings, the feminist revolution
is seen as a sexual revolution. She defines the program for the feminist
revolution as "freeing women from the tyranny of their reproductive biology, "22
which will result in their economic independence and self-determination as
women and cliildren become totally integrated into society. ^3 Production and
reproduction would be organized to be non-repressive.
20
Dana Densmore, "Independence from the Sexual Revolution, " in Notes from
the Third Year: Women's Liberation, (Ohio: Bell & Howell, 1972), p. 58. WriFe
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ps.ychc,lo,.y,
.scxu.-U repression and cultural sublimation. 24
in the same way that I find Durkheim's biological treatment of women
deficient I also find both Greer and Firestone lacking. Their treatment of
women is clearly different than Durkheim's; they have moved from his analysis
of passive biological being to woman as an active, aggressive, sexual being.
I'>uL this analysis is still limited to the conception of wom.m as primarily sexual.
Wom.-.n is still restricted by her body; her mind is ignored.
The options that are considered by Greer and l.^irestone are already loaded.
The first is the view rejected, of woman as girl, and girl as passive sexual
object. The second, which is chosen to replace this view of passive being, is
woman as active sexual aggressor. Sox becomes actively creative for woman.
What has happened here is that we have moved from the view of woman as
"passive sexuality" (Durkheim) to the conception of woman as sexually
creative and aggressive, (comparable lo llobbes). Firestone and Greer start to
move us out of the Durkheimian framework but place us in a Ilobbcsian
perspective instead. By affirming the opposite of the anomie perspective they
rcvoiil the extent to which th;it model sets the terms within which they think
.
This may be an historically necessary state in order to discard the constraints
of the puritan ethic. But it does not encompass the full sense of what it means
94
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for women to be persons. It should be evident by now that if one follows this
route one by-passes the concerns rodected in the alienation perspective.
If one is to deal with the idea of human develoon^ent and potentiality
one has to move to the concerns with persons; to move to the concerns of the
total integration of one's thought and activity. Dana Densmore notes how the
concern with "persons" is deflected by the everyday language used.
The language wasn't constructed around concepts like
person, a word that can include man and woman
without differentiation, as if they were the same class
of beings. And we don't think of them that way now.
That's why it sounds strange.
If woman, as sexual, provides an insufficient analysis for the question of
women, then it appears that one has to move to a framework which encompasses
a model of person which involves purposive activity and human potentiality. The
key element here is not that women are sexual animals but that they can be
complete persons only in terms of the integration of their thought and action
.
Anomie and Women in Contemporary Social Science Literature
I have discussed the deficiencies of the sexual-biological view of women,
as expressed by Durkheim as well as the variations on his theme. But now I want
to examine the validity of the theory of anomie for the study of women in contem-
porary society. If one adopts Durkheim's theoretical framework but drops his
biological assumptions about women
,
then women will experience anomie as
25Dana Densmore, "Speech is the Form of Thought," The Female State
,
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men do when they confront the appropriate situations. This move allows one
to ask whether Durkheim's specific assumptions relating to the condition of
anomie ea^ encompass the varied problems of women today. In other words,
does Durkheim's view of happiness as moral solidarity and ordered, secure,
relationships help one in constructing possible expalanatlons of the unrest and
discontent of women today and does it generate as well a model of development
for women?
In comtemporary terminology "status ineonsistency" is one manifestation
of anomie. 26 Women then are often said to experience anomie as a result of
experiencing inconsistent self-identities. For example, a woman who is highly
educated but works at a mundane, unskilled job could be said to experience status
inconsistency. She is aware of her unprivileged status as woman and the
drudgery of her work, yet she knows that she is judged differently in terms of
her advanced education. Conflicts arise in such positions, as women are assessed
according to different and contradictory standards. They are said to experience
anomie because of these inconsistent roles.
Consider, in this light, Gerhard Lenski's treatment of the anomie perspec-
tive as it directly pertains to women in contemporary society. Although I will
be primarily discussing Lenski's treatment of women he also conceptualizes
26^
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men
men within the anomie paradigm, but somewhat differently. For Lenski,
and women are both conceived in atomic terms, as is paradigmatic of mlch of
the social science literature, while the difference between them is that men
are viewed as more independent and aggressively self-interested than women.
Lenski's basic position is that there has been considerable improvement
in the status of women in modern times, although not to the level of full equality.
In agrarian societies the status of woma^ reflected the status of her husband^^
while in industrial society woman's position has changed rapidly from this view
of mere appendage. Hence, it is no longer feasible to view women as merely
dependents of some male.^S According to Lenski, opportunities are now open
outside of the roles of wife, daughter and dependent kinswoman. "Virtually all
occupations are now open to them and they enjoy complete equality with respect
to the rights of property. "29 ^^^^ assessment of woman in society
Lenski is concerned to find out why women have "failed to achieve" full equality.
His answer involves woman in 1) family responsibility, 2) biological factors
such as "pregnancy, menopause, and menstruation (which) still prove handicaps
in the intense competition for the more rewarding jobs"^^ and 3) the concern
with security.
Because women know there is a much less risky and much
more promising route to rewards, most stop striving for
27
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L~iirtl'; --peteinstead m the marriage market and the world of the family. ^1
Lenski discusses marriage as a style of life chosen by women; but clearly he does
not employ my criteria of reflective choice here.
Despite the fact that modern feminists are often critical of
this choice, they cannot ridicule it. It offers almost asmany opportunities for attaining rewards as competition in
the man's world, and the probabilities of success are farfar greater. "^'^
Lenski does not think that the inequalities between men and women will
decrease because women will continue to "choose" marriage for the security
it renders in an uncertain male world. As for the element of choice, it may be
that women are free in their choice of a husband (though this is not always true
because of race and class barriers).' However, the choice of whether to marry
or not is largely influenced by a society which has little place for unmarried
women. As for Lenski's prior assumption that women are driven by the desire
for security, one could as easily posit woman's desire for creativity.
Although Lenski says that full equality in agrarian societies is not realized
for women, it is not as a result of biological or intellectual incapacity that they
remain unequal. Social conditions make it extremely difficult for them to attain
33
it. However, in discussing reasons for the unequal status of women in
industrial society one of the reasons given is biology, particularly, menopause.
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pregnancy, and menstruation. The argument is backwards. One expects his
argument to be the other way around; that in agrarian societies biological
differences might cause inequalities whereas in industrialized societies such
differences can be tectaologically controlled. But this has already been
discussed, so let us rather look at Lenski's position that it is woman's desire
for security which will keep her from gainingm equality with men. According
to Lenski women will prefer marriage with the security it provides rather than
seek full equality in the economic and political world. Marriage creates an
economic security and provides no more stultifying a lite style than many males
are forced to lead.
It is significant that the most serious charge militant feminists
now make is that the role-of housewife is intellectually stultifyino-
but most women seem to realize that this same charge could
with equal validity, be directed against most male occupations.
However, the idea of security in marriage becomes increasingly fallacious
as divorce rates rise. Besides, Lenski has a very particular marriage in mind.
and nevertheless draws broad generalizations from it.
By an advantageous marriage, a woman may obtain half
interest in a very substantial income, entree to exclusive
circles, and leisure to do most of the things she wishes. '^^
(1) An advantageous marriage to Lenski is clearly one with substantial economic
security, and this limits his discussion to begin with. (2) He speaks of the
woman gaining half-interest in a substantial income but one wonders what "interest"
means here. Most often the woman becomes an economic dependent. (3) Lenski
34
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also speaks of entrance into exclusive circles but it is clearly the
.an^s entrance,
the woman again is appendage. Exclusive circles again connotes that this is a
privileged marriage. (4) The idea of leisure of which he speaks is a myth to
most working class families and even to a large portion of middle class women.
(5) I^nski mentions leisure in relation to having time to do what one wishes.
But Without some sense of one's development, what does one wish for?
Hence, for Lenski marriage matches the attractions of a career. He works
Within the anomie paradigm as he chooses security as his cherished value as
opposed to human development. I^nski is content with present arrangements
because he sees woman as satisfied in the "secure" roles organized for them
through marriage.
The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in the family
system which, as noted previously, makes it possible for
most women to attain their goals, through marriage as
easily as^most men can attain theirs through work and political
activity.
It is on this basis that Lenski predicted in 1966 that the feminist movement
had lost its vigor.
This probably explains why the feminist movement has
lost most of its vigor; for the vast majority of women,
the battle of equality has been won.
In 1972, one can say that Lenski's theory did not predict appropriately the future
developments of women's priorities. The feminist movement has escalated and
marriage as it is presently conceived is under serious scrutiny. Marriages
36^,
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have always supplied differential a^ouiits and kinds of security; soine carriages
provide none. But the rejection of the present sexist system cannot be under-
stood within the confines of the anomie paradigm itself.
Before laying to rest the much acclaimed virtue of security, let us examine
it as Germaine Greer handles it. Greer, in the FejuUe E^uch, dismisses the
importance of the value of security. Security largely means boredom, because
it implies the status quo. "Security is when everything is settled, when nothing
can happen to you; security is the denial of life. "^S oftentimes this is what
security does mean. But security as boredom at the same time is clearly an
upper-class conception of the idea.
Although theoretically security appears as a socially approved and valued
"need" in actuality society is not organized to really satisfy this "need" by pro-
viding secure relationships. In other words, women may not become quite bored,
because even if married (the so-called haven of security) there is always the fear
of divorce (which is a one in three possibility today). Ideologically, security is
of top priority in terms of the way women are socialized but the social relation-
ships which are offered to women often do not actualize such relations.
But the above is still insufficient in terms of analyzing the "need" of
security or order. Possible ways to analyze the prevalence of the "need" of
security are: 1) Society nurtures the need for security in women to help
maintain the present arrangements of marriage and motherhood and earning
capacities. Women then, desire security to the extent they are social beings.
38
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2) Although there are pressures tew.n, the
..secure" nfe se^o w„n,e„ who have
developed the oapaeities for eritieal thought choose diHerently. They therefore
direct their lives towards purposes
.md goals which often necessitate risk or
conflict.
:,) Thirdly, one can question the very idea of security, as Greer
does, but It seems as thought .t wouKI be „„,st fruitful to ,1„ so not in terms of simply
the dimension of boredom, hut rather in terms of possibilities for freedom in
relationship to developing as persons.
The anomie perspective does partially express certain dimensions of
woman's problems to the extent that women are social and historical beings and
therefore reflect societal needs. ^vinccM^^
ana lysis it roriccts upon soci.-.li/ed woman. One of woman's largest problems
is that she becomes locked inside a definition of self which is defined in terms
of external pressures. Women then are seen as needing marriage, aggressive
husbands, and several children, in the specific sense. In the general sense
woman is seen as needing stable and secure relationships. The anomie perspec-
tive of individuals focuses upon them in terms of their wants and needs and to tlie
extent women have been socialized into their roles and want them. They reflect
the tendencies of the society. In other words the condition of anomie may
reflect the problem of normlessness because the individual has been socialized
for instance, to accept authority relationships as necessary. Hence, some
women may feel insecure when not married, due to societal pressures which
teach one to expect certain routines from life, while others may not.
As stated throughout, if one's conception of a person is limited to manifested
needs it becomes impossible to make distinctions between real and false needs.
are
One then becomes locked within the societal framework created at the time.
Needs as integral to the whole process of productive-consumption become
invalid standards for assessment. "Women don't get what they need, they r
compelled to need what they can get. The needs which are developed within
society-for order and security and harmony-are insufficient to analyze society
With because they are self-perpetuating. A society develops those needs which
Will perpetuate its stability.
The anomie perspective via the phenomena of status inconsistency continues
to be deficient as an explanation which can foster an understanding of the problem
of women in contemporary society. It seems to be able to express (in a limited
way) the problems of only a few particular cases, such as highly educated middle
class housewives (although not all) and let us say, Black professional women.
The example of the middle class educated housewife can reflect the problem
of status inconsistency. The expected criteron is present in that the middle class
housewife is often educated far above the tasks which she performs. However,
necessary to the occurrence of status inconsistency is a level of consciousness
about the conflict between women's capabilities (specifically education) and her
actual life style. In other words, for the middle class housewife who is well
socialized into her role, and who does not realize that her worth is inconsistently
appraised (she may not even be aware of her own worth), no problem of anomie
exists. Two women, hence, can occupy the same social roles; however, only
the one who is conscious of her condition as woman in conflict with her societal
39
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value, can .e sai. to suHer fro„ status inconsistency or ano.ie. To tMs extl
assessments of status inconsistency are ii.ited to the dimension ot conscious-
ness.
It is important to note that even for the middle class housewife who is
aware of her conflicting roles, status inconsistency is only a partial expression
of the problem she faces. The conflicts which arise are dealt with only as a first
approximation of the problem. She may feel undervalued. Conflicts exist
between education and motherhood. She feels berated, shortchanged, or used.
But these feelings are only a partial expression of the problem, because they
do not encompass a model of human development. Status inconsistency describes
a problem but provides faulty possibi^lities for its resolution. As a theory it
incorporates descriptions of societal conditions as well as descriptions of the
individual but it does not have a developed model of person.
There are also biases clearly involved in the notion of status inconsistency.
Wliat of the economic classes of women who are unable to partake in any of the
privileged activities of society, i.e.
,
higher education. There simply may be
no role conflict for these women because their oppression is consistent. This
is an expression of cumulative inequality. For Durkheim himself states that
the poor or "lower classes" are not subject to anomiCo"^^ A "Black." "poor,"
"woman," may not suffer from anomie in that her roles are consistently
E mile Durkheim, Suicide, (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 250
discusses how the "lower" classes are bounded in such a way by those above
them that there is little room for the expansion of desires which lead to anomie.
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of a (leveh)ped person.
Anomie Will also often not exist in women beeause they do not experienee
-H^lear roles. Their roles are most often too narrowly and clearly defined
and, therefore, they do not experienee the freedom neeessary to attain the
conselousness and edueatlon before status inconsisteney can beeomo a problem.
And even when there is a resolution of role eonfliet, for the privileged
few who ean experience, it. I would still want to say that alienation remains a
problem. Why V Beeause the resolution of ano.nie <loes not reflect upon the
presence of a life of developed huu.an beings. Th. educated professional woman
may resolve-, the problem of status inconsistency and may still be alienated. One
might have aii ordered scl l-e one option and still be far from Gxperiencing species
Afterall, one might have clear life goals as stemming from one's biological
role as mother, and hence not be able to develop other aspirations. One then
may not have experienced the richness of community or creative activity with
others.
Social Needs and llistorv
At tlu^ sa m(> time one rejects Durkheim's view of woman one can begin
to construct ;ui alternative framework which allows one Lo umU.rstand wom(Mi as
social and historical beings. At the same time one constructs such a perspec-
tive for the analysis of women one is able to draw upon historical evidence
170
Which contradicts prevailing conceptions of women.
This involves one in much the same way Marx was involved in trying to
understand the phenomena of needs within a given society. Such an analysis
rejects the idea of a static woman's "nature'- (as reviewed earlier). Woma.
rather becomes a part of the activ_e process between individual a.d society.
The "myths" which are an intermixture of the social and historical
intexpretations of women's nature change as society changes. Society reflects
upon woman in terms of its own needs. For example, as the needs of society
have reduced the number of wanted births women's "natures" become defined
somewhat differently. As overpopulation has become a more serious problem
women's roles have had to be somewhat modified; she cannot be the breeder
ol largo families. Society is still molding the balance according to its needs.
The family remains intact along with the woman's role as mother. One is
mother to fewer, that is the only change. In other words, woman's partial
separation from having large families is rooted more closely to the historical
I'or discussions elaborating upon or using a social and historical perspec-
tive in relation to women, see: Judith Hole and Ellen Lovinc, Rebirth of Feminism(New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Frederick Engels, The Ongin ojthc F^miiW,'
Private Property
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(New York: Pathfinder Press,
1971); Dec Ann Pappas, "On Being Natural," in Sookic Stambler, Woman's
Liberation
: Blueprint for the Future, (New York: Ace Books, 1970). For
historical studies of women see: Eleanor Flexnor, Century of Struggle
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(New York:
Antheneum, 1959); William O'Neill, Everyone Was Brave
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(Chicago: Quadrangle,
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
phenomena of overpopulation than the concern with personhood.
To survive we must stop making babies at the current
rate and this can only be accomplished by breaking
the ancient stereotypes of man the warrior, woman
the breeder.
Obviously, then, even the recognition that female roles are social and
historical does not necessarily lead to a focus of woman as persons. It may
merely lead to a redefinition of a new role for women based upon changing
societal needs, without ever coming to grips with the concerns of species being.
One must, then add to the social and historical perspective an ideal of human
development for women by which one can assess particular historical develop-
ments.
Then, to understand meaningfuily the present relationships between women
and society one has to examine the need structure of society in terms of the
model of persons which expresses women's potentialities. The construct" 'A'
needs 'X' in order to bring about 'Y' " can reflect such an analysis of needs in
relation to purposes and goals. In terms of women, specifically, if "Y"
represents security the construct would read: Woman needs marriage in order
to bring about security
. However, once "Y" is changed to read as species being
or developed person
, "woman needs 'X' " would read as: woman needs creative
activity involving consciousness of goals and aims, exercise of choice, and/or
other persons in order to experience human community. Once the model of a
42
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person is brought to bear upon the question of wo»en one
.ust no longer stay
Within the confines of n^anifeste, societal needs, one
.oves to the potentialities
of species life.
The anomie paradigm does not inoorporate a model of development for women.
It instead privileges the interests of the status ^uo and. hence, perpetuates the
myth of woman's role by reinforcing woman's manifested needs (i.e.
,
security).
This view is not only internally deficient but is brought into further question by
woman's history itself.
Woman's own history challenges the anomie interpretation of women as
passive and in need of security. Many of the struggles for human dignity of women
challenged the order and security of their own lives. It was against the imposed
submissive life that the Feminists fovght. Ida Wyler, an English Feminist writes:
For two years of wild and sometimes dangerous adventure, I
worked and fought alongside vigorous, happy, well adjusted
women who laughed instead of tittering ... I slept on hard
floors
... we often were tired, hurt and frightened, but
we were content as we had never been content before. 43
In the United States in New York and Philadelphia, in 1909-1910, women were
active in organizing and supporting union strikes for more human working conditions.
The Shirtwaist Strike involved organization and commitment by working class
women who had the least security of any group in society. Women workers who
were actively involved in union activity were often beaten by police and harassed
on the job.
43
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The conditions of wo^en workers in the early ISOCs were crude and often
dangerous to hu.an health. They demonstrated and .ade their grievances Wn.
Working conditions, however, remained most demanding.
But the grievances remained-low, unequal wages the lon,rhours the indignities inflicted by foreman and em;ioyerand the unremitting, sporadic, unsuccessful attempts toorganize against them also continued. 44
^
Clearly it cannot be that these hard working women in the sweat shops of the 1900'
are best described as gentile and passive
.
Women also played a large role in the struggle against slavery especially
in relation to the underground railroad.
Harriet Tubman was then thirty years old. She became a
conductor" on the Under-round Railroad. During a period
of ten years she made nineteen journeys into slave territory
and brought back more than 300 men, women and children
"Moses, " they called her, a magic name among slaves
plannmg to take the dangerous journey northward.
In woman's history there has been the feminist movement, there have been
strikes organized by women as well as women's involvement in Abolitionists.
The disparate purposes of the different movements are not at issue here. The
issue is, that despite the need structure which society manipulates women to
accept, there are those who rebel against it. The fact is, is that there were and
are activities which challenge the societal statement that women need order and
security and calm and that challenge reaches to the foundation of the aaomie
paradigm.
s
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Women in the Alienation Perspective^ ^
If the preceding discussion is in any way persuasive then it appears that
to understand the problem of women in contemporary society one has to move
outside the anomie paradigm to a framework which encompasses questions
about huma. development. The alienation perspective provides such a founda-
tion through the conception of species being which provides both a critical stance
and a commitment to the ideal of human possibility.
The terms alienation paradigm are used here to express the model of
human development through species being that poses a model of human fruition.
This model involves further commitments to the importance of creative labor as
purposive activity, the integration of'thought and action, and the value of rich
social ties developed through social community.
The two ways in which the alienation perspective can apply to women are
through: 1) a set of priorities which are posed as important for the development
46
Although the alienation perspective does pose a model for human develop-
ment, Marx's treatment of women in terms of any specific attention is limited.
As Juliet Mitchell notes in Women's Estate
,
o£. cit, , "He retained the abstraction
of Fourier's conception of the position of women as an index of general social
advance. This in effect makes it merely a symbol—it accords the problem a
universal importance at the cost of depriving it of its specific substance." (p. 78.)
He also basically accepts the division of labor along sex lines in that he never
questions the very conception of "woman's work." The problem of women rather
becomes deflected in his analysis of the bourgeois family. This, however, does
not undermine the value of the alienation perspective which poses human alienation
against the counter example of species being which expresses human possibility
for men and women together. Species being becomes the contrast model to sexist
society; which reflects rigid prescriptions about human possibility along sex
lines.
of species beings (as posing a model of human development for women), and
2) woman's own involvement in the alienated life. The first dimension is of
major concern here and I will deal with it in terms of the outlines of the model
of person constructed earlier. The second dimension is important in that
contemporary treatment of alienated women reflects conceptual shifts away from
the classical, Marxian concerns with society to a psychologized, personalized use
it.
To a large extent, the individualized contemporary usage of alienation
drops the important model of human development (as directly related to species
life) in the same way contemporary interpretations of anomie (as status incon-
sistency) do. This problem resides in the fact that contemporary social science
literature dealing with alienation is primarily limited to an implicit need theory,
or need theory with only implicit models of human development expressed.
For example, writing specifically about women, alienation is seen as
referring "to the disintegration of our very selves and personalities which occur
when we are powerless. "^"^ The author sees the problem of the destruction of
female sexuality as a special case of alienation. "If alienation is the destruction
of self which ultimately leads to schizophrenia^ the widespread alienation of
females from their own sexuality is a kind of rampant mental illness at the base
of our experience which we must recognize for what it is. "'^^ Extreme alienation
47
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is then considered schizophrenia. The problem of women's alienation as is
dealt With here is that it is conceived of as an individual case of mental health,
instead of as a social and historical phenomena.
To limit the discussion of alienation to the dimensions of schizophrenia
appears most problematic. Alienation is not seen as a condition flowing from a
social system in which many are implicated (e.g.
, the typical housewife, the
typical worker) but it has been individuated into a personal experience of frustra-
tion or hostility. Secondly, it refers only to the persons' felt grievances, and
anxieties and excludes references to limitations placed on one's possibilities for
development, which she might not, and obviously does not in this case recognize.
To define alienation in terms of schizophrenia is to lose the entire set of relation-
ships between the individual, society, labor and species being. One, therefore,
loses the potential for development actualized through such relationships.
If one believes that alienation is rather best discussed as a series of
relationships established within society, of which the individual is an active part
then I think the statements below (using the construct developed in chapter two)
express the dimensions of alienation more adequately for women. They clearly
locate woman within her place of work as well as relate woman to the pressures
of her society through her relationship to needs.
For instance, the statements of women's alienation can read as follows:
Alienation exists when the relationships between woman and work,
established in the home or place of work
,
prevents the ability to
become a person .
Alienation exists when the relationship between woman and needs
,
established in society, prevents the ability to know or experience
species life
.
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I would at this point like to fi^rther discuss alienation as it exists when
women.s potentiality is curtailed because of the relationship which prevails
between her labor and herself in her place of work.
Labor, when it is creative, according to Marx, is done tor itself and
not jnorel, for the satisfaction of another need. It is to be productive in and of
itself for the individual involved.
In contrast to this view is the fact that most women are involved in work
which is non-creative; work is not conceived of as a self-creative process.
"Money is undoubtedly the largest incentive for married women to go out to
work. Three out of every four women interviewed gave this as the main reason
for having a paid job. j^^,^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
does not reflect changes in the work situation itself nor does it reflect related
changes about views of women in terms of work being a necessary part of a
fulfilling life. It rather seems to be more a product of social and historical
circumstance. When the man, as the main provider in most families, can no
longer provide adequately for his family, the woman in the house must find
some kind of supplementary (often temporary) work. Most of these women
find jobs in factories or as secretaries. This work is not geared to the
development of the individual; nor is it seen as necessary to be so organized.
49
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financial periods. As Greer notes in the Female Eunuch
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employment in Britain and the United States displays the same basic character,
that of an inert, unvalued, though essential force, considered as temporary
labor, docile, ignorant and unreliable. " (pp. 112-113.)
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tive won. The roUowin,
,s a quote fro. a secretary which supports the view
that many women do not have, but desire creative work. thinU that people
like and need productive worU. and when we're not allowed any, we m.U.e up
games to make what we have to do seem productive. "51
The above discussion is not to imply by my emphasis of concern with women
that men are able always to experience creative work. Alienation on assembly
lines extends <.oss sex lines. '^^ But the point 1 do wish to make is that most
often iLa concern is shown at all in terms of the necessity of a rewarding work
situation lor the development of individuals, this concern is extended to men and
not to women. This may best be expressed throu.^h the olten noted statenu.U, that
a man, without "work," is aimless.' A Job is seen as necessary lor the nnn.
where it most often is not for women. Aithoui^^li ihc concerns with creative labor
as expressed through the alienation perspective are seldomly applied to both men
and women in terms of everyday language as well as social science literature (as
demonstrated through Lenski) when they ar(, applied, they are applied to men.
51
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And Whether or not the eoneerns involved in alienation are theoretically
applied to women, wo^en do experience conditions of alienation. However,
until women are conceptualized as persons, in terms of the necessity of labor
and objectification. they will „ot be viewed as alienated in the work situation,
in the home as well as outside of it. If her work is not assessed partly in
terms of its connection to her development one cannot view either the lack of
creative labor in a woman's life or a poorly organized work situation as detri-
mental to her human growth. Such a view of woman stunts the growth of a
critical stance which is necessary if present conceptual molds as well as work
arrangements are to be changed.
Theoretical views of women reflect her incorrectly. Although she often is
engaged in serious work she is viewed as a non-worker. It is an insufficient
and incorrect analysis to assess women as non-workers. Women do work. The
assumptions which underly the theoretical treatment of women as non-workers
are factually incorrect. Over half the female population works outside the home
and almost all, but the very rich, work within their own homes. Everyday
language denies these obvious facts as it conceives of workers as men; although
women work, women are not viewed as workers
.
Hence, it is unacceptable to conceptualize women as though they do not have
a relationship to work situations. First, because women are workers in order
to examine and assess the relationship one must initially acknowledge the connec-
tion. Secondly, even if this were not the case, if work is an integral part of
becoming a purposive being, and if women are to be persons, then women should
53
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be understood in terms of their potential as creative purposive beings. Present
work relationships are alienating and should be assessed as sueh. But such
conclusions cannot be drawn until woman is seen as (a) potential person and
(b) actual worker.
If persons develop through creative labor as the concretization of their
ideas and purposes, then it must be incorporated in the conception of person
as it is extended to women. Only then can women be understood as alienated
in their work as well as estranged from their species being.
Starting from the premise that women do work, one finds that almost all
have engaged at one time or another in the labor termed housework. One sees
that most women's involvement in such work is contrary to the purposes of
human development because it is alienating labor, and only unalienated labor
promotes species life.
One of the problems with the work that women perform in the home is that
it is not conceived of as work. This parallels the treatment of women as non-
workers.
In sheer quantity, household labor, including child care,
constitutes a huge amount of socially necessary produc-
tion. Nevertheless, in a society based on commodity
production, it is not usually considered "real work" since
it is outside of trade and the market place.
In a society where money determines value, "women are a group who work
outside the money economy. Their work is not worth money, and it is therefore
54
Margaret Benston, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation,"
(Boston: New England Free Press, 1969), p. 15.
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valueless, it is therefore not even real work. "55 Women's housework has no
market value and therefore is judged as having only slight importance in terms of
valued work.
According to Marx, one affirms oneself through the active creation through
labor. However, woman's work within the home is not related to active creation,
she produces nothing.
Thus woman's work within the home gives her no autonomy;
it is not directly useful to society, it does not open out on
the future, it produces nothing. It takes on meaning and
dignity only as it is linked with extent beings who reach out
beyond themselves, transcend themselves, toward society
in production and action.
Housework can best be described as monotonous and boring;
. . she
makes nothing, simply perpetuates the present. "^^ Lenin wrote of housework:
You all \u\ow that even when women have full rights, they
still remain factually downtrodden because all housework
is left to them. In most cases housework is the most
unproductive, the most arduous work a woman can do. It
is exceptionally petty and docs not include anything that
would in any way promote the development of the woman.
Besides the repetition and routine that women face in housework, the work
that woman performs in her home (or in another's home) is often done in
isolation from others. "The development of the modern family meant the break-
59down of a large integrated society into small self-centered units,
"
Ibid
.
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p. 16.
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Historically the extended family was the family unit. Wo.en then were not so
isolated and alone in the work they performed. But today wo„an wor.s mainly
by herself and although part of her work ™ost regularly involves caring for
children, young children do not provide the kind of reciprocating relationship
Which promote complete friendships. Within the present organization of the
family, women can be simultaneously surrounded by her young children and still
feel isolated.
Oftentimes it is said that housework could not be oppressive because the
woman is "her own boss." However, the more fundamental point which must
be reckoned with is that one kind of labor that does not need a director, or boss,
is isolated labor.
Her work is private and because it is private and for no
other reason, it is unsupervised
... the freedom of
the housewife is her isolation.
Labor in order that it can lead to species consciousness must be social.
The isolation of women cuts her off from others and therefore from herself.
Alienation ensues, as these conditions combine with the fact that housework is
an objectless activity. Nothing is created. Things are only done to be redone
again.
Unalienated labor is labor performed in concert with others. Being that
woman's potentials cannot develop in isolation from social community, housework
as it presently is organized is detrimental to the growth of women as persons.
Op , cit
.
,
Mitchell, Woman's Estate
, p. 161.
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women workers are not li„.ited to the sphere of housework. Women work,
as well, outside the home as secretaries as well as factory workers. Such
work is alienating. Factory work is most often described as alienating labor.
Sometimes the alienation of women is greater than men's because women are
assigned the most menial and routinlzed Jobs. Woman is viewed either as not
capable of more, and/or not "needing" more.
Most ot the jobs in the plant were like mine, a scries of the
same ten or so motions all day. All the men I knew who
were factory workers admitted that the women had the worstjODS • • •
Women have the most debilitating jobs and are paid less because their jobs
demand less skill. Monotonous work is not seen as detrimental or bothersome
to women, in the eyes of men. Her social training seems to fit her for her
monotonous work in their eyes. Juliet Mitchell quotes a male worker's feelings
about women who work in his factory.
Now a woman, she's good, the job doesn't matter to her,
she's not interested, her hands work, she chats to her
neighbor but she doesn't look from side to side as a man
does. ^2
To the extent that women's labor is (1) "forced," that is performed for the
satisfaction of a particular need, (2) non-creative in that it is not object creat-
ing (instead of designing or building a house, she cleans it) and, therefore,
routinous and boring and (3) isolating, organized largely according to separate
61
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fan^ily units, women labor but are not involved in creative or productive work. If
women are viewed conceptually as persons their work should come to encompass
"purposive rational action. "^^
Thus, it is within the framework of alienation as rooted in the relations
between woman, and labor, society and species being that the problem of persons
becomes clear. The discussion relating to alienation and women does not relate
to "feeling" or "consciousness" or "vague urging." Rather alienation exists as a
condition which can be recognized in terms of the absence of species lite. There
can be a condition of alienation because there is an objective condition of non-
alienation.
Women as Persons in Durkheim and Marx
So far I have dealt with the question of alienation and women as it connects
to the issue of labor. At this point I want to turn to the more general issue of the
fundamental importance of the model of persons one adopts.
In order for women to be involved in a life of persons they have to experience
(a) labor as creative productive activity, (b) critical thinking which presupposes
a rich set of ties to others and an awareness of one's interests, goals, and
purposes, and (c) social living or a consciousness of others involving group
experiences.
All of these dimensions are dealt with (to differing degrees) within the
theory of alienation, whereas the anomie paradigm excludes some and adjusts
63
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others to more narrowly defined limits, (a) Durkheim excludes women from
the View that labor is an important, creative, process because he sees women
as limited by '^nature.'' He does not view her in the active process of refining
and redefining nature through labor. For that matter, Durkheim does not
discuss labor as an important objectifying process for men either. The
division of labor is seen as important primarily in terms of creating solidary
relations through specialization and dependence for the maintenance of organic
solidarity. And labor is not assessed as creative in and of itself. Hence, the
division of labor which prevails is valued as moral for the solidary relations it
nurtures, while for Marx labor is valued for itself as a self-defining activity.
(b) The importance of critical thinking as it involves consciousness neces-
sitating choice in terms of goals and purposes is treated in Marx only in a limited
way. Although his own work assumed critical thought as a starting point he
never deals with its development on an individual level. Nevertheless the idea
of critical thinldng (as critical consciousness) is necessary to his idea of
revolutionary consciousness, and his concern with social change. Durkheim'
s
thought operates more out of a distrust of individual's capacities to project
their own goals and purposes and desires. He is preoccupied with circumscrib-
ing the possibilities of limitless and endless desires as opposed to creating the
conditions for critical thought so that individual's real interests, purposes and
goals can be defined, and individual choice be realized.
Therefore, in terms of this aspect of the model of a person Durldieim
is quite inadequate and Marx limits his treatment in that he never deals squarely
with the issue of individual's goals or purposes as they might relate to human choice.
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Despite the neglect of this dimension in Marx and Durkheim, the criterion
of choice is of key importance for a life of persons for women. The process of
choice is most often involved in the assessment of an activity as worth-while
or meaningful or not. When choice is eliminated for women, and it
automatically is when one is defined by one's biology, what one does loses
import in terms of the standard of creative activity. The point is that the kind
of needs women are said to have do not primarily involve voluntary, planned,
goal-directed behavior. Women do not choose, in any meaningful sense of the
term, their life purposes and goals, i.e.
, childbirth and feeding and child care.
Purposes and goals are rather assigned to women. The consciousness and the
involvement with choosing one's purposes, which is a necessary element in the
lives of persons, is lacking.
(c) The importance of social experience and social consciousness is deeply
interwoven with (a) creative labor and (b) creative thinking. However, women
find themselves severed from human relationships as they are isolated in their
homes and as the perimeters of their life activity are defined within their
individual families. To be a part of a community, and to feel a part of one, means
that women have to become involved with other people in common projects. The
contemporary family structure is most often not conducive to this sense of
community, especially for the woman. Her relationships to others within the
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family are not those of mutuality and equality of burdens and rights. Usually
the woman is economically dependent on her husband and her children are
dependent on her for her "motherly" functions. These relationships of
dependence, although the fiber of the moral community for DurlAeim, hinders
the full development of women in terms of the priorities of a life of personhood.
Marx's view of species life requires a consciousness and an activity
which necessitates social involvement and social responsibility. What is
unique about persons is that they can in some ideal sense operate with a con-
sciousness of concepts like social justice and social responsibility. Such a life
style does express a tension in Marx's thought. It is a tension, however, which
I think can be dealt with most effectively in terms of the actual practice of one's
life. And that is: How does one integrate a life of freedom with commitments
to others? How does one live freely with responsibility?
Species relations exist to the extent that the persons involved are needed by
one another for each other 's fruition. They need one another as whole persons,
and not as merely sexual partners. This needing of others is in Marx's tradition
of whole beings sharing together. The conception of woman as species being
(social) is thereby differentiated from Durkheim's conception of morality
(through dependence), which results from partial selves. Partial selves do not
lead to a consciousness about their relationship to themselves, to others, or the
society. What is at issue here is the kind of human relationship wliich allows
one to be conscious of her relationship to others as well as to her aims and
purposes.
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The anomie and alienation perspectives present varied conceptions of the
individual and therefore different views of human society. One moves from
Durkheim-s discussions of whatis to Marx's ideas about whaM^^oss^
In present society when there is dissatisfaction with woman's position voiced
through the Women's Liberation Movement it seems more than reasonable to
view the alienation paradigm as more likely to handle the questions connected
to conditions and desires for social change.
The possibilities of creating community, the abilities to handle conflict
and cooperation, the seeking of new situations, all arise out of the alienation
paradigm. The anomie view poses the idea of passivity, the concern with stable
expectations and the internalization of roles and customs. When one chooses
between the applicability of these perspectives in handling the important issues of
the day, these are some of the concerns to be reckoned with. I clearly believe
that the alienation thesis helps us to understand the issues with a greater scope,
poses a higher model of development, one which I would choose for myself and
my friends, and makes possible the development of a person who is better
equipped to deal with the changeability and conflict of modern society.
Conclusions; Theoretical Perspectives, of Women
My primary task has been to show that Durkheim's view of persons, even
when women are not treated as intrinsically inferior, is insufficient as a model
of development for women in contemporary society and that one must move to the
concerns expressed in species being in Marx for an appropriate model. I have
argued throughout that the alienation paradigm provides the more valid ideal
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of human development and the more insightfcl conception of how to foster tto
development.
However, we have also seen that the anomie perspective persists in its
deficient treatment of women as it continues to structure the theoretical
foundations of everyday language, as well as the social science literature. The
alienation perspective is seldom applied in contemporary social science
literature and when it is, it is used in formulations about men. Women are most
often not seen as reflecting alienation (as viewed through the discussion of women
workers) because they are not viewed in terms of their developmental capacities.
Even within the anomie perspective itself there are competing interpreta-
tions of what it means to be a person, for men and women. Both men and women
may be conceived in terms of the necessity of security but the content of what it
means to be secure for men and women is notably different. Security for a woman
will be defined as a good marriage or a husband with a stable job. For the man
it is defined as a good job (although this usually means good pay instead of crea-
tive work). Such conceptions are inadequate for both men and women, however,
security as it is defined for the woman turns her into a dependent being.
The differentiation in conceptual molds, witnessed through everyday
language, between men and women sometimes cannot be expressed through the
anomie/alienation distinction and is, therefore, best expressed through the
opposition of the Durkheimian and Hobbesian framework. This language
expresses man as aggressive, self-interested and competitive, as opposed
65
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he attributes it to the atomistic market economy rather than to an Hobbesian
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to the everyday language used to describe women as docile, passive a.d subjec-
tive. Most often the differentiation of the qualities of .an and woman within
this dimension by-passes the concerns of the alienation model. Neither man
nor woman is discussed in terms of their creativeness or species powers;
woman is passive, and man is aggressive. Some women Liberationists them-
selves then adopt the Hobbesian framework as their replacement for deficient
theoretical conceptions already applied to women. Again the concerns raised by
the concept species being are excluded.
In conclusion, I have treated the issue of women as a problem of philosophy
as well as society, a problem of theory, as well as practice. The conceptual
framework applied to women is important because it defines and/or limits
one's life style; theoretical frameworks define possibilities.
Plato's view of the tripartite nature of man resulted in a society with a
parallel organization. Rousseau's conception of man made possible the general
will. Marx's conception of the nature of "Mensch" involved the ideal of species
being. And the conception of woman also structures the possibilities for her
life. That is why it has been the position of this paper that women should be
viewed within a framework which allows for the development of their most
human capacities. This means that women cannot be sufficiently comprehended
through the anomie paradigm, which functions within the limitations of need analysis,
and conceives of woman as a sexual-biological being. Rather, women can more
conception of human nature. See, C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory
of Possessive Individualism
, Hobbes to Locke. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1962).
191
fruitMly be understood, theoretically, as persons within the alienation paradigm.
She then is viewed in terins of her potential developn^ent. The ideal of a person
beconies a theoretical reality and a contrast n.odel is therefore available to
pinpoint areas of needed social change.
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